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Organizational science/fiction : the postmodern in the management disciplines.

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ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE/FICTION:
THE POSTMODERN IN THE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINES

A Dissertation Presented

by

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This work is dedicated to Linda, Tony, Al and Stan...
to their patience and understanding.

And to Walter, who often does not understand.

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Acknowledgements... as if they were an extra-textual situation. In the text are the voices and silences of those who contributed to its inscription. I am not the author. The text is only a pre-text to constitute a subject... a Ph. D.

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE/FICTION:
THE POSTMODERN IN THE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINES

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Traditionally, the organizational disciplines have been understood as the scientific study of organizational practices. This dissertation proposes, instead, that the discipline is constituted through specific textual and discoursive representations and by the limits imposed on such representations. It explores the constitution of the management disciplines as particular formations of the modern historical period, and as determined writings within the institutional domain of the modern American university.

Informed by recent works in the human sciences, heralding a transition from modernity to postmodernity, it is argued here that:

1. The organizational disciplines are articulated in the development of the modern American university and its conditions of possibility at specific points in time.

2. These disciplines are discoursive formations defined by the university-society relationship.

3. The representations which purports to "advance knowledge" in the organizational disciplines are discourses particular to their time and place, constantly reinterpreted to re-mark the modern concern for

"scientific disciplinary progress."

Analyses of three foundational organizational texts illustrate the plausibility of these arguments: Barnard's (1938) The Functions of the Executive; McGregor's (1960) The Human Side of Enterprise; and Mintzberg's (1973) The Nature of Managerial Work. The texts are read against specific contexts and intertexts, following poststructuralist/deconstructivist strategies. These readings sustain the concluding proposition: The possibility for the "organizational sciences" to perform as postmodern cultural critique.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AN-OTHER FICTION

Part I

The organizational sciences are currently characterized by major debates. There are serious discussions centered on the nature of the organizational phenomena (the subjective/objective debate), on the claims to knowledge in theorizing and researching (the question of degree of participation of the knower in the known), and on the appropriate techniques for capturing this knowledge (the quantitative/qualitative methodology debate).

These ontological/epistemological/methodological debates have been, in most cases, attempts to resolve the issue of **truth/knowledge** in the organizational disciplines. They point to an on-going contest between the dominant paradigm of research and theory and other less dominant approaches that intend to confront the dominant views. Within the debates there seems to be an intention to substitute one approach for the uncovering of **true knowledge** with another.

Other disciplines in the human sciences have been experiencing similar unrest, e.g. anthropology, architecture, art, legal studies, literature, music and dance, philosophy, social theory, theology (Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Taylor, 1987). But some theorists have attempted to stand back from the debates to take a meta perspective, and to understand the confrontations within their disciplines differently.

From one perspective, the debates appear to be grounded in confronting "false" with "true" because at some point in history "truth or falsity" became a style of thinking and saying equated with knowledge. With this kind of understanding, the grounds of debate shift from a question of true or false to a question of representation. The questions that become important are not What is the truth? What is knowledge? but How is "truth" made?, and How is "knowledge" fashioned?.

Scholars questioning "truth and knowledge" in this fashion have conceived of the need to do "discipline" differently. They question their discipline's construction from socio/historical and discoursive perspectives. These perspectives foreground the institutional arrangements and specialized discourses of "the disciplines" as inclusion/exclusion mechanisms which determine what counts as knowledge. They also foreground the power/knowledge aspects of the disciplines, and the non-neutral status of knowledge and of the knowledge-producing institutions. In summary, these perspectives propose that the quest for truth and knowledge in the disciplines is itself a representation of knowledge bounded to the modern cultural period.

This manner of questioning the disciplines pays attention to the multiple social situations, particular discourses, and discontinuous occurrences which, as a very entangled web, provided conditions of possibility for the emergence and development of academic disciplines. They are commentaries which pay attention to the disciplinary productions ---how they are fashioned and how they are sustained as claims to knowledge--- by overlapping them with other productions which have been excluded from their limits. In any case, these commentaries

do not claim to be more truthful or better knowledge than that upon which they are commenting. They are interested productions which, on calling attention to what they are doing, point at the traditional "disciplinary knowledge" and "disciplinary boundaries" as equally interested productions. They are ways to question the limits of knowledge by pushing them into the realms of their "outside," of their "margins."

The activities described above are mostly conducted through the adoption of poststructuralist theory, which addresses these issues of knowledge and representation in a form of criticism called deconstruction. This form of criticism questions the claims to truth of any human production by addressing its taken for granted textual constructions. It points to the instability of human signification and to the difficulties of grounding truth/knowledge on such activities. Poststructuralist theory has become a common ground for theorists and researchers from diverse fields to engage in reflexive activities over their disciplinary constructions, and to re-define the notions of theorizing/researching in their fields. Also, these activities are now considered a signal of a changing cultural condition: The transition in Western society from the Modern to the Postmodern period.

From this discussion, I propose this dissertation project as an attempt to create awareness in the organizational sciences of the possibilities offered by taking a poststructuralist stance over ours current debates. It is also an attempt to question the limits to "truth and knowledge" imposed by traditional disciplinary understanding in this "modern field of knowledge." And beyond, it is an attempt to join the

other "human sciences" in the present production of the Postmodern condition in Western society.

Organizational Sciences: A Moment of Disjuncture

In recent years the disciplinary "outputs" of what we call organizational_sciences_literature have increasingly displayed signals of confusion over the generated/generation of knowledge in the field. In some cases there seems to be despair over the inability of the discipline to fulfill and transcend, from research to practice, its promises of general theories of organization, with the power for predicting and explaining macro and micro organizational phenomena (i.e from adequate "fit" between organizational structure and environment to the "fit" of individual attributes to specific organizational activities and expectations).

For example, Wallace (1983) is explicit in saying that confusion in level of analysis and parochialism in conceptual definitions are impediments to a general theory of personnel and industrial relations; Brousseau (1983) proposes a model of informed choice to develop a more comprehensive and precise model of job-person dynamics; Jick and Mitz (1985) emphasize the importance of overcoming inconsistencies in previous research findings pertaining to sex differences in work stress in order to build a valid theory of their relationship; Ronen and Shenkar (1985) propose some new methodological developments in an attempt to uncover underlying cultural and social traits in different countries that, they think, produce differences in employee work goals;

and Van Fleet and Yukl (1986) still hope for a GUT (Grand Unified Theory) of leadership to emerge in the next century. Many have been working toward the goals of "general theories" for a long time, and few are as optimistic as Locke (1986) who asserts that there has been a progressive development in the understanding of the phenomenon of job attitudes since the times of Scientific Management, especially in recent decades.

The difficulties in the type of work mentioned above are commonly explained as due to insufficient methodological rigor ---inadequate sample size; low power in statistical tests; low reliability in instrumentation; confounding effects due to deviances in research subjects--- (e.g. Marino and Lange, 1983; Mayes and Ganster, 1983; McElroy and Downey, 1983; Phillips and Lord, 1986) and/or theoretical limitations ---inadequate or incomplete models--- (e.g. Jakofsky and Peters, 1983; Lord and Smith, 1983; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1986; Ralston, 1985; Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 1984; Salancik 1984; Szilagyi and Schweiger, 1984).

The difficulties in developing definite knowledge in the field have not prevented researchers and theoreticians from proposing the practical applications of their findings (as may be easily ascertained by perusing the "applied/practical implications" paragraphs in the majority of these writings). More recently, however, very serious considerations have been given to the lack of utilization of traditional academic research in the field of organizational practice (e.g. Beyer, 1982; 1983). Beyer (1982) mentions that as organizational studies became a distinct field by the mid-1950 researchers were oriented toward

the production of basic research, as expected. From her perspective research utilization is a new issue for the organizational researchers' agenda. Thus, Beyer and Trice (1982) offer various recommendations so that researchers can ensure their research will be utilized in organizational practice. But they do not admit that the traditional research approach needs reconsideration.

However, others do. For example, Thomas and Tymon (1982) point at some difficulties in traditional organizational research (e.g. research variables lacked operational validity because they were often not subject to managerial control) that limit their relevance for organizational practice. As an answer to these difficulties, Litterer and Jelinek (1983) propose organization design. They define this approach as the practical application of general knowledge to a specific client's organization problem, which shares the properties of action (context specific) research and knowledge (traditional generalizable) research. But McGuire (1986) conceptualizes the problem as residing somewhere else. She emphasizes the different realities academic and practitioners may be approaching when it appears that they are approaching the same situation (i.e. the organizational context). In her view it is important to learn about differences in cognitive processes between researchers and managers before any of the more immediate recommendations to foster utilization could be implemented.

In summary, the traditional understandings about discovery and application of knowledge in the organization sciences posit the possibility of eliciting measurable, comparable, and generalizable phenomena relevant for managerial practice. These understandings keep

organizational researchers and theorists from abandoning the path of normal science (Kuhn, 1970) in spite of lack of consistent and cumulative results. The latter assertion is perhaps difficult to grasp in view of the numerous discussions about the either preparadigmatic or multiparadigmatic state of the field [e.g. see Astley (1985) for a recent summary of this issue]. What is not often observed is that these discussions and understandings are conducted within a philosophical framework to which the organizational sciences have already made a firm commitment: empiricism and positivism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 1980).

A more recent stream of organizational theory and research, frequently associated with phenomenological and/or critical philosophical positions, and often embedded in approaches known as "organizational culture/symbolism," is contesting the aforementioned (and by now traditional) difficulties in the field [1]. This literature points to the nature of organizational phenomena as constituted in the realm of organizational participants' interactions and meaning-making activities. The positions taken here usually pay greater attention to the particular contexts in which these activities occur, and would rarely propose generalizability for their findings [e.g. Martin, Feldman, Hatch, and Sitkin (1983) is one of few exceptions in this regard]. What is often implicit in this type of research is the stability of the human processes in which the findings are based. That is, there is an apparent consensus among these researchers about the existence of stable "hidden structures" where the meanings and understandings are formed and maintained. In general, they represent,

within the organizational literature, the structuralist philosophical orientation discussed in the second part of this chapter.

For example, within the more phenomenological/interpretive perspective Smircich and Morgan (1982) offer a view of leadership based on the management of organizational symbols by those in positions of authority. They indicate the importance for the leader to deal with the equivocality of interactive situations by attending to the interpretive schemes of those involved. Once this is attained, the meanings and values conducive to desirable organized action can be embodied through appropriate symbolic discourse; Barley (1983) offers a semiotic approach to elucidate rules by which members of a work culture consistently and coherently generate meaning; Frost and Morgan (1983) suggest that focusing upon sensemaking leads to a search for key themes that structure a situation; Gregory (1983) explores the possibility of approaching the organizational members native views through an ethnoscience approach; Schall (1983) proposes understanding the culture of particular organizational groups through elicitation of their communication-rules; Smith and Simmons (1983) argue that by paying attention to the symbols, tales, legends, and myths that organizational members use to describe their experience it is possible for researchers to tune into organizational groups' operative dynamics that otherwise remain inaccesible.

There are also some attempts to capture the "stable structures of meaning" in more overt and public organizational manifestations. For example, Trice and Beyer (1984) caution that studying organizational cultures requires the search for elusive meanings. These can be better

found in the latent expressive implications of particular organizational rites and ceremonies; and Pondy and Huff (1985) propose the possibility of symbolic exploitation of "routineness" to reduce the exceptional conditions surrounding organizational change.

For the interpretive/organizational culture researchers the main limitations in attaining knowledge are the problematics encountered in eliciting the meanings and meaning-making structures from the researched organizational members. Beyond the more obvious preoccupations with method, these commentaries often focus on the difficulties experienced by the researchers in ascertaining the validity of their findings from the organizational participants, and sometimes they focus on the disturbing activities in the organizational setting produced by the research enterprise itself (e.g. Louis, 1985; Mirvis, 1985; Adams and Ingersoll, 1985).

These latter considerations have also provoked other more critical perspectives about the relationship between the producers of knowledge (researchers) and the producers of organizational phenomena (researched). The question: "What kind of knowledge is possible?" which has informed the interpretive research agenda, has been overturned in other recent works to question: "Knowledge for what, is possible?" For example, Jones (1985), Deetz (1985a), and Butcher (1985) emphasize the importance of "organizational culture research" in instilling ethical values in organizations. And others (e.g. Jermier, 1985; Rosen, 1985; Deetz, 1985b; Stablein and Nord, 1985; Steffy and Grimes, 1986) follow critical theory perspectives (represented here by neo-Marxist, Frankfurt School, and Habermas' positions) and concede the researchers an

important position in the emancipation of organizational participants from the ideologies in which they may be entangled. These are positions which join the participatory (e.g. Freire, 1971; Smith, 1982) and action research views (e.g. Morgan, 1983a; Morgan and Ramírez, 1984) to redefine a more active and responsible researchers' role in the consequences of knowledge generation and consumption.

One may say, in general, that interpretive and critical organizational research differ from their more traditional counterpart not only in their position about the nature of the organizational phenomena --- usually proposed as context-specific, and residing in the realm of human processes for the construction of meaning --- but also in their view of the possible relationship between organizational research and organizational practice. The less traditional research is more likely to consider important the multiple views of organizational constituencies, not just the managerial view. It is more committed to promoting an ethical view of organizations, and in its critical stance is even likely to adopt an anti-managerial view.

In any event, be it content or process oriented, generalizable or context-specific, grasped by quantitative or qualitative methodology, etc., the traditional and the less traditional research in the organizational sciences have rested on the assumption that what they envision as true knowledge is possible. That is, they rest on the assumption that there are forms of organizational phenomena, external to the research process, that can be theorized and then captured by empirical research activity. This knowledge is to be maintained (e.g. in books, journal articles, conference papers) and utilized in some

other forms (e.g. for extending knowledge in further research; for teaching students; for helping organizational practitioners ---first and foremost, perhaps, for helping the researchers in their tenure processes).

Few are as perceptive as Gray, Bougon, and Donnellon (1985) in recognizing that meaning-making in organizations is an unstable and precarious condition. For them the organizational meanings are constantly destroyed and constructed in some other ways. Unfortunately, on taking a critical theory, "organizational-members-empowerment" position, they fail to recognize that their proposition "lifts the mat" from a stable ground for empirical knowledge about organizations. One may question the possibility of following their recommendations to elicit those structures which account for the constructions/destruction of meanings; after all, aren't those "structures" also precarious meanings? And beyond, why would the researchers be excluded from suffering this condition?

Perhaps, Smircich (1985) understood this situation very well when she said:

> "... Drawing conclusions about experience is always arbitrary, depending upon what one chooses to bracket and pay attention to. In the same way, although these symbols are fixed upon these pages in an apparent stable way, the reader's interpretation of them and my interpretation of them are in no way fixed and stable... When I read these pages a year from now, they will no doubt mean different things to me...There are no authoritative conclusions, just the confrontations of our multiple interpretations" (:72).

These latter comments reflect the position which I adopt in this project. It is a position which denies the possibility of true knowledge in the organizational sciences as commonly envisioned within

the field. It denies that organizational research can be predicated as "knowledge about organizations" because the knowledge it produces is as unstable in its meaning as the meaning of the organizational phenomena itself. Mine is a position which proposes that the disciplinary difficulties stem precisely **from the understandings** about what the organizational sciences **are** and what they are supposed **to do**.

In this dissertation I discuss how the field's predicaments are nested in the ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical position it occupies within its own cultural space. The paradoxes and ambiguities appear, for example, in the gap between management theory and research and management practice, in the uneasy relationship between the concept of "scholasticism" and the concept of "application" in the field, and in the questionable status of the organizational sciences within the intellectual and scientific community in the university. On observing the organizational sciences' difficulties with theory and research one must not fail to consider the lack of influence and acceptance that the scholarly management work has had in the larger social world of which it is a part. Unfortunately the latter has been explained more often than not as a result of the former --- the lack of definitive theory and research, and the lack of conclusive results, prevent the advancement of good applications. It is my position that the current difficulties of the organizational sciences will not be resolved through the circularity of this kind of thinking.

Rather than staying within the discipline and asking: What are the difficulties with theory and research in organizations which prevent the organizational sciences from advancing more conclusive results and

more useful applications?, in this project I move to a different kind of discussion that pertains to the organizational sciences as they belong to the larger social milieux of the modern knowledge-producing institutions and the modern scholarly disciplines. This discussion stands back from the immediate understandings in the field and asks: How did the organizational sciences become "sciences"? How is it that in a culture centered around business organizations and economic issues, these organizational sciences are separated from organizational practice?

The discussion is embedded in the assumption that the wider cultural space to which the organizational sciences belong is undergoing a marked change from that on which they were founded, and that it is this change that permits me to contextualize the arguments on social and historical grounds. I will further propose that in their present form the field's understandings and discourses will not withstand the change. Thus, it is time now to ask: What is this dissertation about?

Problematizing "The Discipline"

Usually there is the idea that to write a dissertation in the organizational sciences one should start by identifying a problem within the discipline and propose a resolution for that problem in a way that could be assesed as "an original contribution to knowledge within the discipline." My dissertation is not about investigating a problem, as defined by the discipline, in order to advance knowledge within it. One may say that it is, instead, a work set out to problematize:

"investigating problems, as defined by the discipline, in order to advance knowledge within it."

This position immediately questions the notions "investigation of problems," "disciplinary definitions," "advancing knowledge," and "within," and proposes that they should be taken as discoursive formations determined by/determining the modern historical period in Western society. On taking this position, one is observing the notion of discipline as a cultural/historical artifact **given in language**, instead of accepting a conception of discipline as "the site where knowledge about a subject is accumulated."

In order to take a position which problematizes "the discipline" in this manner one must, however, proclaim that one is standing outside the period in which modern disciplines were defined (i. e. one cannot "observe the modern" if one is part of it). To that effect the dissertation promotes its own postmodern stance and declares the postmodernity of its effort by constantly calling attention to what it is doing. It works in a space that contrasts discipline as "knowledge about something" (the "normal" modern notion) with "discipline" as "knowledge as." The latter notion focuses on the concept "discipline" as a human pro-duction which pro-claims that it is knowledge.

More specifically, the manner in which "the problematic status of the discipline" is established by the dissertation is not by questioning whether the knowledge claimed by the discipline is truthful and close to a particular reality, within/beyond the accepted paradigms. Rather, it questions how the ideas that disciplinary knowledge "has to be about truth and being close to reality" was put in place. In this

sense the dissertation takes a postparadigmatic stance emphasizing that any disciplinary construction of knowledge is a form of writing, implicated all along in the network of social, discoursive, and institutional conditions of its time and place.

As mentioned before, the activity through which the dissertation unravels the disciplinary production is known as deconstruction. This activity is concerned with the manner by which particular philosophies throughout Western history have defined what is possible "to talk about," and what can be considered legitimate knowledge. Poststructuralist activities such as deconstruction also question how the contributions made by these philosophies to modern Western thought have accumulated around us in discoursive and institutional formations to the point where we stand today. It notices how these philosophies have left traces of ideas which had particular relevance for specific moments in history. However, these traces have lived on, to our present, in taken for granted discourses and institutions as they became embedded in the modern rhetoric of "the progress of knowledge."

The deconstructive activites to be performed here, inspired by works of Foucault (e.g. 1972; 1973; 1979; 1983b) and Derrida (e.g.1976; 1978; 1986), focus on the organizational sciences' "disciplinary discourses of knowledge" and their construction through institutional arrangements and textual formations. These deconstructive activities are themselves a form of writing which pay attention to "the unsaid" of texts and institutions. They work as a scanner on the surface of "the evident" to open spaces for "the-not-so-evident." At the same time, "the-not-so-evident" is presented only as another writing which could open up indeterminate spaces for many more writings. There is no claim

for "the-not-so-evident" as if it were "true knowledge" which was made opaque/covered by "the evident" (which is the type of claims usually made by critical theories). On the contrary, "the-not-so-evident" becomes a strategy to point at the fictions which produce both "the evident" and itself. It works by producing disquieting effects over the claims to knowledge of the modern disciplines in general, represented in this case by the organizational sciences.

This deconstructive work **cannot** follow the argumentative logic typical of <u>modern</u> analytical writings and <u>modern</u> critique because the modern analytic and argumentative logic is itself a form of writing ---attempting to get at "truthful knowledge"--- which is non-reflexive about its own constructions. Rather, because deconstruction is situated at the edge of the modern as it moves toward the postmodern, it often works as an il-logic which points to the fabrication of "logical arguments." These conditions create a particular dilemma for both the writer and the readers of this text. That is, any expectation of linear argumentation and inductive/deductive models of knowledge, within which the traditional organizational disciplines perform, must be suspended at this point.

On the other hand, I recognize the importance of providing some form of guidance to the reader of this work. By disclaiming that it is "knowledge about something" I am denying it the form of "solid ground" common in the organizational sciences discourses, and moving it into very unknown terrain. It does not bother me (the exile, the foreigner) to engage in such activity, but others may not feel that ready to work their way through it.

The very strange disclaimer that I have just made, as much as

what I am doing now, ---and what I will be doing over and over again throughout this work--- is to shift the grounds of knowledge from representation of some kind of reality, external to that representation, to the discoursive formation (e.g. this dissertation) that works as a representation. This shift has been increasingly announced in the discourses of philosophy since the last century. It is this "linguistic turn" which more recently has been making incursions into other disciplines.

In the following paragraphs I hope to provide some guidance for the reader based on a short genealogy of changes in philosophical discourses. I can say that this is a logical way to approach the task since philosophy claims to be the foundational discipline for other types of knowledge (e.g. Rorty, 1979; Culler, 1982) ---and since many of the recent difficulties of the organizational sciences have been attributed to their being unaware of commitment to a particular philosophical position (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Morgan, 1980; Morgan, 1983a).

I should immediately emphasize, however, that announcing it "as logical" is just an arbitrary and interested choice to make this dissertation text possible. Philosophy is only a discourse, a form of writing, that claims to be about knowledge, (e.g. Rorty, 1979; Derrida,1982) and that is subjected to its own cultural and historical conditions. But it is also an excellent pre-text to present the poststructuralist issues as the more recent positions in the discoursive "lineage" of "true knowledge."

Part II

Modern Foundations of Knowledge: From Decartes to Kant to Late Wittgenstein

In this section I will sketch some philosophical ideas which have been defined as "important in determining modern Western thought" by multiple commentators. I will take an historical approach, starting in the sixteenth century. As can be gathered from Figure 1-1, the "historical line" is not a direct one. Along the times ideas have come and go, and moved around, in the stream of thought of different philosophical positions. Some influences are more direct than others. Often, discontinuous notions enter these "patterns of thought" in ways that disfigure their alleged influencers beyond recognition. Perhaps, as Nietzsche would have said, the "philosophical field" could be understood better not as foundational discipline for knowledge but as the philosophers' private grounds in their battle over the possession of Truth.

I am drawing my commentaries from Jones (1969; 1975), Feenberg (1981), Hartnack (1981), Hartshorne (1983), and Osborne (1985). My readings here, including the choice of sources, have two aims: First, they serve to chart, very briefly, the territory where the poststructuralist ideas inspiring this dissertation eventually flourished. They point at the increased preoccupation with language in the philosophical enterprise of the twentieth century. Second, they serve to guide the readers in a territory usually kept outside the boundaries of the organizational disciplines. The discussions provided



Figure 1.1 Philosophical currents influential in Postmodernity.

are basic informational material, and not narrowly specialized philosophical digressions. They are very broad commentaries that do no justice to any individual philosopher. They just try to convey a sense of what appeared to be the main philosophical issues in those periods. Readers knowledgeable in these matters are invited to continue on to the following sections. I hope to be of service to the rest of us.

From Descartes to Hume

The period I am charting here covers around two hundreds years, roughly from the end of the Renaissence to the Enlightenment era. These years are known as The Age of Reason (e.g. Durant and Durant, 1967). Philosophy separated from religion during the Renaissence, taking more secular overtones. These were the years of emergence of the modern national states, and the definition of civil society. Religious ideas multiplied, including the Protestant Reformation. And these were also the years of Copernicus and Galileo, and the amazement provoked by scientific advances. One may say that two things stand out for philosophy during this period: it has to be redefined as a discipline on its own right separated from religion; and it has to be defined in its relationship with the scientific enterprise.

Descartes is the representative philosopher of this era, often mentioned as originator of modern thought. But perhaps the influence of these years in modern and current thought is better understood by including Descartes' contemporary, Hobbes, as an oppositional voice.

To the epistemological question on which most modern philosophy

rests: How do we know? Descartes gave an answer centered on the individual, by stating that there is nothing easier to know than one's own mind. The other problem was the ontological question: What do we know? Or, what can be known through Descartes proposition? The answer is that basically we can know everything: first the self ---that famous phrase "I think, therefore I am"--- and then everything else through God, who reigns over the knowing self. In this view the gap between mind and matter, subject and object, is kept open in reality (the dualist position) but closed in knowledge through the help of God, who cannot lie to us. Descartes, the geometer, includes knowledge through science ---knowing the ordered, calculable universe--- among those things that we can know out of the goodness of God.

The solution redefined philosophy in relationship to both religion and science. The task of philosophy was not to prove the existence of God anymore. It was clear that God existed. Its relationship to philosophy was as ultimate presence to validate knowledge; and science was just one of the objects of knowledge for man's mind.

Hobbes had much to say about this matter, including that Descartes should have kept to geometry and stayed outside of philosophy, for which he did not have a mind. Following from the ideas of Bacon, Hobbes was a materialist who relegated mind to appearance, and reality to the empirical world of sense perception. For him all that existed must be explained in mechanistic terms through laws of the evolution of substance. But aside from ontological and epistemological issues, he contributed a theory of the origin of civil society. In his view man

surrenders his individual freedom to the state out of egotistical reasons. In exchange for security he enters into a pact or contract, and into moral obligation to comply with such pact. His theory justifies the existence of the civil state and balances the dichotomy between individual freedom and allegiance to power and authority, maintaining man in the center of it. Thus, his contribution provided a modern orientation to political discourses in philosophy.

Following after Descartes and Hobbes other representative figures of this era are Spinoza, who proposed monism (everything is God) against Cartesian dualism; Leibniz, a logician whose monism is proposed as a relational structure, as an identity-in-difference; and Locke, who denied any a priori content of the mind (as proposed by Decartes) and predicated all knowledge out of empirical experience. Spinoza and Leibniz would agree with the Cartesian conception of idea (following from the Platonic tradition) which is subjective and dependent on the human mind. For Locke, ideas are sensible objects and the task of mind is to work over the received ideas. It follows that the relationship between philosophy and science requires that science formulates the problems that should be undertaken by philosophy.

Like Hobbes, Locke had an interest in political philosophy. Like Hobbes he stipulated a justification for civil society. He proposed the existence of individual identity based on self-consciousness, and a subordinate identity to the state to protect individual rights to property. Thus, Locke's natural state is less violent than Hobbes'. The subordination to civil society is required to guarantee equal enjoyment of individual rights, rather than to protect individual life.

Berkeley overturned Locke's conception of reality. If reality for Locke was independent of our perception of it ---and could only be inferred--- for Berkeley what was perceived is reality. However Berkeley's idealism is based on empirical knowledge. What exist can be perceived, either actually or potentially, otherwise it does not exist. He conceived his proposition as an answer to the ontological question. Later, other philosophers received these ideas as an epistemological answer.

After Berkeley, Hume proposed a radical scepticism. Hume emphasized that the accepted necessary condition between cause and effect, until then conceived as an ontological property of the cause, is illogical. Unlike his predecessors, who were willing to rest the ultimate cause of all knowledge in the goodness or perfection of God, Hume indicated that all we can know is our mind's states. He cannot prove through the empirical method the existence of other minds and of the external world. However, for Hume experience becomes a fairly reliable guide even if not a necessary condition for any occurrence or existent. What we experience are either simple or complex impressions. And the simple impressions can be separated into their simple components, which are independent from each other. His proposition is for a pluralistic world of absolute disconnectedness and absolute order at the same time.

Hume, whose ideas also explained the idea of utilitarism as a moral philosophy, closed "The Age of Reason." Rationalism and empiricism did not provide final answers to the philosophical questions of their time but opened a diversity of ideas which are still

influential in our time.

From Kant to Nietzche

The rationality, objectivity, and self-consciousness which pervaded the seventeenth and eighteenth century gave way to a less optimistic conception of the world. It became clear in the nineteenth century that the expectations of a wonderful world promoted by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were far from realizable. These events brought, instead, additional difficulties. Hume's work is representative of the end of the Age of Reason. He undermined the concept of reason, science, and nature in which the period rested. Kant can be understood as a response to Hume. He wanted to show that an a priori knowledge of nature was possible. And he also wanted to limit scientific knowledge in order to make space for other forms of knowledge based on feeling and faith.

Kant abandoned the rationalist view, where minds are passive contemplators of independently existing objects, to propose a constructivist position. That is, objects are constructs in which the activities of the mind play an essential part. Derived from this idea are the following:

---experience is a spatiotemporal manifold in which distinctions are made, including the distinction between self and not-self.

---the natural sciences are limited to describing and generalizing about this spatiotemporal manifold and the various "objects" distinguished within it, including self and not-self.

---transcendental conditions are the types of questions that the mind asks of nature. They validate the sciences in their own separate fields, and at the same time limit them to those fields.

---transcendental conditions are not in experience. They exist a priori and are the way by which our minds organize experience. They are relational categories.

---Other questions like God, freedom, and immortality fall outside the field of experience. They belong to a different field where their reality is guaranteed by the facts of morality and faith.

Kant's fundamental thesis is that we are dealing with two kinds of reality which require different criteria of meaning and truth.

These ideas have proven widely influential to our days. Almost all Western philosophy since the nineteenth century can be considered a response to Kantianism.

The immediate reactions to Kantianism can be discussed along two different lines of thought: One rejected that metaphysical knowledge was impossible, and the other rejected the realm of methaphysics altogether. The first one worked on solutions to incorporate the metaphysical and phenomenal world in a single explanation (a rejection to dualism of any kind). The other promoted scientific knowledge through phenomena as the only kind of knowledge which is important for human life.

Representatives of the first ideas are Hegel and Schopenhauer, who went in different directions to attain the possibility of absolute certainty. For Hegel, Kant's idea of pure reason is constitutive of things as they are, not as they appear. That is, mind can eventually have access to metaphysical knowledge. His ideas are embedded in a

processual and developmental concept which is an important contribution to contemporary thought.

He conceived the evolution of human mind in history, and from there the possibility that as we develop we will be able to attain higher levels of truth and knowledge. This happens through a process of negation, where things that appear as opposite become the same ---in synthesis--- at a higher level of consciousness. These ideas are proposed as a new system of logic, different from the Aristotelian model that was not opposed before.

For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the mind is limited to things as they appear, to the phenomenal world, but the world of things as they really are is accessible to us in intuition. His reaction was a clear heir to Romanticism. He considered the meaning of art and ethics as stages of higher development in human life. In his radical nominalism, philosophy was relegated to the task of articulating experience into a system of abstract concepts for working at the phenomenal level. In his view, philosophy would work on clarifying linguistic conventions that often disguise experiential similarities. As we will soon see, this insight worked in different ways to promote a linguistic interest in twentieth century philosophy.

Both Hegel and Schopenhauer formulated political views which denied the possibility of laissez faire philosophies ---stemming from Lockian and Humian views, and promoted by Adam Smith who was also Hume's disciple. If anything, laissez faire was at the low level of moral and political development. For Schopenhauer the differences between individuals exist only at the phenomenal level. Thus, at a higher level

we are ready to sacrifice individuality for the needs of others, as we are all one. For Hegel, man follows a compulsion which he thinks is his individual will, but this notion is eventually transcended when he reaches the State's will. At this level, individuals recognize that they are not separate or autonomous entities but organs of the one true individual, the State.

The other reactions to Kantianism, those that limited knowledge to the phenomenal realm, shared some interest on history and philosophy of history with the above views. They also shared the view that unlimited progress is possible; but from there on they parted company. In opposition to Hegel and Schopenhauer, they were indifferent and even hostile to the idea of a system of knowledge which included metaphysical questionings; they did not see a need to transcend reality beyond this world, and promoted scientific methods for all study of human phenomena. Their scientism was predicated on the view that social phenomena was as amenable to scientific method as physical phenomena.

As social philosophers their interests went beyond knowledge of man as individual to knowledge of social organization, a contribution which shaped the new disciplines of sociology and psychology. In their views the ideas entertained by any group of people are elements of their world view that can be predicted. Their practical orientation derogated theory per se as a form of knowledge, including the derogation of philosophical speculation. In general, they attributed most of men's mistakes in this life to ignorance which is remediable through scientific knowledge. They accepted Bacon's dictum that "knowledge is power" and should be used for the improvement of man. But the old

geometrical model of knowledge about the physical world was transformed now into a genetic model of knowledge.

These are superficial similarities, however the representatives of these views also differred in fundamental ways. The utilitarians, represented by Bentham, John Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill, did not pay too much attention to the historical point. Pragmatic and empirically oriented, their views of "the greater happiness for the greater number" was predicated upon a strong rationalist orientation toward general utility. Their quest was to demonstrate that the universe is basically simple, and that the mind can discern its simplicity and use the knowledge of it as a model for conduct. From here it followed that everything, including values, could be quantified and measured according to its utility. Theirs was an approach to decision-making that stressed extreme individualism and laissez-faire.

Comte, shared with the utilitarians a rationalist view of the universe, but he denied that most human beings are rational and capable of acting on the basis of long-range, intelligent analysis. Only a few men ---an elite--- are able to control their emotions and use scientific methods to ascertain the right answers. His question is: How to induce citizens to adopt his program, given the inferior intellect of the majority?

His science of society ---positivism--- with a branch of social statics to describe the laws of order, and a branch of social dynamics to describe the laws of progress, would provide the answer. This science would make possible the highest stage of development in human history. At this level society could organize in a tightly controlled

regime. Conformity to the ruling elite ---the experts--- would be assured by appeals to the emotions and sentiments of the majority. The intention of his program ---a secular religion-like dogma--- was to arouse men's feelings for "humanity." To make them aware of their unity and counteract selfish motives.

Perhaps surprisingly, Marx is the third representative in the phenomenal responses to Kantianism. He shares a phenomenalist view with the utilitarians and the positivist. Like them he believes in the inevitability of progress, and that human nature and the physical universe conform to simple laws that can be discovered by science. Unlike them, the key to his system lies in notions of development and dialectics which followed from a strong Hegelian view. But for him the developments would occur at a material level.

Historical materialism would work to overturn economic and political theories of capitalism. It offered an epistemological and pragmatic device where the pragmatic test would provide the definitive answer. That is, the empirical correspondence between theories and facts was not enough to ascertain what was true. The truth was what worked. And if it served to overthrow capitalism, it was true. Thus, his belief in violence, conflict and class stuggle ---revolution--- as fundamental realities in historical changes move him away from Hegel and closer to Schopenhauer.

Hegel was thirty nine years old when Darwin was born. Marx was Darwin's contemporary. The "family resemblances" here are more a product of their times than of intellectual influences. They shared a cultural space that was ripe for evolutionist and progressive thoughts.

The Industrial Revolution was not creating the promised better society. Rather, it was creating new sets of problems. Eventually "Social Darwinism" became an influential current of thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Two other philosophers within this period, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, offered a radical departure from the above views. They were hostile to science as a cognitive enterprise, and doubted the applicability of the scientific method in the solution of economic and political problems. Their views were either ignored or discounted as aberrations during their times. Today they are very influential and, in the case of Nietzsche, his views often considered prophetic.

Kierkegaard is regarded as founder of "existentialism." For him philosophy's task is to improve us by changing us. To exist, to be a "self," is to struggle and to become. Everything else are "things" for selves and do not have independent status. His philosophy of radical subjectivity and existential anguish can be read as a personal struggle. The truth, centered in improvement for humankind and the unified individual, which previous philosophies has promised, seemed even more remote in the "century of progress." His voice anticipated some current themes in Western culture.

Nietzsche was relativistic, antisystematic, and very difficult to classify. He partook of the existential problems proposed by Kierkegaard but did not try to solve them. His question addressed what position one should adopt toward the irrational, purposeless, and meaningless world that one faces. He formulated a version of understanding the world based on the impossibility of recovering the

original text. That is, we try to know the world by interpreting what we expect to be its real, original meaning. But this is a myth, since there is no such original meaning. The world that we know is already interpreted many different ways over by the different social groups that preceded us. Thus, any absolute answer to "truth" is impossible.

His attack of philosophy as pretended foundation for Truth is quite strong. Philosophy is just a language that traps us and make us fit to it our experience of the world. It is also an attempt by the philosophers to justify their instinctive beliefs. The philosophers are like lawyers making a case for their views. He extends this critique to science on similar grounds.

Another central concept in Nietzche was "the will to power." In this view the shape of the world is produced out of the exercise of power over the less powerful. At the conscious level the "will to power" is a double standard where the virtues of the strong and those of the weak are different. For example, the Greek and Christian virtues of equality, consideration for others, and moderation, are virtues of the weak which were taught to instill them with a "herd morality." Nietzsche's model for power was the creativity of the artist. The artist can attain "self-overcoming" ---to cope with the absurdity of the world--- by the creation of a work of art. This work of art is the creation of a miniature cosmos from the chaos within the artist. And out of all this, he recommends that one have to learn to laugh at oneself, otherwise one must weep.

Process Philosophy to Late Wittgenstein

Philosophical thought in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries takes more diverse paths than in previous periods. These philosophies address four issues that are still of current interest. First, there is a feeling of ambiguity about the appropriate human mode of being in the world. Second, there are debates about the role of science in modern society. Third, the position of the individual in the world is questioned. Self-consciousness and acknowledgement of a divided self are difficult ideas to master together. Fourth, there is a concern for the role of language as representation or articulation of reality. As we will see, these issues become intertwined in the different philosophical positions.

Three philosophers who bridge the path between the two centuries, Bergson, Whitehead, and Dewey, follow the "process philosophy" inaugurated by Hegel, but each took other distinctive characteristics. Bergson attempted to use scientific findings to construct an antiscientific conception of reality. His metaphysics was close to Schopenhauer's intuitionism but incorporated to it the theory of evolution as a doctrine of progress. Whitehead reaffirmed Hegel's view about the capacity of reason to know reality, but based his categoreal scheme toward absolute knowledge on modern physics. Still Dewey took another path.

Though influenced by Hegel in his early years, the philosopher of instrumentalism became skeptical of the possibility or desirability of building philosophical systems. He believed that philosophy must be

useful in the solution of social problems. For those purposes philosophy must be modeled on the natural sciences, and must be content with probability rather than absolute knowledge. For him the truth must be useful. He believed, with Nietzsche, that the quest for certainty was the philosophers' response for dealing with an uncertain world.

The three believed in the possibility of progress promoted by intelligent action on the part of individuals. They conceived thought and its objects within the evolutionary process. Ideas have a history which is relevant to their present, and the philosophical thought is an outgrowth of its own culture and period rather than eternal truths. They shared a notion of reality as changing and dynamic, and recognized the prestige that the natural sciences had in their times.

Others followed a different orientation. Reviving the rationalist-realist tradition of the Hobbes-Locke-Hume line, these philosophers proposed that:

---philosophy was primarily a cognitive enterprise.

---existential problems should be kept out of the philosophical writings.

---the universe of knowledge is only the phenomenal realm.

---things in the universe are only externally related. They are simple entities which appear complex only in their combinations.

---knowledge is attained through analysis, by decomposing complex entities into their atomic simples.

---clarity is achieved when mind is brought into the presence of each these simples. This is knowledge of their essential nature.

---everyday language is inadequate for presenting to thought the clarity

of knowledge.

---the central problem of philosophy thus become the problems of finding a language simple enough and clear enough to either represent or be isomorphic with the simples.

---simples endure through time. They do not change or evolve, they just recombine in different forms.

This tradition of analytic philosophy had variations. For example, Moore's philosophy of sense data engaged in issues of common sense knowledge. Frege, a founder of philosophy of language, believed ---like Moore--- that our mind can be in contact with the objective world, and ---unlike Moore--- that the logic of the signs in which we express our knowledge reflect the structure of the objects we know. He thought, like Plato, that in mathematics we attain knowledge, not mere belief. He then proposed that all models of knowledge follow mathematical thinking, since this was the best type of thinking.

On the other side of Moore was Russell. He used analysis to purify science and purge it of the errors of common sense thinking. Among his most important propositions was the distinction between hard and soft data, and his attempts to show that inferences from hard to soft data are warranted. But his main interest here was to define the extra-logical principles we use in making these inferences.

A different position in this tradition is represented by Wittgenstein's (1922) earlier writings. He said that what can be said should be said clearly, and what cannot be said one must pass over in silence. Still, in his view there was the difficulty of articulating what can be known but about which we cannot talk. His view is a

linguistic reformulation of Kant's metaphysical realm, which exist but is unknowable. His fundamental question was how to talk about what is unsayable, if only to say that it is such. His preoccupation was to understand the boundaries between what can and cannot be said.

The Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle ---e.g. Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, Ayer--- found wide support for their concerns in the writings of the analytic philosophers and in positivism. They placed all their confidence in knowledge through the model of the physical sciences and in attaining verifiable knowledge. They strived to reduce all the sciences to unity in physics, where the ultimate simples of knowledge could be found. Following the Fregian view, the fundamental assumption was that isomorphism existed between the structure of scientific language and the structure of the world. Following Wittgenstein on the sayable (and disregarding the unsayable) they strived to attain the pictorial-logical form where ultimate facts would rest.

This program did not attain its end. Eventually Carnap wrote the Principle of Tolerance. He proposed that rather than an ideal language, whose structure is revealed by logical analysis and that mirrors the world in its identity, it appeared that there were a variety of languages. None of them were isomorphic with the world, and all could be appropriate for knowledge. Still, this view was based on formal scientific languages, like Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry, and not on everyday languages.

The source I am consulting here (Jones, 1975) considers that the positivist/logical positivist views vanished after the early 1950s.

They were discussed as anachronistic survivors of eighteenth and nineteenth century culture during the early part of the twentieth century.

If the search for objective knowledge is usually associated with the rationalist/analytical tradition, a different view toward this kind of knowledge was initiated by Husserl's phenomenological tradition. Like the analytical philosophers, they rejected Kantian constructivism ---i.e. that mind participated in the construction of its object. Analytic philosophy thought that consciousness was transparent/inert and mind would pass through it to know its objects. In this sense inner states and bodily states were equivalent. For phenomenology the intentionality of consciousness apprehended the objects. In both schools major importance was given to the immediacy in mind of the objects-for-mind. And from here they diverged widely.

Phenomenology was inspired by Hegelian views, and attempted to overcome the Hegelian oversight about the intentionality of consciousness. In its view the world was made by the interconnectedness of things, by a river of experience. There was a refusal to write off as subjective the world of emotions and transitory things, since they also rested on the experiential realm. To attain phenomenological knowledge, certainty about all the richness of the world, it was necessary to cultivate phenomenological bracketing and "reduction." In this sense phenomenology attempted to eliminate the distinctions between mind and body, idealism and realism.

Their view of language reflected their confidence that reduction of preconceptions about the world would give the world to mind. Rather

than reducing the world to the limited sterile language of positivism, they encouraged language to flourish. A rich language would be the only way to represent the richness of the phenomenological world that was known.

In a sense, Husserl's phenomenology was an epistemological answer to Kierkegaard's anguish about uncertainty. His successors, Heidegger and Sartre, would delve into ontology and existential interpretation.

Rather than accepting phenomenology as a theory of knowing the world, Heidegger transformed it into a method for knowing our Being, as a creature concerned with its fate in an alien world. In order to attain such knowledge one must become involved with the world, with its everydayness, and accept, live, one's own anxieties. These activities would lead to a moody understanding that would uncover the real structure of Being. This ontological structure is a priori, primordial, acultural, and ahistorical.

In this very complex philosophy two themes are of primary importance: the relationship between Being and time, and between Being and language. Heidegger believes that if we found the articulation of these two structures with Being, the latter can be uncovered. His concern with language is particularly interesting. He thought of humankind as a conversation about Being, to deal with anxiety about death and finitude. Eventually he realized the impossibility of finding Being in the articulation of language because one cannot "say" that articulation ---i.e. how does one present the relationship between language and reality without including any of them? His answer to this

dilemma was that authentic saying must be a dialog of silence.

If Heidegger's basic question was: How do we face the knowledge that we are going to die? Sartre's was: What is our human situation in a world without God? His questionning was close to Kierkegaard's, his answer closer to Nietzsche's: One must make ---rather than try to find--- a center for life. Another way to understand this position, knowing that Sartre was Heidegger's disciple, is to question what to do after experiencing Heideggerian anxiety. For Sartre the first thing to do is purge oneself of illusions of knowledge as a prelude to action.

For Sartre, the limitations proposed by philosophy which impede us from knowing about our true consciousness and ego are not so. For example, we make the world we want to see in language, there is no "original text." We are only passing moments, and the self we experience is a social self constantly reinterpreted. If we could describe the real world through any word it would be "absurd." Our true consciousness is transparent, an impersonal spontaneity, like wind blowing toward objects. Thus, out of this nothingness we are free to become the self of our choice. Our problem is how to adopt a project where we can make the world and the self of our choice, keep our individuation, and respect the projects chosen by others.

Sartre's existential phenomenology emphasized, like Nietzsche, that the authentic individual is one who accepted living with uncertainty. His major problematic was reconciling his philosophical emphasis on individual freedom and his own Marxist project. He recognized that the world he was living in imposed undue limitations on human beings out of social and economic problems. In his late position,

joining revolutionary forces was viewed as an individual step toward creating the appropriate conditions for individual freedom.

Since the early twentieth century, and often parallel to the phenomenological movements, other schools of thought appeared. These derived directly out of the Marxist tradition, and kept alive a political orientation in social philosophy. This current of thought, generalized as Critical Theory, includes Lukacs revisionist interpretation of Marxist reification, and the Frankfurt School tradition represented by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas.

The latter thinkers wrote to explore and oppose the manner by which "instrumental rationality" becomes embedded in society. This kind of thought makes human beings dominate other human beings, and ultimately makes them to engage in self-domination. When thinking and social organization are dominated by instrumental rationality, the dominance becomes "totalizing" in the sense that no other way of thinking seems possible. In this sense ideology is a "partial truth" that claims to be "the whole truth." Needless to say, this is a critique of modern capitalist industrial society, and of the role of knowledge in such a society.

To end our tour of modern philosophy, I will re-present Wittgenstin in this text. His latter writings would criticize the kind of linguistic approach he had taken earlier. That is, while still preoccupied with language and knowledge, his late language-games were a far cry from his picture theory. The early theory explored the possibility of achieving isomorphism betweeen ideal language and things-in-themselves, later he thought that the notion of an ideal

language was an illusion and the quest for isomorphism doomed to failure. This view agreed with Carnap's Principle of Tolerance, and with Nietzsche's position that philosophy is a form of therapy rather than a form of analysis.

He exposed the fictions concealed within standard philosophical writings. For example, he indicated that preciseness is not the substance of logic. Rather, logic is a non-vague language because that is a rule imposed by the philosophers. Accordingly, he considered traditional theory of language reductive of the domain of language and meaning. His concern now was to understand how language functions in the social context of the world. He proposed that:

----language arises in a particular social context.

----any system of signs is a language.

----a language is a language if it is effective in promoting its purpose.

----the identical correspondence between word and object is the exception.

----how language means depends on how it functions in particular circumstances.

In his view language functions as language-games, with rules that are not identical among different games, can change often, and have a context-dependent meaning. At this point, Wittgenstein (1953) was accentuating the multiple language games that are possible in the modern world.

There are many ways to interpret this fast tour of modern

Western philosophical thinking. For my purposes at this time it suffices to say the following: It has been a tour that shows the progressive erosion of the domain of metaphysics, or ultimate Truth, since the time of Descartes --- the only truth found is that there is no Truth. In this "crisis of knowledge" philosophy moves from its traditional definition as a cognitive enterprise to a definition as social, political, and therapeutical discourse. The traditional epistemological question ---How do I know?--- has been transformed into the question, How does "know" mean? The theories of knowledge have been transformed into representation as theory. The "foundational discipline of knowledge" is remains. What is erected in these ruins?

Poststructuralist Theory

A game. Evidently, there is no structure, no foundation --- after contemplating the ruins poststructuralist theory plays on articulating some answers. The answers have an interesting genealogy where structural linguistics, Nietzsche, Marxism, phenomenology and existential phenomenology, among others, dance about the unbounded space of this game.

As we may infer from the previous discussion, in the early years of this century everything was a science, or had a structure to be proposed or discovered by science. In the United States the pragmatist/pragmaticist Peirce was busy devising semeiotic, a science of signs. He attempted to classify all cultural signs in a universalistic scheme ---e. g. icons, indexes and symbols. On the other side of the

Atlantic, Saussure was contemplating linguistics as part of a larger science of signs, semiology. He attempted to demonstrate that language was a system of differences and relations between signs.

There are wide differences in their views, but both agreed that the task of their sciences ---from the Greek semeion ("sign"), and today generalized as semiotics by Eco (e.g. 1976; 1979; 1984) and others--- was to describe those conventions that underlie even the most "natural" social behaviors and representations. They attempted to discover the structure that underlies human signification.

Culler argues that the development of semiotics at the beginning of the twentieth century was an important influence in philosophical works thereafter (e.g. Cassirer, 1945) but he also observes that:

> "... the crucial insights which semiotics develops lie further back, in the work of Marx, Durkheim, and Freud, who insisted on the primacy of social facts... in focusing on social facts which are always a symbolic order, Marx, Freud, and Durkheim dramatically showed that individual experience is made possible by the symbolic systems of collectivities, whether these systems be social ideologies, languages, or structures of the unconscious" (1981: 25-26).

The pragmatism in Wittgenstein's later work can be traced to the pragmatic interest in Peirce's semeiotic, which questions what are the species of signs and the important distinctions between them. Wittgenstein questionned the species of contexts, and the rules for language-games in these contexts. We must remember here that Wittgenstein had defined language in relationship to its functionality ---i.e. a language is a language if it is effective in promoting its purpose.

The Saussurean influence took a different path. The French

Structuralism of Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Lacan in psychoanalysis, and Barthes in literary criticism are direct heirs to his ideas. If the structure of language was a system of differences and relations, the key to the structure, its code, should be in the articulation of those differences and relations ---e.g. the binary oppositions, and the relationship between that which signifies and that which is signified by it. It followed that finding the structure of a language would lead to the core of human signification, the rules by which people make meaning.

Thus, the Saussurean differences at the level of words (e.g. cat/hat) influenced Levi-Strauss (1955) to look for the structure of cultures at the level of myths; influenced Lacan (1966) to critique Freudian theory, and to propose that the unconscious was structured like language; and influenced Barthes (1972) into searching and showing the structures of popular culture in France.

I should stress here what is implied in the structuralist proposition. First, the existence of an a priori structure in the system (be the system language, myth, or mind) which defines how humans think. The question then is, how is this system patterned? Second, that the structure is acultural and ahistorical. Thus, the system, in its origin, is not defined by its culture and history but defines its culture and history. Now, suppose that the system's pattern really looks like a text. And further, suppose that we impose over this text the Nietzschean idea that there is no original text, or at least no way by which we can recover the original: What would happen? Poststructuralist theory.

Once we get to this point it is difficult to find a unifying

theme followed by proponents (?) of poststructuralism ---i.e. one cannot look for a definitive pattern anymore. Still, there is an interest in language for understanding the manner in which humans produce their life. And beyond, there is an interest in re-reading the "general text," the human productions which form the history and practice of our present, of our Western culture, and that claim to be the right interpretations, "the way things are, or should be." The aim from here is to show how the "right interpretations," can be undermined. The main purpose is to produce undecidability about having a "right interpretation," rather than to propose a better interpretation. Once the limits are subverted, the possibility of extending the horizon of our history and the boundaries of our practices is there, but first we must ask: What are we now?

The answers are searched in the discourses/writings of knowledge. Remember that Bacon said "knowledge is power"? And that Nietzsche said that humans create the world in their "will-to-power"? What we are now may be our struggle for power defined as knowledge; or plainly, a definition through the lie that poses as Truth. Let's now get acquainted with the two poststructuralist writers that inspired this dissertation.

The Foucault Connection: Technologies of the Subject

Foucault explores the theme will-to-truth/knowledge to re-interpret the history of the modern episteme. He reads chance where planning was implied; discontinuity in explanations of continuity;

exclusions and silences in the "natural" isolation of the pathological and criminal; and progress of knowledge nowhere.

His best known work looks into the institutional arrangements (e.g. prisons, hospital, schools) and disciplinary discourses (e.g. medicine, law) and practices (e.g. sexual practices) in modern history. He thinks that there are the readable traces of the discourses of the present. He follows how things and theories take shape, subsist, change and disappear. His interest is understanding the way by which discourses and institutions influence and work on each other. He is not searching for immutable rules and systems to predict what we would be. He is re-opening the past to understand what we are.

For him discoursive practices are:

> "...characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discoursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.
>
> Furthermore, these sets of `regularities' do not coincide with individual works; even if these `regularities' are manifested through individual works or announce their presence for the first time through one of them, they are more extensive and often serve to regroup a large number of individual works. But neither do they coincide with what we ordinarily call a science or a discipline even if their boundaries provisionally coincide on certain occasions; it is usually the case that a discoursive practice assembles a number of diverse disciplines or sciences or that it crosses a certain number among them and regroups many of their individual characteristics into a new and often unexpected unity.
>
> Discoursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourses. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms of transmission and difussion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them..." (1977c: 199-200)

His readings bring other discourses alongside the "author-ized

versions." The others constantly creep in (e.g. the mad, the criminal). They are the voices that were not heard, the ones that could crack the continuous surface of the mirror, that can show the un-natural of the natural. The continuous, the heard, the natural exclude the others. But there are technologies for controlling them: through individuation, separation --- and then massification. They can be counted, measured, classified, promoted, demoted..., and all for their own/common good. Once they create a subject they can subjectify it.

The Derrida Connection: Iterability of Signification

Rather than working on historical documents Derrida primarily reads modern philosophical texts. He shows how the claimed "foundation of knowledge" cannot be so when knowledge is written in the instability of language. Working in the text proper, he shows how every text can subvert its own meaning. There are always overdeterminations in the text. The words can be made to mean very different from its apparent, intended meaning.

His deconstructive enterprise proceeds from the binary oppositions of structural linguistics. First, the opposition is overturned by showing that the second term, often thought as inferior and dependent on the first, can be read as superior. Second, the total structure of the opposition is made unstable to prevent its return to the original condition. Space is created between the terms.

For example, he deconstructs the opposition presence/absence and its relationship with speech and writing. The claims to knowledge in

Western civilization have given primacy to the voice who can say the truth, and ultimately to the voice of God. The voice is represented as truth because it is immediate to the speaking subject's mind. The subject is self-present, identical to itself, capable of saying what it means, and clarify if necessary. Writing is secondary to speech. It is a transcription, absent from its author, and incapable of meaning as clearly as voice/presence.

He shows, instead, that writing, the sign ---the capability to signify with something else than speech--- must happen first. He cannot have made any original sound unless we have thought of a way to differentiate it from another sound. In this sense speech comes after our capability to create/inscribe a sign with certain durability and transferability --- ecriture.

What follows unstabilizes the situation further. Now, what is presence and what is absence? Is the voice really self-present or does it depends on others to inscribe its meaning. What is writing and what is speech? Or, is not all a play of differences? It is undecidable. Thus, it is "differ/a/nce," a word created by Derrida to mark the space between the previous pair of opposites. In French "difference" and "differ/a/nce" sound the same but, what is differ/a/nce? And, of course, various philosophical texts get further unstabilized here: the concept of "difference" has been central in the writings of Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger.

Derrida's writings are a constant showing of the iterability of signification. He produces new texts, new meanings, by working over a previous text. He shows how the same words can mean differently in

different contexts but, unlike Wittgenstein, he does not collect those con-texts. They are writings, as multiple and undecidable as the text themselves.

A final comment for now on this discussion about Foucault and Derrida. They are critics of our modern society, and their writings can be read as leaning toward the left (what is right/left?). However, Critical Theory proponents attack them [Nagele (1986) calls this situation "a war between frankfurters and french fries"] on the basis of their refusal to acknowledge and fight directly in their writings the dominance of capitalist ideology. Derrida is particularly vulnerable. The texts he has chosen to critique, and the lack of "everydayness" in his writings, is considered by some (e.g. Habermas, 1983) a conservative if not a reactionary sign. Foucault, who has publicly refused to be labelled Marxist ---or anything else--- refrains from formulating any global systematic theory, he rather analyzes the specificity of power mechanisms, wherever they may appear, including in "critical positions." They are perhaps closer to Adorno's (1973) late writings, but it is clear that there cannot be a grand theory position in poststructuralism.

Modernism/Poststructuralism/Postmodernism

I proposed at the beginning of this chapter that we are in the transition between modernism and postmodernism. Where is poststructuralism located? I concur with Huyssen (1984) on saying that it belongs to the modern at its end, and perhaps at the beginning of the postmodern. He sees the poststructuralist projects as important steps in understanding the end of "the modern." And it is in that sense that poststructuralism is postmodern, as a reading of the failures and limitations of the modern.

Thus, how are the works of Foucault and Derrida important in the postmodern stance of this dissertation? Knowing their work, and the issues they have been addressing provide a starting point for my work. The dissertation is not about explaining how to use or apply Foucault and Derrida in organizational sciences. To do that would be to write the defeat of the dissertation ---its inability to stay away from <u>modern</u> approaches to theory. Rather, it is the issues they question ---how is it that we have constructed theories on a foundation of "Truth" without paying attention to the textual/discoursive/institutional construction of those claims to knowledge?--- that I will be working on.

The "summaries" of their positions which I presented above [drawing from Culler (1982); Leitch (1983); and Hoy (1986)] underscore that we, in the organizational sciences, should understand how implicated are our institutions and discourses of knowledge in the philosophies and epistemes that Foucault and Derrida have discussed. I argue that doing <u>organizational disciplines</u> in a postmodern mode

requires a broader understanding of our position in the episteme of the modern.

For that purpose, I re-present a history of the organizational sciences' constitution as a modern discipline in the next chapter, bringing into it some other (hi)stories usually not heard. Chapter three formulates a transition between the "modern disciplines" and postmodernity. I first discuss some postmodern commentaries about the role of the knowledge producing institutions in a postmodern world; later I describe major postmodern topics.

Chapters four to six are poststructuralist readings of main organizational sciences texts: Barnard (1938), McGregor (1960), and Mintzberg (1973). The deconstructions effected in each chapter illustrate three movements in the construction of the discipline: Barnard's discuss the grafting of past discourses as claims of authority for current discourses; McGregor's is the exemplar discourse in the construction of "the disciplinary subject;" and Mintzberg's shows the working of discourses as mecanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In each case, the deconstructive work is presented as postmodern practice of organizational theory.

In chapter seven I re-view the issues previously discussed and suggest the practice of organizational__sciences as postmodern cultural critique.

And now, for a pre-~~text~~-view of what is to come, let me deconstruct the title of this dissertation:

	Organizational	
	Science /	Fiction
What is it?		
	Truth /	Lie
How does it happen?		
	Discovery /	Invention
What does it become?		
	Found /	Produced
What do I do next?		
	End /	Create
What does it mean?		
	Death /	Birth

Thus, the desirable term in the opposition, "science," has been transformed toward the undesirable "dead end," and it is "fiction" which can now claim a desirable meaning. Let's explore further what kind of fictions we have produced to maintain our "science" out of the "dead end." Is it time now to play over the ruins?

Notes

[1]

Not all "organizational culture" literature would question or oppose the traditional approaches. See Smircich (1983) and Smircich and Calás (1987) for more detailed analyses of these issues.

CHAPTER II

WE MUST BE PERFECTLY CLEAR

In a recent book Stanley Melville attempts to define current criticism. Settling for a Derridean perspective he said: "Criticism finds itself not in its defeat as knowledge but in the [indefinite] complexity that marks its attachment to literature as neither wholly internal to that literature nor simply an external addition to it -- a primary supplement, a fact." (1986: 152).

For Derrida, the supplement is more complete than that to which it is attached. By definition, a supplement would be whole by itself --- as a supplement --- while, at the same time, it would be an addition to something else. On the other hand, the "something else" announces its incompleteness, its lack, by requiring "the supplement." Derrida's notion of supplement is his way to subvert the meaning, so taken for granted, of supplement as something of secondary importance. But he did still more with this concept.

In On Grammatology, Derrida (1976) indicates that Rousseau's obsession with "supplementary" as secondary to an "original notion" not only marks the incompletness of the "origin" but it also shows that once one starts to supplement for more completion one gets engaged in a neverending supplementation. Thus, the myth of the possibility of completness, wholeness, origin, final meaning, becomes "deconstructed." His interest in these issues was, of course, beyond anything specific

that Rousseau may have said. His aim was to show that any text means more than it says; that if one conceives of writing as a supplement to speech, one is marking the possibility of intellegibility without the presence of a speaking subject. And additionally, one is standing in a position, neither inside nor outside that presence, which makes it possible to understand but also to extend any meaning.

Paraphrasing Melville, above, I argue in this dissertation that the organizational sciences are in a moment of history which often announces their defeat as knowledge. My contribution here is to help the organizational disciplines find themselves as participants in an indeterminate complexity which could mark their attachment to our current cultural moment. That is, this work aims to move the organizational disciplines out of their possible defeat as a modern form of knowledge, and into a different self-understanding: one that will position them as neither wholly internal to the current culture, nor simply an external addition to it --- rather as a primary supplement.

In light of these comments I propose that the organizational sciences as scholarly disciplines have been engaged for too long in overcoming their "supplementarity" (in the sense of "secondary") to other disciplines in the modern cultural space, as well as their "supplementarity" to the organizational world. For these purposes they have pursued the creation of a subject: management, whose presence validates and authorizes a meaning for "organizational sciences" and define their boundaries. I further suggest that the future importance of these disciplines in/for the society in which they were created would

stem from a different self-understanding: one which would enhance their supplementarity in the Derridean sense, and which depends on the possibility that they become critics of their own society. The "organizational sciences" would then be understood as criticism/supplement of Western society's main cultural production: organizations.

My work in this chapter starts the explorations for such possibility. In it I review some socio/historical conditions which gave way to the organizational disciplines as a university subject, and analyze their attempts to define themselves as disciplines in the context of modern American society [1]. As indicated in the previous chapter, the review is initially guided by the following questions: How did the organizational sciences become "sciences"? How is it that in a culture centered around business organizations and economic issues the organizational sciences seem to be separated from organizational practices? At the end of the chapter I re-submit my contention that we are now in a different cultural moment, postmodernism, where even talking about unresolved disciplinary definitions is meaningless. What is increasingly questioned instead is the role of the knowledge-producing institutions in their relationship with the rest of society. What is the role of "scholarly disciplines" in a postmodern society?

This latter questioning guides the rest of my project. It emphasizes the importance, and the difficulties, for traditional scholarly disciplines ---in particular for the organizational

disciplines--- of attaining a different self-understanding and participating in the postmodern condition. A different self-understanding for the organizational disciplines would require the deconstruction of that illusion of presence and privileged knowledge which currently authorizes and validates the field: **the role of the manager**. As indicated in chapter one, I effect later some of that deconstruction through readings of major management literature which hinges on the space between "management theory" and "management practice." Neither outside nor inside, my readings re-produce them as core exemplars of primary supplements. After this is done, could the "organizational sciences" be adequate for participating in the postmodern moment? Would they be able to become cultural critique? These questions are in line with my overall aim of problematizing the limits of "truth and knowledge" imposed by the traditional disciplinary understandings, pushing these limits into the realms of their "outside," and of their "margins."

A Short Excursion into the "Origins" of Modern Management Education

In the following paragraphs I discuss the development of the organizational disciplines, and the professionalization of their academic activities, as the struggle for validation of a new field of knowledge within its own historical period: the modern. My discussion focuses on socio/historical explanations. It is a narrative of continuities and developments in society and history; a descriptive tour of the discipline within the context of modern America's higher

education institutions. This history (story?) is important for this project because it points at how the construction of modern disciplinary boundaries is an activity quite distinct from the traditional (Kantian) disciplinary claims: that knowledge has to be specialized in each discipline out of the logic of the discipline itself ---to attain "the truth" in each realm of knowledge. Many other reasons seem to be at work here.

This section highlights how the organizational disciplines' development, and the development of their "discourses of knowledge," have shared some common paths with the development of other disciplines in American universities. The sharing, however, has been more running behind than leading in those paths. The discussion serves as basic background for analyzing the current crisis in the field against the larger cultural scene.

Modern America: The Specialization and Professionalization of Knowledge

The marking event in the emergence of the modern disciplines of organization and management has been attributed to Henry Towne in 1886 (e.g. Wren, 1986; Chandler, 1977). In his statements for that year's American Society of Mechanical Engineering meeting in Chicago, Towne indicated that:

> "Engineering has long been conceded a place as one of the modern arts, and has become a well-defined science, with a large and growing literature of its own, and of late years has subdivided itself into numerous and distinct divisions, one of which is that of mechanical engineering. It will probably not be disputed that the matter of shop management is of equal importance with that of engineering,

> as affecting the successful conduct of most, if not all, of our great industrial establishments, and that the management of works has become a matter of such great and far-reaching importance as perhaps to justify its classification also as one of the modern arts. The one is a well-defined science...; the other is unorganized... A vast amount of accumulated experience in the art of workshop management already exists, but there is no record of it available to the world in general, and each old enterprise is managed more or less in its own way, receiving little benefit from the parallel experience of other similar enterprises, and imparting as little of its own to them; while each new enterprise, starting `de novo' and with much labor, and usually at much cost for experience, gradually develops a more or less perfect system of its own, according to the ability of its managers, receiving little benefit or aid from all that may have been done previously by others in precisely the same field of work" (1886: 428).

Towne's statements indicate the acceptable interpretations for the industrial activities at the end of the nineteenth century in the United States. The question now is: Were Towne's expectations ever fulfilled?

The answer is yes ---and no. Eventually, attempts at the professionalization of management, and the institutionalization of management education happened as a matter of course and today, the management-educated managers are doing their specialized work within the organizational world ---and the management academicians are doing their specialized work within the academic world. On the one hand, there is no doubt that management is now a well defined science, with a distinct literature, with numerous journals, and with many associations for the interchange of experience. On the other hand, it is questionable whether "the accumulated experience" has benefitted old and new enterprises; especially the "accumulated experience" in the form of scholarly

management research.

How to comprehend this ambivalent answer? this ambiguous situation? Let's now do some "archeology of knowledge," which starts by locating the nature of Towne's statements within the broader social scene of his times.

The post-Civil War years in the United States brought a general sense of economic well being into a nation still in its forming stages. While Europe had a tradition of being periodically shaken by intellectual currents, which influenced its economic and political systems, the United States was developing in those years an economic and political system fairly devoid of any explicit intellectual roots. If after the Civil War there was a clear followership of the ideas of Herbert Spencer which were of little interest in Europe, was probably more due to their congruence with the ideals and aspirations of American society at that time than to any revelatory message about the way America should go. Spencer was a firm supporter of science and industry, and a believer of individualism and survival of the fittest. He was also an advocate of representative government which he thought necessary for a progressive industrial society (Bottomore, 1969; White, 1976; Blackford and Kerr, 1986).

The society which developed along these ideas was not without criticism. Important figures like Dewey, Veblen, Beard, Robinson, and Holmes spoke against truculent capitalism and conspicuous consumption, for progressive education, for the understanding of the law as judicial contructions rather than immutable truths, and for the understanding of

history as a pragmatic weapon in the explanation of the present and control of the future (White, 1976). They provided a balance of liberal thinking against the more conservative groups who owned or controlled capital. But their views, if not identical to Spencer's, were important in fostering the institutionalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism which also helped shape as hegemonic ideal a form of economic development based on "the survival of the fittest" --- and economic development, per se, as the core value of society (e.g. Heilbroner 1963, 1968).

Not until the late 1800s did the United States develop into a society where economic issues stood at the forefront. The discourses of specialization, production, and marketability were then established as those of everyday life, and the society's institutions reproduced this order of things.

The universities were constructed around very similar notions. In a nation which in its post-Civil War era was seldom to be known for the influence of its intellectuals in public policy or public life (Hofstadter, 1964), it was easy, for example, to confine "the arts and literature" to "the departments"; and to declare liberal arts education as something to be had as adornment or precursor of something else that was "useful." These conditions still prevail in current American society, except that with the passage of time the local and particular motivations from which they arose have acquired the status of ontological and universal reasons. In today's universities the separation of academic "fields" has acquired the intellectual authority of a natural objective fact, and this "natural fact" becomes a forceful

depoliticizing strain when you can only participate in the very narrow space of "what you know about" (Said, 1983).

Towne's 1886 statements were enacted in institutional arrangements for which the American society had recently acquired a blueprint. Before the Civil War the most common design for higher education in the United States was the English Cambridge-Oxford college model in the ideal of providing general liberal arts education to the elite members of society, and to those who were to govern the new nation. The English model conceived of liberal arts and pure sciences as university subjects while keeping professional preparation outside of it (e.g. medicine in the hospitals, engineering in the construction site). After the 1860s the nation approached higher education with a different model: the modern German university (Bean, 1953; Jarausch, 1983).

The Pseudogermanization of American Higher Education

After the Civil War there were arguments about the need to stimulate national economic development through educational policy. It was clear that the American universities lacked the requirements to provide the perceived necessary advanced training and research. The new demand for graduate and professional education became a blending ground for fostering the interests of an individual career, the advance of scholarship, and the national welfare (Herbst, 1983).

The German universities of the nineteenth century pioneered the

model of scholarly specialization and higher technical education, as well as professional education after the undergraduate sequence, and appeared as an answer to the new American requirements. This model was brought to the United States in different forms. In some cases the German approach was added to the existing program of studies (e.g. Cornell), and in other cases whole institutions were developed under the new conception (e.g. Wisconsin). But different from its German counterpart and other European universities, which responded to a national definition and approval for their offerings, the American system of higher education (similar to the American business enterprises) followed a laissez faire philosophy rather than a "national higher education policy."

Herbst comments that before the Civil War the nation had already prepared "a wide platform of institutional types on which with the onset of largescale industrial development a new configuration of academically and technically more advanced institutions could be placed and developed without making superfluous or destroying the older institutions" (1983: 200-201). Thus, the public large institutions flourished side by side the smaller private colleges and academies which, in many instances could not draw the line between secondary, vocational, and higher learning. In the United States institutional differentiation and diversification became the norm for what was called higher education, and little attention was paid to crossinstitutional standardization of offerings.

From this discussion one can gather that creating a new

university or university program did not present a major difficulty in the United States. At the same time, however, the multiplicity of stakeholders (donors, parents, teachers, and college administrators) were apt to influence the configuration and offerings of any institution in more definitive ways than in the centrally planned European institutions, which responded to national policies and the labor market. What eventually restored some uniformity to the American universities' curricula, in spite of the institutional diversity, was the German emphasis on **development of new knowledge through scientific investigation and specialization.** This emphasis became the basic requirement of higher learning and the main tool for development of the academic professions in the United States; but its workings here, as we will soon see, had more to do with societal and institutional politics than with science as such.

Structural Ambiguity: Academization of the Professions versus the Professionalization of Academia

A large number of the new American colleges only survived for a few years. For a large proportion of the population, now engaged in developing new business and new fortunes, college education in its more traditional form had little to do with the life they were leading. Colleges developed sometimes as another form of business, and industrialization became in many ways the cause rather than the effect of higher education. As such, college and university education often evolved as another consumer good which could be bought because its price was accesible (Burke, 1983).

In some cases, the value of traditional higher education was explicitly considered a negative asset. For example, in 1889 Andrew Carnegie, representing his industrial and business peers indicated that "...as far as business affairs are concerned, the future captain of industry is hotly engaged in a school of experience, obtaining the very knowledge required for his future triumphs...College education as it exists is fatal to success in that domain" (Veysey, 1965: 4).

How, then, did higher education in America make peace with economic development to the point that today it is considered a sine qua non, as if always had been the case? The dilemma was "solved" through the **professionalization** of higher education, which reproduced in the academic structures the notions of specialization, production, and marketability which were already valued as sustainers of economic development (Furner, 1975; Haskell, 1978). In an increasing commercialized and specialized society academia became one more producer which should respond to the market with an appropriate product. The German model of higher education was in this sense more a means than an end.

Light (1983) indicates that the history of professional schools in the United States is one of **structural ambiguity**. When the universities took professional training and education upon themselves, following the German model, they created this kind of tension in more than one form. On the one hand, the academic professionals had to define themselves as the carriers of knowledge whose expertise was to be transmitted to the future practitioners. As "men of science" their

location was the university and their primary concern was the development of knowledge. On the other hand, this separation put them at odds with the practitioners of their own professions and the more pragmatic members of society. It also forced many of the non-professional disciplines, including the liberal arts, to model themselves after the professional fields in order to survive the quest for relevance in what appeared to be an increasingly pragmatic higher education system.

Observe, however, that structural ambiguity of this nature could only appear in the absence of a national policy of higher education. In most European countries the authority and legitimation of certain units of higher education as the site of professional training and education was established by the state as national priority. In the United States, however, this authority and legitimation for the universities had to be negotiated with the rest of society.

According to Light, the negotiation was attained principally through three strategies. First, the universities declared that their research, the hiring and training of specialists, and the publishing of journal articles should be taken to represent professional reality. Through this strategy they created a compromise situation between training the practitioners and educating them in the profession's core knowledge. The outcome of this tension was to create a hybrid "who too often tended to be neither well prepared in the skills for being effective practitioners, nor able to bring a critically honed intellect to bear on [their professional] questions" (1983: 346).

Second, the creation of "communities of professional scientists" served as the means to establish a community of the competent, which could determine standards of professional excellence independent of institutional affiliation, and judge each others' work. The National Academy of Science was founded around this notion in 1863, and the American Social Sciences Association in 1865. The latter developed a concept of "the social sciences" which became the acceptable label for these disciplines' professionalization inside and outside the universities. In this manner their members contributed to the public civil service reform movement and, at the same time, to the establishment of many other professional associations for academic disciplines.

The third strategy, closely tied to the other two, involved the process of status transfer. By the late 1800s, the research university/professional school designed after the German model comprised only a handful of institutions in the United States. But it was a model aggressively promoted by old and new elite as a way to serve their purposes. Through this strategy, Light indicates:

> "...an elite faction used the universalistic rhetoric of science and the modern university to legitimate its own particularistic approach to professional work by institutionalizing it in such a way as to preserve its privileged class position... the interest of university entrepreneurs of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, who acted as agents for the new industrial barons, coincided with the interest of the professional elites" (1983: 346).

The universities which followed the route of professionalization and a strong scientific research orientation found themselves richly

endowed by the interests they were serving, and were more likely to attract students inclined toward a "useful" education. And the elite factions which promoted rigorous professional schools, and their emphases on science and research, did so mainly to give universalistic legitimation and respectability to their own private interests. From this perspective, academics and elites were to benefit as long as each "kept to their side of the fence" without attempting to interfere with the other.

The question remained, however, of what would be considered "a professional school" under the expectations of those who supported and legitimated them. One of the stronger and clearer answers was from Abraham Flexner, head of various investigations sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, and whose recommendations were taken as guide for other endowments by industrial tycoons. He questioned the appropriateness of vocational and popular education within the university. Regarding the professions he indicated that:

> "A clear case can, I think, be made out for law and medicine, not for denominational religion, which involves a bias, hardly perhaps for education, certainly not at all for business, journalism, domestic `science' or library `science'..." (1930: 4).

Thus, at the time of Towne's 1886 statements American higher education was still defining its modern shape. Those disciplines which could easily enact discourses of science and technology were likely to establish their disciplinary core without major difficulties. If they were constituted within the elite institutions, which as research universities provided the standards for all others, they were likely to

be imitated and perpetuated as "the only coherent account of academic reality" (Light, 1983: 355). In the case of engineering, moreover, not only the discipline could be naturally tied to another wide range of older scientific disciplines (e.g. physics, mathematics) but the public recognition of its importance for the development of the nation provided it with a home at the uniquely American land-grant colleges. In this sense, the engineering profession could follow its own path without necessarily depending on private endowments. On the other hand, management training was fairly distant from any claims of either professional or scientific status.

It is important now to summarize the relationships that were evolving between the universities as institutions of higher education, academic disciplines, academicians, professional practitioners, and society at large by the turn of the century in the United States. At this point, the universities, private or public, had become the centers of higher education for the nation, and they had their own interests at heart when claiming priority for a scientific, research-based graduate and professional training after a liberal arts undergraduate education. They were privately-endowed or state-supported models after which other higher learning institutions would follow. At the same time, undergraduate disciplines, including the liberal arts, and especially those in the four-year colleges, were following a path of specialization and utilitarianism in the quest for relevance and survival. The academic faculty, if members of a particular profession, were likely to establish a close relationship with other non-academic groups in their

profession, or outside of it as independent scientist/experts. In the liberal arts the relationship with non-academic groups was less likely to arise, but in this case the university was the provider of the appropriate climate to cultivate/separate "the intellectual", an important if not immediately useful educational elite for the to-be-educated elite.

The critiques of American education by Dewey and Veblen at the time probably did more to entrench than to erradicate the already established order of things. For example, there was a clear interest on the part of Dewey (1899) to eliminate the separation between society's everyday life and the educational system, but an enactment of his propositions was more likely to bring into education an occupational ethic than the values of intellectualism to society at large. His apparent effort to eliminate the separation between theory and practice worked to engulf theory with practice; and ironically, all of it supported the permanence of an elitist status quo.

In Dewey's views instrumentalism was a humane philosophy which did not worship the commercial values of American society ---what it obviously worshipped was a technocratic society:

> "...The world in which most of us live is a world in which everyone has a calling and an occupation, something to do. Some are managers and others are subordinates. But the great thing for one as for the other is that each shall have had the education which enables him to see within his daily work all there is in it of large and human significance. ...At present, the impulses which lie at the basis of the industrial system are either practically neglected or positively distorted during the school period..." (1899: 38-39).

These views were reiterated even by the harshest local critic, Veblen (1899; 1918) who otherwise went often ignored. If he had any influence as a critic of this society it was not over the elimination or reduction of conspicuous consumption or waste in general. His influence was on the ways he could be interpreted to sustain the "wasteful nature" of the liberal arts and the importance of the sciences, and engineering, in the community's industrial life (Bottomore, 1968; White, 1976).

From this socio/historical vantage point we should observe that the American approaches for the development of "a good (goods?) society" were then tied to the discourses of social engineering rather than to the discourses of social criticism. These discourses preserve and extend the status quo of "order and rationality," and avert understandings based on discontinuities or catastrophic changes. The former establish their power bases in technology and specialization, the latter in intellectual movements. This distinction is very important for the discussion that follows. It serves to locate the "roots" of the current organizational disciplines and "disciplinary discourses" as a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) weaved throughout the surface of social and cultural developments which are in most cases as American as the organizational disciplines themselves.

In the Margins: The American Business Schools

Higher business education by the turn of the century had a

marginal position in American society. This situation could be partially explained by the undefined nature of these disciplines as either "science" or "liberal arts". Moreover, any attempt to define higher education in business was likely to elicit thoughts of the relationship between this new form of "professional education" and the clearly vocational private commercial school which proliferated in the nation since 1835 (Miller and Hamilton, 1964; Burke, 1983). The German model could not legitimate any attempt at professionalization in this respect; Germany did not provide status of higher education to business training until 1898 (Lundgreen, 1983).

Nonetheless, by the 1870's there was already some awareness in the United States of the need for business education for those who would inherit the business empires that were being constituted, and recognize the status differences between this elite group and the clerical personnel receiving vocational training in the commercial schools. The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, founded through an initial "gift" of Joseph Wharton in 1881 was the native American response to this predicament, followed in 1898 by similar schools at the universities of California and Chicago. Not surprisingly, however, Wharton stayed under the umbrella of the College of Arts and Sciences until 1912; it was the understanding until quite past the turn of the century that higher education for business was part of the gentlemen's education, that it should provide more character development than vocational training, and that it would build intellectual and moral orientations without necessarily leading to a career (Hugstad, 1983).

This approach to higher business education was soon to change. The empire building that occurred on those later years of the nineteenth century became a powerful force in reducing the liberal arts orientation in the business schools. The growth of Chandler's (1977) "invisible hands" (the larger organizations becoming more complex and more dependent on hired "professional managers" than on the capitalist owners) created pressure for more specialized management education. Moreover, management education soon became a vehicle for social mobility when it was evident that a college degree in this field could provide lower income groups with entrance to the emergent managerial class.

What were the views of society for this kind of education? Veblen, who clearly saw social advantages in professional education commented:

> "The professional knowledge and skill of physicians, surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, agriculturists, engineers of all kinds, perhaps even journalist, is of some use to the community at large, at the same time that it may be profitable to the bearers of it... But such is not the case with the training designed to give proefficiency in business. No gain comes to the community at large from increasing the business proefficiency of any numbers of its young men. There is already much too many of these businessmen, much too astute and proefficient in their calling, for the common good... The work of the College of Commerce, accordingly, is a peculiarly futile line of endeavor for any public insitution, in that it serves neither the intellectual advancement nor the material welfare of the community" (1918: 205).

Implicit in Veblen's comments is his negative answer to a more unspoken dilemma about management education. That is, can there really be a management education? And if so, what is it?

Early disciplinary efforts were spent on building the

"management subject." Evidently, the fate of the discipline depended on this definition, and on its ability to separate its "professional product" from the non-management educated. But also, its discourses had to demonstrate its primary value to society. Thus, at that point in time they started to be scientific.

A prime example of these efforts appears in Hotchkiss' 1918 lecture at the University of California. The then Director of Business Education at the University of Minnesota stressed:

> "Business may not yet be a science, but it is rapidly becoming scientific. Scientific inquiry is all the while carrying new factors from the category of the unknown to that of the known, and by so doing it is setting a standard of business efficiency. The more brilliant qualities, like courage and imagination, must be coupled with capacity for investigation and analysis...The person who uses scientific method takes account of all his known forces;... His trained imagination and judgement working on known facts set the limit on what he does find, all along the way... scientific method is the only sure approach to all problems; it is a thing of universal application, and far from being confined to the technical departement of business,... it may have its widest application in working out the problems of management" (1918: 47-49).

Hotchkiss was not referring his comments to Taylors' "scientific management", for the latter's contribution was more to industrial engineering than to management; more to methods and procedures than to decision making. Hotchkiss is explicit in his critique of scientific management as "a cult..." whose followers "...seem to assume that their science is absolute and inexorable, that it eliminates disturbing factors and hence needs no adjustment to adapt it to the difficulties met in its application" (: 64). However, he recognizes that scientific

management has made a contribution because it has "stirred up" businessmen who "...have become accostumed to using the words `science' and `business' in the same sentence" (: 65).

His insightful words, which point at the power that a particular discourse could have, were promoting the professionalization of business education in the universities similar to the professional training given to prospective lawyers, physicians, or engineers. And what he was promoting with more immediacy was the development of a body of knowledge which could be uniquely identified with the management of organizations. Discussing the primacy of "the scientific method" for businessmen was his strategy for gaining their respect for business research in the universities. His expectation was that a disciplinary body of knowledge, with tried and tested universal principles of management, would be adopted and respected by "executives" who could understand the value of knowledge derived from empirical investigations.

Hotchkiss' expectations, the definition and growth of the businesss management disciplines as an empirical field, and their more recent entitlement as organizational sciences, occurred in spite of the absence of vigorous management research in the universities until much later. The demand for management education as a means to entry in an emerging elite group, and by those who eventually entered into a state of "status panic" (Mills, 1948; 1951) drove the hordes toward business education in the universities. Meanwhile, for the universities, producing business school graduates was a low-cost proposition if compared to such schools as engineering and medicine. The "product"

with high demand and supply was for many years the highly specialized undergraduate degree, which provided entry-level job "knowledge" to an increasingly business "educated" population (Hugstad, 1983).

Structural Ambiguity in the Multiple Margins

Business higher education epitomizes the notion of structural ambiguity discussed before. With the exception of the field of accounting, the traditional definition of "profession" does not apply to the other business school "specialties" (e.g. Gordon and Howell, 1959), a situation which creates strain between the manager's status as a professional and the notion of professional in other fields. Moreover, in spite of its graduate status the MBA has seldom been recognized as a truly professional degree.

The professional relationship between educators and practitioners in the business field is also a strained one. Those who educate physicians are physicians, those who educate engineers are engineers, scientist educate in the sciences (including the social sciences --- behavioral, social, and political scientists, anthropologists, linguists, etc.) and the liberal art educators are usually referred to as intellectuals or even artists. What are those who educate business persons and managers?

In this case, the alienation of the academicians from its alleged "field of practice" is particularly evident in the management/organizational "specialty". Academicians in this specialty,

probably the most undefined within the field, are usually absent from the professional associations (e.g. American Management Association) while the opposite is true in the absence of practitioners from the academic meetings (e.g. Academy of Management).

Within the universities, the status of the business school is also an ambiguous one. They are usually latecomers in the more traditional and established campus, and have a history of growing out of financial considerations: the university administrators promoting the program in view of student demand, and low cost if compared to other high demand fields like technology and science; the other faculties opposing the program because of its imposition on already limited budgets. The charges, however, have been more clear on accusations of vocationalism, and the lack of intellectual orientation in the field, as well as to the quality of the students and of the education provided (Hugstad, 1983). As late as 1959 the influential Gordon and Howell report was emphasizing the importance of a doctoral degree for an appropriate higher business education in view of the absence of full time academicians in the field. They pointed out, however, that the degree did not have to be in business. This assertion further indicates the confusing identity of the discipline, especially in the area of management and organization.

Gordon and Howell also commented on business executives' unawareness about research conducted in business schools which could be relevant to business organizations. These same executives were, on the other hand, aware of research conducted in other fields like psychology

or industrial relations. From Gordon and Howell's point of view, the problem was that:

> "...more significant knowledge of ultimate value to business has come out of the nonbusiness departments of the university than out of the business schools. This is true, we think, even if we exclude the physical sciences and engineering. Major contributions to our understanding of business behavior and to the ability of business to deal with some type of problems have come from psychology, mathematics and statistics, economics, and sociology" (1959: 381).

And in the footnote to that paragraph they state that perhaps cultural anthropology and political sciences should also be included as contributors to business knowledge, but that political science:

> "...has not, on the whole, developed analytical tools as obviously useful in the study of business problems and business behavior as have the other social sciences. **This is beginning to change as political science takes on a more empirical, positivist, and behavioristic coloration** (1959: 381 [My emphasis]).

They did not explain cultural anthropology one way or another.

Their general critique, stemming from the interviewed executives' responses, was that the business schools have not made sophisticated use of the underlying disciplines mentioned above to provide better, and more useful, empirical research for business organizations ---the possibility of a different explanation was not offered. One alternative explanation could have been that the executives understood business as a practical and not a research field. Moreover, it must have been difficult for these executives to think of a unique contribution made by research in business which the other fields were not capable of making.

On the other hand, the increasingly "academized" business faculties had to establish their own definition on this situation. While the origins of the discipline were in the liberal arts, and the early moves out of it were toward skills development, the recommendations for an academic-oriented (more research than practice oriented) discipline were creating another dilemma for the organizational scholars.

Remembering the introductory lines for this chapter we may say that at the crux of this dilemma lies the supplementary nature of the organizational disciplines. Because its constituting elements, organizations, are the central objects and subjects, as well as the main artifacts, of modern western society, any attempt at defining "the organizational field" becomes an attempt at the difficult task of cultural self-reflexivity. In the absence of this awareness, attempts at defining it through other disciplinary models led it to be defined by its lack: Neither art nor science, and if the latter neither "pure" nor "applied", nor quite a professional field, it did not have any original claim to mastery other than its service to the "masters" of society. Eventually, it was anthropology without field, economics without economy, engineering without shop, mathematics without theory, psychology without lab, sociology without society. If defined as an undergraduate degree, it suffered criticism for its early specialization which detracted from the liberal education. As a graduate degree, it had to balance its position as a profession while fending accusations of vocationalism. It was clear that business education was badly in need

of defining its subject.

And that was the task which by the mid-1950s the organizational studies scholars imposed upon themselves (Beyer, 1982). As an answer to business practices, which did not understand what academic business research had to offer, they further removed the research into the deepness of academia --- perhaps hoping that eventually a Grand Unified Theory of Management would emerge?... and provide answers to business problems that no other field of knowledge could provide? Otherwise, how to explain the Academy of Management's explicit disapproval since the early 1960s about incorporating practitioners in the membership? Or the great emphasis placed on staying away from practitioner orientation in academic research and publications since the mid-1950s? (e.g. Beyer, 1982; Wrege, 1986; Adams and Davis, 1986).

These strategies could be easily interpreted as the academicians' responses to the structural ambiguities discussed before. The prestige within the academic community of this newer and equivocal field would be established through its highly scientific nature and exclusive scholarly community. Keeping away the practitioners, or at least in a clearly separated dimension (for them you do consulting --- professional work) was a way to avoid the vocational label while awaiting the discovery that will "clearly speak" of the contribution of scientific business research to the field of practice. Conveniently along the route of this evolution was the increasing momentum that the "scientific orientation" was gaining in all fields of knowledge, and the higher status of the sciences in society at large. In the kingdom of

pragmatism, positivism was to reign over idealism; and any discipline which could be re-presented as scientific would reassert a privileged status. More than three decades later, Hotchkiss' expectations were to be partially realized.

A Belated Entrance to Modernity

My commentaries in previous sections highlighted the development of the organizational disciplines within the larger context of development of modern higher education institutions in the United States. But, in any event, it was and still is the "American culture of modernity" which defined what would be accepted as "true knowledge" in these institutional arrangements as follows:

1. The status of "knowledge" is conferred only to activities that can be empirically validated. Behind such importance lie at least three related notions: first, that truth is attainable; second, that the more generalizable a statement the higher the likelihood of its explanatory power, and the closer it will be to truth; and third, that the generalizability of a statement depends on how well it would get to represent the reality that is outside of it. Thus, a strong claim to knowledge must be based on the possibility of constructing good representations.

2. The idea that "knowledge", as defined above, is attainable through the accumulation of additional evidence towards truth. To accumulate evidence is tantamount to become more specialized in less and

less; to be able to discover, one by one, the "pieces in the puzzle" of truth.

Closely related to this idea is the separation between "common, everyday-life" knowledge, and "intellectual" knowledge, with clear privileges conferred to the latter. The intellectuals, separated from the rest of society, are invested with the important responsibility of discovering truth, and of preserving their fields as one where "knowledge" is spoken.

3. The importance of authorship, and of intentional actions and results that can be attributed to a person, including the notions of "freedom" and "reponsibility". This is to say that the way to "knowledge" is dependent upon "that one who is able to discover it". It is dependent on "his (very unlikely "hers") personhood", and on his actions as an individual.

These ideas, derived from empiricist, utilitarian, logical positivist, pragmatist, and instrumentalist philosophies discussed in chapter one, formed the core of classical modernity in America, and eventually encountered opposition from within its own period. "Late /High Modernism" identifies these oppositional movements which, since the 1920s, attempt to oppose the rational, realist, technocratic, and capitalist orientation of most cultural forms. Ironically, they often ended up coexisting with what they opposed.

For example, even when the philosophical discourses for the validation of knowledge, which separated "subject" and "object" in the positivist tradition, were contested by the phenomenological/existential

tradition, which united subject and object ---and which provided strong support to knowledge through the knower's experience--- the bases of knowledge were still tied to a thematic of presence by the knowing subject in an apprehendable and stable field of experience.

In art, literature and other cultural avantgarde manifestations "Late/High" modernism stood against the formalism and the burgeois modes of thinking of classical modernity, but eventually the "movements" became institutionalized as formally and intellectually elistist as what they opposed. And so, the knowledge bases in the structures of society became even more marked in their separation from society's "everyday life".

In understanding the organizational disciplines from this modern "periodizing" perspective one may say that they arrived into classical modernity when the culture was already moving into "high modernism". The original disciplinary core was formed between the 1920s and 1950s, placing major emphasis first on descriptive realism and latter on the role of individual knowledge through "scientific validation". In the meantime other "human sciences" were involved in cultural developments toward more abstract, and more existential expressions.

In the 1960s and 1970s the business schools and the organizational disciplines consolidated their position within the universities as prime producers of "useful knowledge" ---e.g., establishing the supremacy of the MBA --- but the 60s were also years of neo-humanism [e.g. Miles (1966) "human relations" vs. "human resources"] and the 70s and 80s saw the advent of skirmishes within "scientific

rigor" [the rationalism of organizational sciences ---e.g. Armstrong (1979; 1980; 1983); Mitroff (1974; 1980; 1983); Boal and Willis (1983)]; and between "cultural naturalism" and logical positivism [the neo-romanticism of organizational metaphors ---e.g. Pinder and Bourgeois (1982); Bourgeois and Pinder (1983); Morgan (1983b); Eber (1985)]. Whether these are instances of "high modernism" in the organizational disciplines is difficult to say but there is no doubt that they have been years of increasing elitism in this academic realm.

Thus, when I asked at the beginning of this chapter: How did the organizational sciences became "sciences"? How is it that in a culture centered around business organizations and economic issues, the organizational sciences are separated from organizational practices? I was not posing these questions at random. I was standing outside their own periodization (as a modern field of knowledge) and observing how the disciplinary activities and their own questioning (i.e. What are the difficulties with theory and research in organizations which prevents the organizational sciences from advancing more useful applications?) would not make sense outside the culture of modernity.

My questions have been already partially answered. From my discussions in previous sections it is possible to provide fairly descriptive answers, grounded on a socio/historical perspective of modern higher education in America. For example, one may say that the "organizational sciences" as latecomers into an established educational system had to follow the rules of that system to legitimize its

disciplinary status in higher education --- And these rules prescribed that disciplines with professional/scientific orientation would earn a privileged scholarly position.

At the same time, how to claim professional and scientific expertise for a field of knowledge which touched upon the most prevalent and common of all activities in American society: business organizing and management? The ambiguity of its "origin" and the multiple disciplinary discourses in its constitution permitted the organizational disciplines to choose the more desirable self-understanding; one that would stress its prestigious "scientific orientation." Accordingly, it retrenched into the academic research structure and headed into "discovering the perfect manager/management form," while protecting its "scientific creation" from the highly populated worlds of undergraduate management education and organizational commonsense. And the quest still goes on.

My questions, however, are still to be answered within the context of the postmodern cultural period. They address issues of current concern to most disciplinary fields which call themselves "the human sciences," including the organizational sciences. They are the minor questions behind a major one: **What is the role of the knowledge producing institutions in the present state of society?** In the next chapter we will discuss how the "logic" that informed the development of the modern institutions and discourses of "knowledge" may not make any sense in postmodernity.

Notes

[1]

For the sake of convenience I will use throughout the project the highly ethnocentric term "American" to refer to persons and things from the United States. I recognize, with regret, that such usage for the term has become so pervasive that it is often difficult to remember that Americans are all the naturals of North, Central, and South America, and assorted islands belonging to these continents.

CHAPTER III

POSTMODERNISM, ORGANIZATION, SCIENCE: IN THE TEXTUAL FIELD WE FIND EACH OTHER

In the two previous chapters I have argued that defining appropriate realms for knowledge ---disciplines, institutions, practices--- was an ongoing interest in the discourses of modernity. As Foucault has often observed (e.g. 1972) the institutionalization and regimentation of the production knowledge in the nineteenth century ---which have been represented as stemming from pedagogical interest and cultural progress--- served to define, as well, the relationship power/knowledge that sustained modern society. Is there a discourse on "knowledge" in the discourses of the postmodern?

It seems that the questioning has changed. The recurrent voices are more interested in redefining the relationship between the production of knowledge and the rest of society. Now that "the solid structures of knowledge" have been lifted, what will count as knowledge? Is it now just a matter of naked power, of violence? Some recent discourses on these issues are discussed below. Their different positions may address the same problematics, but they only touch in the margins. The fragmentation in their views indicates where they are coming from.

Habermas on the Hegemony of Scientific Knowledge:

According to Habermas (1983) the philosophers of the Enlightenment era formulated a project of modernity whereby objective

science, universal morality and law, and the arts would each develop according to their inner logic, and into separate spheres of knowledge. This project aimed to foster the accumulation of specialized knowledge for the enrichment of everyday life. Habermas contends that the Enlightenment project went wrong because the specialists in each profession became more preoccupied with their immediate professional problems than with the betterment of society. Still, he proposes that an awareness of these limitations will bring modernity to its emancipatory, critical end without giving up the advantages of knowledge through specialization. Greatly simplified, his argument is that the developments in each sphere of knowledge would come together in the form of a "good society" if each separate sphere works toward that end.

But Habermas recognizes the privilege conferred to the empirical-analytic sciences in the technical interest of modern society and writes to correct this imbalance. More specifically, he made the point that the technical interest was incorporated into the sciences only as one type of knowledge and not to be taken as the canonical standard for all forms of knowledge. Moreover, he challenged positivist philosophers of science who presupposed that empirical-analytic sciences provided the model for legitimate knowledge, while any other claim to knowledge was pseudo-knowledge (e.g. Habermas, 1971; Bernstein, 1985).

Habermas' sociological theory is an approach to bring all members of society to a position of mutual understanding. He conceives of communication acts as situations performed against a background of consensus. If communication breaks down, however, the participants must engage in argumentation in a discoursive arena where it is necessary to

warrant a claim to validity. The good society would only occur if scientific, moral, and aesthetic knowledge could present their "cases" as of equal value in the discoursive arena.

Bell on the Central Role of Science and Technology:

Bell (1976) presents another position. He sees the university as the place where theoretical knowledge is codified and tested. During the "industrial society" era technology was capital-intensive and less dependent on theoretical knowledge. Now, in a "postindustrial society," theoretical knowledge gains centrality as the source of innovation and policy analysis when technology becomes knowledge-intensive. Under this new set of conditions the university has to maintain both its disinterested autonomous role regarding knowledge, while being the principal service agent of the society. Thus, from this point of view, the production of knowledge has had a separate place in society (the universities) but society's new requirements should bring the production of knowledge now closer to everyday life.

Bell works through these issues in a fashion almost opposite from Habermas'. He acknowledges an a priori disjuncture between the three realms of society: techno-economic, polity, and culture (these correspond roughly to Habermas' spheres). He asserts that these realms are not congruent with one another and have different rhythms of change; he also indicates that they follow different norms which legitimate different and contrasting form of behaviors. For example, the bureaucratic and hierarchical techno-economic realm (elitism) contrasts

with the political ideology of equality and participation (egalitarianism), and a culture concerned with self-fulfillment of the "whole person" (individualism). He proposes that these discordances and contradictions define the shape of contemporary society.

In Bell's view, "the public household" is a solution for a society that may otherwise annihilate itself out of its contradictions. This is an argument for a society where "all interests are to be included and all issues should be negotiated" (1976: 280), which almost sounds like Habermas' argument for communicative action. The similarities end with that phrase. Bell's is a proposition that unites the techno-economic and polity realms through a more intent governmental intervention (and some form of religious revival) while he very much dismisses the realm of culture as exhausted and depleted. His is a world-view where science and technology maintain a central role, while basically negating a role in society for modern art.

To understand the significance of this proposition in relation to the production of knowledge it is necessary to understand the manner in which Bell defines the role of the "public household." In his view, the "public household" always exists for meeting the common needs of American society. For example, during the 1950s the "public household" started to underwrite science and technology, given its linkage to defense through revolutions in military technology. More fundamental still was the centrality of science and the systematic use and application of research, from basic science to systems analysis, to economic innovation (i.e., the development of science-based industries like computers, electronics, optics, and polymers) and to managerial and

economic policy. The linked relation of science to technology is now inextricable. Thus, says Bell ---"Who shall be educated and how far; how much should be spent for graduate training, and in what fields--- this is no longer, in its magnitudes, a matter of individual choice but of government policy" (1976: 225).

In this order of things, what counts as knowledge and how can it be expressed? Bell stresses that the dominant mode of intellectual experience today is mathematical in a new language of variables, parameters, models, stochastic processes, algorithms, heuristics minimax, and other terms adopted by the social sciences. "Life is a `game'," he says , "a game against nature, a game of man against man --- and one follows rational strategies that can provide maximum payoffs at minimum risks, minimax payoffs at minimax risks, and that most lovely terms in utility preference theory, a payoff that is provided by a `criterion of regret'" (1976: 98).

These changes in language, according to Bell, incorporate uncertainty, and break temporal and spatial sequences as we have known them in our everyday world of facts and experience. They disjoint the world of facts and experience from the world of concepts and matter. Or, to say it differently, his is a commentary to further disallow the realm of culture to participate in defining modern society. It is a commentary about the impossibility of a coherent notion of art and expressiveness as we have come to know them traditionally.

Said on the Ethic of Objectivity and Realism:

In a different vein, Said (1983) sees academic autonomy, and the specialization within fields of knowledge, as one way to depoliticize the intellectuals and to keep their critical stance outside of public political life. His arguments are very different from both Habermas' and Bell's. The latter authors describe and discuss the separation of spheres of knowledge and realms in society at large (Germany as the context for Habermas, and the United States as the context for Bell, in spite of their generalized comments about "Western society") rather than only within a particular institution in society. Said, on the other hand, goes more in depth into the significance of "the separation of fields" within the specific institutional arrangement of the American university. His view is that under the logic of separation and specialization of fields within the university there is "an unquestioned ethic of objectivity and realism, based essentially on an epistemology of separation and difference" (1983: 155).

The ethic permits words such as "objectivity", "realism" and "moderation" to be used equally well in different fields (e.g. sociology or literary criticism), while the epistemology works to maintain for each field an appearance of "separate realms" for the sake of "knowledge". He concludes that these conceptions of ethic and epistemology work to keep the universities from interfering in the affairs of everyday world.

Thus, out of its apparent innocence in regard to politics, and logic in regard to knowledge, the notion of separation in and within

academic fields can be interpreted as the desirable strategy under Bell's notion of "public household". In Said's words:

> "It does not stretch things greatly to note that noninterference and rigid specialization in the academy are directly related to what has been called a counterattack by `highly mobilized business elites' in reaction to the immediately preceeding period during which national needs were thought of as fulfilled by resources allocated collectively and democratically" (1983: 156).

It is also important to observe how the structural arrangements of the university as criticized by Said reproduce the societal structures analyzed by Bell. The university, from this point of view, is a microcosm of the society where it is embedded, where not all "the realms" are equally "vital" or "legitimate"; and where only certain discourses will be heard in spite of Habermas' hopes to the contrary.

For a society that places extreme emphasis on the production of knowledge and information ---Said uses the examples of IBM and AT&T as two of the world largest corporations which claim that what they do is to put "knowledge" to work "for the people"--- he claims that it is time for the intellectuals to break out of the disciplinary ghettos and actively participate in a politics of interference and active social practice. He ventures some specific suggestions like "crossing from literature, which is supposed to be subjective and powerless, into those exact parallel realms, now covered by journalism and the production of information, that employ representation but are supposed to be objective and powerful" (1983: 157). He is concerned with how a consumer item we call "the news" is represented by a rhetoric of objectivity, balance, realism, and freeedom, and is mostly a euphemism for ideological images of the world that determine political reality for a vast majority of the

world's population.

It is clear in Said's discussion that he is directing his commentaries specifically to the humanities, which in this order of things become accomplices of their marginalization and exploitation by remaining "decorously silent on the large questions of social, economic, and foreign policy" (1983: 157). His discussion is, however, relevant to any other field within the university in the sense that any field, in its separation, is equally liable to suffer the fate of abiding to the dictates of outside societal powers; to be "defined as" rather than to participate in being definers of a better society.

Bove on Aronowitz and Counterhegemonic Critical Science:

In his discussion about recent works by Stanley Aronowitz, Paul Bove (1986) comments that the importance given to specialization within the universities is tied to a historical practice of division of labor, which is part of a larger societal order. This practice reproduces a social order which works to separate those who can be the critics of society from the course of society's everyday life. From his perspective, if critical intellectuals want to be relevant they must first understand the historical specificity of their own current practices ---i.e. specialized knowledge in the universities as a historical development which responded to some specific interests of a particular society. He sees a need for the intellectuals to reposition themselves outside the disciplinary division of intellectual labor in order to be influential and help bring about a different, more

desirable, societal order.

With this discussion of Aronowitz's (1981) work the arguments made by the other authors better stand out by themselves and contrast with one another. Bove, like Said, sets his discussion on Aronowitz against a background where the practice of disciplinary division of labor is strongly criticized. The basic tenet of this critique is that those who choose to criticize the current historical moment and the current state of society are per force criticizing and opposing the discourses that have gained hegemony within society, and that have marginalized other discourses. Hegemonic discourses can only occur out of separation and specialization. They occur when any discipline claims to be able to explain and subsume under its explanations whole bodies of social or natural occurrences. Thus, the ruling order of our Western society has become that of those who can offer more totalizing discourses. Needless to say that the model totalizing discourse is that of science.

Bove discusses Aronowitz as an exemplar of those current critics of society who are capable of crossing disciplinary and institutional boundaries in order to offer a theoretically sound counterhegemonic practice. Aronowitz (1981) outlines how the modern critique of society offered by historical materialism and Marxism is no longer an appropriate critique for the current state of the Western world. More importantly, he calls into question any theory of society that offers to resolve its diverse problems and factions by accomodating them into some form of coherent pattern and explanation ---i.e. he negates the possibility of having <u>a__master__discourse</u> of liberation and social

change.

From this point of view an adequate theory of society is one with a critical purpose rather than an explanatory purpose; one that pursues an alliance with practice rather than the separation of the theoretical intellectual from the world of practice; and one that is always aware of its social and historical specificity; that is, aware that its "solutions" are both local and temporal. There is no possible "theory of emancipation" in this view.

Aronowitz is especially critical of the cultural dominance of modern science, and follows Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) in saying that modern science must be explained in sociohistorical, not epistemological terms. He laments that under the rules of science any field-theory of society must be a unified theory of explanation with an implicit commitment to models of causality and progress. Such a theory would fail to comprehend historically specific conditions, which call for multiple alternative discourses to describe multiple and partial causations, and incommensurable differences. With their ideology of causality, progress, and prediction, scientistic field theories are reductive because they either ignore the elements of cultural life they cannot subsume, or they dismiss them as "anomalies" which would eventually be incorporated into the theory.

This discussion leads to a different conceptualization of the intellectual who wants to contribute to and participate in a society which does not reproduce the current struggles for dominance and hegemony. Aronowitz's notion of "critical science" proposes that intellectuals become close to those groups representing the oppositions

in society. The role of the intellectual becomes, first, providing careful investigations into the concrete and specific constitution of the historical moment in which the opposition is placed; and second, "leading" the opposition into the ideology of the autonomous group. This "ideology" preserves the differences of the multiple groups in society through a politics of bloc which demands a self-managed society and, at the same time, maintains the autonomy of all the constituting positions. According to Bove:

> "Criticism becomes the ideology of bloc politics... Scientific criticism would theorize a bloc that is, by definition, **antihegemonic** in its politics and culture, in its ideology and the forms of everyday life. Theory must refuse doctrine if it is to assume the perspective of self-management. It must describe and defend the "**permanence of difference**" against the common sense of identity in both socialism and liberalism" (1986: 20).

On first impression one can say that the four authors align themselves within two opposite views about the role of the production of knowledge in contemporary society: Habermas and Bell on a pole that fosters disciplinary and institutional separation and specialization as the means to serve, that is, better knowledge for society; Said, Bove, and, Aronowitz on the other pole, fostering the crossing over disciplinary and institutional boundaries so that knowledge could become part of the actions of society. But these commentaries could be regrouped in still other fashions.

For example, Habermas, Bove, Aronowitz, as well as Said, are clear in questioning the model of positivist science as the privileged model of knowledge. Each is also explicit about the political consequences of fostering this model. Bell, on the other hand, offers

strong support to scientific models, but his support is more for probabilistc mathematical models than for the more traditional universalistic prediction/control models of the physical sciences.

Habermas, Bove, and Aronowitz place special emphasis on respecting differences that cannot be subsumed under a particular model of knowledge. For Habermas the problem is one of bringing non-scientific and scientific realms to equal status as knowledge. For Bove and for Aronowitz it is a matter of including as knowledge issues and approaches that currently are either ignored or disregarded as abnormalities by the hegemonic scientistic approaches, for example, those pertaining to women and minorities.

Some may say that their commentaries are "leftist" discourses but that claim is difficult to sustain. Bell is pure controversy floating between extremes; Habermas is accused of naivete by the Critical schools; Said and Bove are more interested in the work of literature in relation to the world; and Aronowitz goes at length on criticizing Marxist and Neo-Marxist positions, and explicitly adopts a stance near poststructuralism.

However, on examining their differences it becomes clear that there are two common focuses in their commentaries. One common focus is that they indicate, explicitly or implicitly, what are and what should be the relationships between the knowledge-producing institutions and society at large. Within the same focus the authors discuss discoursive practices that could account for the structural arrangements of society and of the knowledge-producing institutions. The second common focus is that each of these works is currently considered, in scholarly circles,

to be postmodern social criticism.

These authors do not leave any doubt about the importance that the knowledge-producing institutions should gain in everyday society: they should stand side by side other institutions and practices, participating in the making of everyday society, rather than responding to other societal "forces."

The crossing of boundaries is the dominant tone. The form of participation may vary: concurrent development (equal discoursive value) of all spheres of knowledge for Habermas, with emphasis in creating a better balance of knowledge for a good and balanced society; more knowledge production in science and technology for Bell, with the technocrats now crossing the boundaries of universities, government, and business; and active intellectual intervention to politicize the other apparent neutral structures of society for Said, Bove, and Aronowitz. These ideas are quite a departure from those followed in the modern development of the universities and the disciplines in America ---where even within the context of professionalism their role was to respond rather than initiate, to serve rather than to participate--- and to a lesser extent in Germany and other Western countries. These are the newer postmodern discourses, where kitsch and intellectualism may be rubbing elbows.

My question now is: As in modernity, are the "organizational sciences" to be latecomers again in postmodernity? Or are they now ready to abandon their impossible (because of its dominant scientific posture) and anachronistic quest into "High Modernism" (because of its lateness in reaching this stage of modern culture) and finally become

involved with their own current culture? Even from a purely modern perspective I find "High Modernism" in the organizational sciences --- the elitist separation of "high" cultural forms (as in high-life) from "everyday" society, which peaked by the late 1950s in most other fields --- particularly ironic. As suggested in the previous chapter, for the field which could have broken the representational separation between theory and practice, that is, for the continuity and involvement between the academic activities and the managerial activities, the irony is in the difficulties it has gotten into trying to maintain those representations.

In the rest of this chapter I explore postmodernism further. From there, in the following three chapters, I make another, more detailed journey into the modern constitution of the "organizational subject." It is my contention that not until then we will be ready to understand the postmodern possibilities of our discipline.

Enter Postmodernity

I concluded the preceding section arguing, as I did in chapter two, about the organizational disciplines' late advent into the culture of modernity. I observed that the discipline has been working to attain a respected place within the university as producer of a scientific body of knowledge. With its strategies of separation from the "everyday" practices of organizing the discipline can be easily located within the typical elitist activities of "High Modernism". My comments pointed at the irony of such strategies, but it was an irony pregnant with double meaning. Beyond laughing at the separation between the theory and practice of organization ---which would be just a benign modern commentary based on pragmatist philosophies--- my laughter had postmodern resonance. I was laughing at the elitist attempts of the most popular/populous of theories in the Western world.

That is, it is my position that one can understand the culture of modernity in Western society, and in the United States in particular, as one which has attained its main cultural production in the form of "organizations." Modern life evolves within, and revolves around, the notion of organizing ---society as "institutional order" (Denhart, 1981; Smircich, 1983). Under such circumstances, a discipline constituted from and for such productions could have been a main social critic, the site for cultural self-reflexivity, and a bridge between knowledge production and everyday life. But as we may understand now, that was not within the range of possibilities for "authorizing" a new discipline in modern America.

At this point one can go back to Towne's statements in the previous chapter and observe his emphasis on justifying the classification of modern art for "the management of works", while keeping the classification of science for engineering. On first thought, one may say that had the organizational disciplines kept its label as "art," they would have followed the path of social criticism outlined above, joining other "arts" as a site of intellectual pursuits (such as criticism). But that would be too naive a view. The point we must remember is that for the organizational disciplines to join the university implied demonstrating command of a specialized discourse, to shed the stigma of "vocationalism" and "commercial schools" (the latter having the additional stigmatizing character of being highly populated by female students), and coming as close to professionalism as possible.

The conditions of possibility for such happenings were already delineated in society. The discourses of power were the discourses of science. Thus, the organizational disciplines became "organizational sciences" --- and the strategies of High Modernism the manner to protect their privileged re-presentation. The "bourgeois science" paralleled rather than traversed bourgeois society. But with that movement it showed its "true colors" and sealed its fate: that was how art, not science, moved in "High Modernity". This has added a very concealed ambiguity for the meaning "organizational sciences," and has enhanced in recent years the confused state of the field.

In the following pages I initiate the postmodern program pursued in the rest of the project. Here I discuss how the "organizational sciences" would not be able to continue its "High Modernist" path in a

cultural moment which is no longer modern. Within the university it will be difficult to continue the quest for a privileged position through the stratagems of modernity, which are too transparent and easily "read" in postmodernity. But more importantly, in postmodernity the boundaries between "fields," and between elite and mass culture get erased. Thus, how are these "sciences," in their distantiation from other disciplines and from society, going to participate in the postmodern quest higlighted by Habermas, Said, Aronowitz, Bove, and even Bell? What kind of participants are they going to be in the making of everyday society?

To deal with these issues and questions I first indicate some basic characteristics of postmodernism. Then I focus on the problems of representational strategies in a postmodern mode. These strategies acquire special importance as they would reveal the discoursive formations of the discipline. Later I propose that these discoursive formations have maintained their specialized and privileged modernist status through the constitution of "the organizational subject"---the role of the manager/management. The deconstruction of this subject in the following chapters will permit me to propose a postmodern status for the "organizational sciences" by the end of the project. Behind these arguments lies the conviction that the greatest postmodern opportunities for this "scholarly field" are located in its current confused and ambiguous state.

The Discourses of Postmodernity

As may be understood now, the difficulties of the organizational sciences are not unique. In many disciplines the hope for unified fields and accumulated knowledge, typical of previous historical moments, has given way to the discomfort provoked by competing views and unresolved differences. In general this situation can be described as one where the master discourses are contested by fragmented voices, and one where the hegemony of these master discourses is constantly questioned. No discipline, especially those in the human sciences, has been able to find its "grand unified theory." In most cases multiple and competing theories are accepted within the disciplinary cores. The "real Truth" seems more remote now than ever before.

For example, in the human sciences theoretical approaches which attempted to provide formal general frameworks for understanding and explanation ("new criticism" in literary criticism, legal reasoning in law, positivism in social theory, the ideal of growth in economics, universal principles in philosophy, and even surrealism in art) have given way to more relativistic and local understandings. An illustration from the social sciences can make this point more clear. After World War II the contest between Parsonian sociology and Marxism could be understood as the opposition of traditional ideologies by critical ones. They illustrate modernism not only in their ideological oppositions, but also, as commented on by Bove and Aronowitz, by their "totalizing discourses" (grand theory mode) in which each could explain, and explain away, the "whole" of capitalist societies; and in

anthropology, the whole of the "less developed" societies (e.g. Marcus and Fischer, 1986; de Certau, 1986). From a postmodern perspective, "middle range" approaches (e.g. Merton, 1968), attempting to explain in an integrative fashion what would be, otherwise, incommensurable points of view, are extreme "totalizing" positions.

The Parsonian/Marxist "contest" is uncovered/recognized as a "modern moment" from the vantage point of postmodernity by noticing now how their theoretical assumptions coexist side by side in university courses. The contest won by no one, the "grand truth" nowhere; they are but "language games" (Lyotard, 1979).

No less is the case in the natural sciences, where the concepts of chaos and disorder have become as prevalent, if not more, than the macro theories of order (e.g. Gleick, 1984). The search for a GUT, however, has not been abandoned, it just co-exists with other, less hegemonic understandings. This "crisis of knowledge" is defined by many as marking the movement from the modern to the postmodern (e.g. Lyotard, 1979; Hassan, 1982; Foster, 1983; Huyssen, 1984; Arac, 1986).

Different fields have encountered the postmodern condition roughly since the 1920s, however it seems that since the 1960s there is a concurrent awareness of postmodernity in various fields of the human sciences in a form that crosses the disciplinary boundaries and amalgamates their discourses. To a certain extent, one may think that such is also the case in the organizational sciences, but this judgement must be made against the basic postmodern themes explored later.

The Postmodern (Period?) Moment

Now, what exactly is postmodernity? Wrong question. There is no exactly in the postmodern moment. The "shape" of postmodernity is "collage/montage" (e.g. Ulmer, 1983).

For some, postmodernism is a response to modernism. According to Jameson (1983), the difficulty in seeing this relationship stems from the diversity of postmodern responses to modernism. For example, he labels postmodern the mixed architectural styles built as a response to the International Style of Le Corbusier, Wright, and Mies van der Rohe; pop art and photorealism against abstract expressionism. Similarly in music, film and literature one can find postmodern works that go from the very sophisticated ---the pun is in the ambiguity of this word, which can either mean refined, adulterated or disillusioned--- to kitsch ---it takes Lily Tomlin's interpretation of the Quaker Oats' logo to understand the concept of infinity. The variety of postmodernist works can be partially attributed to the variety of modernist works to which they respond, but there are other understandings of this variety.

For example, Rorty (1979), Lyotard (1984) and Jameson (1984) consider that modernity was a challenge to an impossible project. A challenge to a "history" which put us in the road of rationality as a mode of thinking: from Socrates, as reported by Plato, to Kant via Descartes. Here is where Habermas' position disagrees with these more prevalent postmodernist notions. He believes that the promises of modernity have not been fulfilled due to the separation of the discourses of "knowledge" from the discourses of everyday life and the

primacy given to instrumental rationality ---and not because there is anything wrong with rationality per se as a mode of thinking.

Nonetheless, the modernity of late nineteenth and early twentieth century was an irreverent laughter (e.g. cubism) in the face of rationality. The irony was that the "laughter" became rationalized/institutionalized in "High Modernism" ---the subject of serious discussions and courses in the universities, and well attended exhibitions in the museums.

The "official" modernism most often addressed is that of art and literature because it was in many ways self-conscious and purposeful ---i.e. it presented itself as a cultural challenge (e.g. Adorno, 1973). In other social manifestations, including the sciences, their modern moments were probably less explicit than in the fine arts and letters; but as indicated before, those moments are now being uncovered/recognized by emerging postmodernity. Thus, the epochal uneveness of the postmodern appearance can also be traced back to moments of disillusionment with failed modernist challenges, and their further institutionalization in the different disciplines.

These comments may lead to an understanding of postmodernism as reflexivity over the utopianism of the modern oppositional movements; and over the impossibility of consciously transcending the present toward any different future orientation. The sentiment is best captured in a phrase by Habermas: "Modernism is dominant but dead" (1983: 6). However, there is no simple understanding of postmodernism.

For example, Foster (1983) considers that there are two different kinds of postmodernism: Postmodernism of reaction and

postmodernism of resistance. The first one is a replaying of neoconservatism. It blames the practices of modernism for the ills of modernization; and hopes to reaffirm the economic and political status quo by reconnecting to premodern cultural practices. A good example is Bell, who ties the possible success of a postindustrial world to a religious revival of the Protestant ethic. But as I said before, postmodernism is difficult to categorize through any (pre)known form. One of its critical emphases is precisely against categorizing (e.g. Foucault, 1973). And sure enough, how to interpret Bell's message is debated in postmodernist circles ---e.g. Foster, (1983) and Habermas (1980) versus Arac (1986) who questions whether Bell's position is neoconservatism.

The other form of postmodernism, that of resistance, is the one of interest for this project. Resistance, in this case, is not to oppose (opposition being a modern notion) but to defer belief. The notion of opposition includes substituting one notion of "truth" with an alternative which cannot be compatible (e.g. "paradigms" a la Burrell and Morgan; "mainstream" vs. "critical organizational symbolism" literature). Resistance in postmodernism is to suspect and defer accepting any notion of "truth". It is to question the possibility of attaining truth (as in ideal scientific knowledge) with the view that "possibility-of-attaining-truth" is just an idea, among many other possible ways of thinking (e.g. Foucault, 1976; Hacking, 1982; Rorty, 1979). Thus, in more than one way postmodernism is postparadigm thinking.

Postmodern "disciplinary" activities do not offer a "better or

greater truth". Instead, these are activities geared at suspending judgement while uncovering/exposing the ways in which "the better or greater truths" have been "structured and developed" through discoursive formations. Deconstructive readings (e.g. Derrida, 1976) which "suspect", "take apart", and "defer resolution" (but do not destruct) our taken for granted modes of thinking and saying are good examples of postmodern resistance.

In general, then, postmodernism of resistance does not propose a "dominant view" but observes, comments and takes action upon the multiplicity of fragmentary views. From this position one understand these events in/as the context of our present world, where fragmentation and multiplicity flourish in the face of any attempt at "grand solutions". Postmodernist activities move within and among these everchanging fragments, to make/understand the world "better" --- over and over again. Aronowitz's (1981) position is an excellent example of this view. In the double role he assigns to the intellectual, "action" and "thinking" are both necessary but discontinuous and incommensurable activities.

A Postmodern Thematic for the "Organizational Sciences"

More specific now, let's explore the postmodern themes of interest in this project. They provide the background against which the deconstruction of "organizational sciences productions" will be effected in the coming chapters.

The End of Metanarratives

One very well known postmodern theme is its characterization as "the end of metanarratives" (Lyotard, 1979). This idea emphasizes how the hegemonic, totalizing discourses of previous times, with promises of all-encompassing theories for each disciplinary cluster, have given way to fragmentary illuminations and local understandings. The failure of "the accumulation of knowledge" promised by the philosophical positions which promoted the "truth and falsity" style is questioned by more eclectic positions. The questioning, in this case, is done in a mode which allows the "regime of grand theory" to rub elbows with "the resistance", with modes of thinking which question how come we got into a "regime of grand theory" in the first place. As expressed by Marcus and Fischer:

> "The authority of "grand theory" styles seems suspended for the moment in favor of a close consideration of such issues as contextuality, the meaning of social life to those who enact it, and the explanation of exceptions and indeterminants rather than regularities in phenomena observed ---all issues that make problematic what were taken for granted as facts or certainties on which the validity of paradigms has rested." (1986: 8)

Talking about "hegemonic discourses" is another way of addressing "mainstream views" and the power relationships that support their dominance. In postmodernity one may observe that the "hegemonic discourses" are not the only ones in around anymore. They may still be dominant, but there are other minor voices (the ones that question, the ones in the margin, the resistance) that are being heard. In postmodernity the aim of the minor voices is not to stay around until

they become dominant, but to maintain an opening from where to question the totalitarian attempts (of providing integrative, all encompassing, "world views" which explain, and explain away, everything) of those who want to become or to stay dominant.

Fragmentation of Disciplinary Boundaries

This brings us to two closely related themes: **the fragmentation of disciplinary boundaries and the multiplicity of discourses.** The end of metanarratives in the disciplines can be better understood if rather than thinking in terms of "finding Truth" we think in terms of "saying `truth'", or language-games in a Wittgensteinian mode. If the grand theories are conceived as a style of thinking and saying during times where there was a **taste** for "hegemonic discourses," the analyses of those times and thoughts must be effected through analyses of their discoursive practices (e.g. Foucault, 1976; 1978; 1979) --- to analyze the ways in which "truth" was fashioned.

Thus, the analyses of theoretical discourses, and learning about textual practices in theorizing, have become common grounds for many disciplines not only to question previous styles, and their institutionalization, but for enacting (more consciously) new ones (Culler, 1982). In this manner the textual model permits one to deconstruct other discourses, and understand our present cultural condition as one where it is possible to exist (like different texts in a library) with heterogeneity, contradiction, and the discourses of others. But, without entering into details here, it is also a position

which deconstructs and opens for questioning the logic of the library (and the museum, by metonymy) itself. For example, what is "the organizing principle" behind the library? What is the epistemological position which informs "collecting knowledge" in the library? (e.g. Crimp, 1983; Donato, 1979; Foucault, 1977a). So much for comfortable metaphors in postmodernity!.

The "end of metanarratives" is intertwined with these other two themes when it questions the authority invested on our categories, fields, and disciplines, to determine our bases for knowledge. From this point of view the development of disciplines according to their inner logic, and the separation of fields, is viewed as an arbitrary presupposition, mostly sustained by philosophies which expected to develop "totalizing discourses" for explaining the world, while maintaining a power seat. And while here one is tempted to except Habermas' views from totalizing attempts, Lyotard attacks Habermas directly on this point. For Lyotard, in a fragmented world like ours we cannot entertain the possibility of any particular discourse to provide any specific adequate knowledge. We are entangled in webs of situations and relationships, and we need multiple discourses to participate in the many "language games" which we are bound to encounter.

The Death of the Subject

The last postmodern theme I want to present here, **the death of the subject**, is probably the most difficult for us in the "organizational sciences" to approach, especially since it took us many

years to institutionalize a "humanist" view of organizations. However, it is also the most important postmodern theme in this dissertation. Inside of it is located any possible attempt at deconstructing the "organizational sciences."

Jameson summarizes this theme as follows:

> "The great modernisms were, as we have said, predicated on the invention of a personal, private style, as unmistakable as your fingerprint, as incomparable as your own body. But this means that the modernist aesthetic is in some way organically linked to the conception of a unique self and private identity, a unique personality and individuality, which can be expected to generate its own unique vision of the world and to forge its own unique, unmistakable style... Yet today, from any number of distinct perspectives, the social theorists, the psychoanalysts, even the linguists, not to speak of those of us who work in the area of culture and cultural and formal change, are all exploring the notion that that kind of individualism and personal identity is a thing of the past; that the old individual or individualist subject is `dead;' and that one may even describe the concept of unique individual and the theoretical basis of individualism as ideological" (1983: 114-115).

According to Jameson there are two positions within this theme. One adopts the view that there was such a thing as individualism during the classic age of competitive capitalism. Those were the days of the nuclear family and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic social class. However today, this view points out, in the age of corporate capitalism, of "organizational men and women", of bureaucracies in business and state, of demographic explosion: the older bourgeois individual subject cannot exist any longer. The other position adopts a more radical view. It not only considers the bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past but it also points to its mythical existence. From this point of view there has never been

autonomous subjects of that type. They only existed as a theoretical construct of a philosophical and cultural style which sought to persuade people that they "had" individual subjects, that they possessed this unique personal identity.

The "death of the subject" points not so much to our inescapable situation as cultural and social beings, an argument for cultural and social determinism, as to the imperatives of understanding ourselves and our possibilities past the immediate appearances of "the self" and its "unique place and competence". As indicated by Lyotard's views on language games above, we are traversed by the multiple discourses of our times. We are these multiple discourses.

Recently, an interdisciplinary collection of essays about autonomy, individuality and the self in Western thought (Heller, Sosna, and Wellbery, 1986) has shed additional light on this debate. The essays work from the following assumptions: first, they understand the notion of individualism ---where the individual human subject is the maker of the world--- as a central historical notion of life in the West for the last five centuries. The modern definitions of self, psychology, moral responsibility, identity, artistic representation, and economic behavior "... all rest on the notion of an individual whose experience and history, whose will and values, whose expressions and preferences are essential constituents of reality" (1986: 1).

Their second assumption indicates that from the second half of the nineteenth century the notion of a Western society constructed through an individualistic order has become increasingly problematic. Developments such as industrialization and the emergence of mass society

have altered the necessary presuppositions for unity and autonomy in the human individual. These two assumptions attempt to deconstruct, as much as Jameson's commentaries above, the "individual subject", who either as a mythical or anachronistic figure cannot exist in postmodernism: "... throughout the world, the subject increasingly appears as the empty, ideological image of mass culture, the legitimating myth of an administrative discourse" (1986: 9 [my emphasis]). An argument against Comte, but not necessarily for Marx.

Their third assumption, however, is where the issue regains its affirmative value. The explorations conducted in all the essays seek to attain an alternative conceptualization of the experience of subjectivity, rather than returning to the impossible "individualistic state." From this position, the notion of postmodern "~~subjectivity~~", in quotes and under erasure marks, is to be experienced as dependent on a cultural order, but also as an undetermined productive instance. Here the individual is:

> ..."a self in motion that makes use of the discourse of autonomous individuality in conjunction with an ongoing series of displacements of its position in order to reinterpret the history of its own behavior from continuously shifting vantage points. In an extreme form, this transitory self, which experiences a coherent sense of individuality and uniqueness as one of several competing but mutually vivid accounts of existence, may undergo a kind of intellectual vertigo" (1986: 12 [my emphasis]).

I should point now at the relationships between "the death of the subject" and the previously discussed postmodern themes. These relationships will provide additional insights into the significance of deconstructing "organizational sciences" as we know them now. If, as played with when deconstructing the title of this dissertation, the

"organizational sciences" in their current form are moving into the modern subject's fate, then the deconstruction of the "organizational subject" may help us to reconstruct it in a possible postmodern mode ... where intellectual vertigo can be a tenable position.

Before I emphasized: first, that everything we take for granted as real categories in the world (e.g., truth/falsity; a dominant view; disciplines; the individual) can also be conceived as a style of thinking and saying; and second, that such style is embedded in particular types of specialized discourses (e.g. scientific; professional; psychoanalytical) often aiming at establishing a dominant view. But, as noticed by Foucault (1972) and Said (1983) these specialized discourses may not be as different (among themselves) as we may think. It is likely that they share: the same episteme for Foucault; the same ethic and epistemology for Said; or, as the critical theorist would have it, perhaps the same ideologies.

If we overlap both ideas, we observe that the views we hold about the world are made by the discourses through which we produce it. It does not matter how "unique an individual" we think we are, we are nothing but the discourses through and in which we live. In a sense we are nothing but traversing points in networks, rhizomes, of discourses. Thus, when you (or I), "unique individual", think, or speak, or write, or read, who is doing it? Your (or my) "unique words"? or our inherited discourses and views of the world as they may be said in our times?.

The "death of the subject" provides the background for additional complications. It allows us to focus on the problematic relationship of any product of discourse, and their "authors". In other

words, if what we think, write, speak, comes from discourses that are not exclusively ours, then those others can come up with their own "misreadings" of my words which would be as possible as mine. As our discourses become more multiple and complex, as we move from "network" to "network," what is possible to say and think becomes more dissimilar and localized --- words, the symbol, might be the same, but the meanings would multiply. At this point any attempt to maintain the "hegemony" of any discourse would change from "truth" to violence ---i.e how do you maintain the status of "truth" for any meaning? How do you "authorize" the true version? How do you "prove" it? Those who follow the modern views about "true knowledge" outlined in the previous chapter would say that "further research is necessary," and with that statement they would seal their totalizing views.

To create disciplinary discourses ---"the truth of the matter", embedded in the modern tradition (literature, theory, research)--- has implied the acceptance of the single, approved, interpretation of its meaning. The idea of multiple interpretations has always been an uneasy one for "scientific fields", which exemplify the "truth or falsity style of thinking." But poststructuralism and postmodernism have challenged the "hard disciplines": it doesn't matter what the matter is, it is nothing but discourses. And discourses do not have exact, invariable meaning: any word can have multiple meanings, for different persons, at different times, in different places. Without necessarily implying absolute relativism, the concept of one single interpretation of anything becomes a very problematic assumption from this perspective.

The notion of "the subject", ---unified, whole, balanced,

consistent--- resolves the difficulties. The rhetoric of "the individual" works against the experience of multiple interpretations... a fragmented self is diseased, schizophrenic. Thus, against the experience of multiplicity lurks the shadow of insanity. This ideology has fueled the surviving skills of the modern disciplines. In the discourses of uniqueness, separation, wholeness, truth, and specialization of the individual, ---discourses about its ability to be in control and to control--- hides a world of experiences of fragmentation and ambiguities... and of massification through cultural control.

In this context the "management subject" which sustains the "organizational sciences" is a prime example of the discourses of modernity. The role of the manager is the necessary condition for the existence of the discipline. It is a rhetoric about the unique abilities of the manager, and his effective actions as an individual. On his actions depends the fate of the organizations, and in them the fate of society. The ability to manage effectively can be learned, and this knowledge in enhanced by the accumulation of scientific empirical knowledge. He is in control... He will succeed. There is no space for a disjointed self in this situation. It took too many years ---from Comte to McGregor--- to finally institutionalize these views in an "organizational science."

In this project the deconstruction of the management subject will allow us to understand its sustaining localized rhetorics at different points in time since its emergence as a modern "disciplinary subject." It will show how its "metanarratives" and specialized

discourses have built on the ideology of autonomy and individualism. In the current postmodern moment, where the efforts to sustain this ideology are increasingly changing from "truth" to violence, these readings will set the stage to propose a possible postmodern organizational subject. --- But, are there any signs that this would be possible?

Can there be a postmodern O. S.?

Aside from the concerns of recent mainstream organizational literature highlighted in the first chapter --- and that we can attribute now to the unfulfilled promises of "science," and the contesting of its hegemonic discourses--- the organizational sciences are exhibiting further discontent, and some self-critique. In recent years scholars in this field have been questioning other issues traditionally taken for granted in organizational practices, and especially in organizational research activities.

These works go beyond the oppositional ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates (e.g. Daudi, 1983; Astley, 1985; Calás and Smircich, 1985; Calás 1986a, 1986b; Stubbart, 1986; Smircich and Calás, 1987) and focus on another problematic which deals with the transformation of the researched phenomena into the discoursive practices through which it is theorized and reported.

As already observed, the critiques to mainstream organizational theory and research outlined in chapter one, can still be connected to the discourses of modernity. They are oppositional discourses which

propose to substitute one notion of truth with another (e.g. the positivist "truth" with the phenomenologist "truth"). The more recent critiques are closer to the conditions of postmodernity. They address a recognition that all truth lies in its representation; and they also address the problematics that such recognition represents for the organizational disciplines.

For example, Astley (1985) following Berger and Luckmann (1967) commented on the socially constructed nature of "truth" in administrative science, which is an important argument made by many authors in this and other fields (e.g Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1982; Morgan, 1983; Watzlawick, 1984; Stablein and Nord, 1985). But more important and fresher in this field is his analysis of the linguistic and political nature of "scientific truth" in our disciplines. He notes that:

> "Once we relinquish the view that theoretical constructs are direct representations of external reality, language itself becomes the essential subject matter of scientific deliberation. Language is not simply a vehicle for transmitting information. Rather, it is the very embodiment of truth" (1985: 499).

He also observes how "knowledge" in the field is often determined by social/institutional control of intellectual advance, given the competitive pursuit of intellectual reputations. His arguments, illustrating a self-reflexive awareness of our "occult practices" (Tyler, 1986), join similar recent critiques of other scientific fields (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Clifford and Marcus, 1986). In a similar vein, Calás and Smircich (1985) and Calás (1986a; 1986b) have

performed critical readings of "the leader"; and Stubbart (1986) of "strategic management."

In these arguments, "truth" and the constitution of "the subject of knowledge" in the disciplines are viewed as political, discoursive, and textual activities, which are issues embedded in the discourses of postmodernity. Thus, a postmodern analysis of a subject of knowledge requires an analysis of its discoursive representations ---but it is an analysis of "representation" in a postmodern mode.

A Postmodern Look at Representation

Representation is considered a central concern of postmodernism. With this concern postmodernism questions the dictum of philosophies that privilege sensed and experienced presence as reality. An example may provide a better opening of this issue.

Let us think about a vase of roses painted in the realist tradition. When rendered by the artist it has to be as close to reality as possible. The value of the painting placed on how much it is "like reality". But on looking at the picture "as a painting" rather than "as a vase of roses" we notice that it is not like "reality" at all (implying that it is not like the vase of roses which was the model for the painting). Rather, it is flat, it only shows color differences which are synthetic, fictions of "light" "shadow", and there is no smell of roses. Besides, reality had another context in time and space (the room where the vase was painted, the time when it was painted, the artist presence). Then, if we look at it "as a painting" we may say

that this painting is not a re-presentation of reality but a present-ation of itself as allegory/evocation of something else. There were many more aspects of reality in the trajectory of this painting that are not evoked in it. Looking at the painting in this way it becomes a text "to be read", full of indeterminacies. There is much more to the painting than "being like reality."

Another example, this time from a later artistic moment. A collage/montage made up of real objects pasted together inside a frame. A cut-up from The New York Times; a piece of string; some colored cloth, pink and blue; two soda bottle caps. A nice textural arrangement. Each article there is "real `whatever'". Then, this art piece should be more real than the previous one if we consider the reality of the objects in the composition. Moreover, its title is "Cut up from The NYT, with A Piece of String, Some Colored Cloth, Pink and Blue, and Two Bottle Caps." We may feel some uneasiness: is it art or is it trash? But, do we have to look at it any differently from the previous example? From a textual point of view it is as indeterminate as the previous one, except that it "hides" it differently.

These examples simplify many important aspects around representation (e.g. Foucault, 1983) which will given closer attention in the readings of the role of the manager. They capture, however, a view that I can now transfer to research activities in the organizational sciences.

Be it painting or organizational research, any field which rests its claims on what exist outside of it is dealing with problematics of representation. This is to say that conveying "what is going on in the

world" implies engaging in a transformation and re-production of that world into some form of re-presentation.

In other words, it is the assumption of the organizational sciences ---as well as any other empirical discipline--- that to form a disciplinary core they must rely on their ability to apprehend the organizational phenomena and to redefine it into an ordered set of categories and abstractions. These categories and abstractions are further reconstituted in whatever form a research description and report may take, usually a written form.

On addressing these assumptions a question appears which goes beyond the ontological and epistemological issues more often acknowledged. We have to further ask in this case: Where is the organizational phenomena the disciplinary core refers to ? Is it in the organizations themselves, or is it in the re-constituted, re-presented form we call organizational research?

Here we are dealing with an assorted set of problems. First, there is the issue of abstracting organizational phenomena. Most debates addressing this issue focus on ontological grounds (i. e. whether to conceive organizational phenomena as "objective reality" ---positivist view-, or as a "social construction" ---interpretivist view-) and epistemological grounds (i.e. the separation or participation between the knower and the known).

The second issue, that of apprehending and categorizing, appears mostly in methodological debates. In this case the problems are posed around the appropriate notions or categories used to obtain and classify the phenomena so that they could be ordered, and explained or

understood. Traditionally the debates have opposed quantitative/qualitative methodologies in the quest for a meaningful ordering and understanding of the researched "reality."

The third issue is probably the one most often taken for granted, its problematics acknowledged in very few instances. It is the dilemma of re-presenting the phenomena through the forms in which it is defined, described and reported. This issue also participates in the ideological debates over the nature of reality.

For example, from a positivist ontological position it is unlikely that the description and reporting of "reality" will be deemed problematic given its a priori objectifying and reductionist defining operations. In other words, the positivist "world" is what the researcher defines it to be, guided by previous "solid" (not disconfirmed) theories and "rational" approaches toward the world "out there." From this position there is no major need for self-reflexivity about the defining operations, nor questioning about the researcher's role in interpretation and description. This approach to representation is close to the "realist" tradition in art, where the artist's task is to render an image as close to reality as possible (the vase of roses).

The interpretivist or social constructionist position is more ready to address the problem. The philosophical position which inform these views (usually phenomenology/existential phenomenology) is explicit in regard to the participation of the "knowing subject" with the "known object." Here there will be some reflexivity about the complexities of conveying the researched situation, and the participation of the researcher in its definition. But the problem is

often "solved" through a contextualizing strategy that gives privilege to presence and experience (where, for example, the social and local grounds of organizing are described, as experienced by the researcher). How is "contextualizing" possible, or how is that "contextualizing" produces "reality" (the politics and poetics of (inter)/(con)textuality") is seldom questioned. In many ways this approach will be similar to the collage in my second example. That art piece not only brings into its constitution the "real object," making it as present as possible; it also represents the experience of the artist, the intentionality of the person over the texture.

As may be gathered from the above discussion, from a postmodern view the issue of representation further deals with quite a distinct complication. Traditional theorizing and researching (ontological, epistemological and methodological issues) deal with phenomena "outside" its representation, thus, with a **thematic of presence** (approaching and apprehending phenomena). Theorizing about re-presentation, re-constituting, and re-producing deal with a **thematic of absence** (evoking phenomena). This latter theme plays a very important part in the position toward representation taken in this project.

Here the notion of representation is understood as the possibility for effecting deconstructive readings. Representation in this case is "mounting" or "grafting" alternative meanings over an apparent straightforward mimesis or copy of an external reality. Such an activity substitutes <u>mimesis</u> for <u>mime</u>. Rather than re-producing reality, based on an external presence and experience, to mime <u>is a production</u> based on the playfulness of presence and absence.

One can understand this idea through the collage/montage of my second example, this time "read" beyond the interpretivist position. In this case the collage/montage produces everchanging effects through the multiple ways in which one can interpret what is really there (e.g. the bottle caps). For example, one can "read" in the bottle caps the evocation of the absent bottles. And then, again, it can be a protest against littering the streets with bottle caps (instead produce art with them). Or a statement of the artist's preference for a particular brand of soda. Or a "hanging" of the company that produces them for their insensitivity to apartheid. And all of the above. Deconstructive readings are a "making" of what is "really" there --- in all its ironies, puns, and indeterminacies.

Thus, from a postmodernist point of view, the issue of representation in organizational research (or any other empirical field) would not necessarily require a change of style in the research approach. What it would require is the questioning of the research approach as style. Such questioning must lead us to enter the postmodern condition addressing first the pragmatics, poetics, politics and ethics of organizational research and theory. Questioning any representation from this position, for example a journal article, one should address what it does (e.g. how does it "advance knowledge") how it is said (e.g. the conventions of writing science) who can, or should, say it (e.g. the established vs. "the novice", when, and where) and what ideological message it sustain (e.g. that the manager's views are privileged over that of other organizational members, or vice-versa).

But more important, this exploration must be done through

collage/montage, and mime stratagems, which produce disquieting effects over any claim to single, straightforward, meanings; and which advance the possibility of other meanings.

This kind of criticism/reading not only opens possibilities for new productions over old texts, but is in itself an exercise on opening and proliferating possibilities of interpretation over any kind of human activity ---almost a practice on the many surprising ways by which we can mean more than what we say--- to have a disjointed self, and still be an "OK individual".

From Modern Metaphor to Postmodern Metonymy and Allegory

Some critiques to the traditional functionalist view of organizations have acknowledged the force of metaphors chosen to represent the world, and the metaphorical nature of theorizing (e.g. Manning, 1979; Morgan,1980; 1983). Mostly, they have adopted the notion that all science is primarily metaphorical and that, depending on the chosen metaphor, theorists commit themselves to an epistemological position which emphasizes a particular form of knowledge. These critiques, however, have often ignored (as much as those that they are criticizing) some other problematics of these claims to knowledge.

That is, be it the "objective world out there" punctuated by mechanistic or organismic metaphors, or the "socially constructed nature of the world" punctuated by metaphors such as culture, theatre, and even language games, all organizational research and organizational practice is theorized and re-produced by discoursive practices.

In few instances the chosen metaphor has been one that questions the discoursive problematics of theorizing; one that would question the representational force of metaphors themselves --- i.e. the ambiguous state of any claimed meaning for a metaphor --- and that regards all language as metaphorical.

From a postmodern textual theory position, the problematics of metaphor have been acknowledged (e.g. De Man, 1979) as attempts at totalizing, stable meanings (e.g. to talk of the metaphor of mechanistic organization permits one to draw and interpret everything through that imagery --- the metaphor providing a structure where to rest a concept). In the postmodern deconstructive approach metonymy and allegory are the preferred discoursives figures. Metonymy because it allows one to move along contiguous figures to proliferate rather than reduce meanings ---e.g. the second "reading" I did in my "collage" example. And allegory because it is an unstable figure, which can be told over and over again with new interpretations. Other examples, through metonymy one can start exploring how to move from the idea "executive" to the idea "women executive" through discontinuous notions, which accentuate the non-identity between the concepts. And through allegory one can think about the multiple ways in which an "organizational story" can be reinterpreted, rather than looking for the "common vision" in the organizational members' "minds."

Thus, this textual theory position, and its accompanying rhetorical figures, allows one to conceive "the world" as representation, instead of focusing on how the world is represented. It calls attention to the construction of "representation" as theory, with

as many implications as possible, rather than to the construction of "an stable theory" for the purpose of representation.

From this brief discussion the importance of textual theory for the critique of the "organizational sciences" is brought to the fore. It informs the possibility that the legitimizing strategies of an "organizational science" and the creation of its disciplinary boundaries reside in its enabling discourses: those which have worked at a convincing best to re-present "organization" and "science."

Having made this explicit, textual strategies may enable a different "line" (loops?) of questioning and critiquing. For example, it could permit one to stop searching for the theoretical standpoint that may best represent the organizational world, and start proposing different representations to constitute that world. Rather than to question how well a theory represents to question how does a theory make representation. Also, these strategies may open the way to new models for "legitimizing" organizational research and practice. These models would more likely be grounded on the analysis and critique of the representational practice/theory, in its textualization, instead of the traditional concept of "degree of correspondence" between "model", "data" and "reality."

Moreover, through textual theory it is possible to open the way for the organizational sciences to participate with other disciplines in the wider cultural debate known as "the postmodern condition." This participation is of particular importance for the organizational desciplines since it is the view of the world they have traditionally espoused (capitalist, industrial, technological, rational,

consumer-oriented) which is at stake in many of these debates (e.g. Bell, 1976; Jameson, 1983; 1984; Lyotard, 1984; Said, 1983).

Finally, with this discussion I am representing in form and content the relevance of this project. All that I have written so far, and whatever I would write is clearly tied to a possible "mastery of effects" as well as to other issues (philosophical, political, ethical) that crisscross the merely "poetical." Here I am trying to create a situation that can convince others of the importance of addressing these issues, of my competence for doing so, of "the world of possibilities" to be opened by doing the non-traditional. Is this a reality that I am creating in and with what I am writing? Is this also the case with all theoreticians and researchers in this field? An affirmative answer to these questions prompts closer and more self-conscious examinations of our disciplinary practices.

In the following chapter I will start these examinations through deconstructive readings on "the role of the manager."

CHAPTER IV

DIVERSIFICATION, DECENTRALIZATION: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE

I think it is time now to explain in more explicit terms ---which because of their announced "explicitness" are, of course, more liable to be reinterpreted and deconstructed--- the work that this dissertation is set to attain.

I have been trying to establish two basic ideas in the previous chapters. The first one, articulated by questioning the role of the intellectuals in a society whose actual "cultural categories" are understood as unstable and often meaningless, works on showing that the activities we call "organizational sciences" are attached, belong, only to that particular institutional order of "the university" and "academia." That is, as is the case with the activities in the other "academic disciplines," the "organizational sciences" exist as an activity within the university and university-related domains ---and not at all outside of it. This first idea, which I explore through the simulacrum [1] **Postmodernism** ---i.e. "what if we have now different cultural categories?"--- tries to subvert our traditional oppositional categories theory/practice (what we do in the university/what we do outside of it), by proposing that there is no theory which corresponds to forms of practice. What I mean is not (as some may think) that to every practice there is an irreducible localized theory (i.e. that theory/practice are a unit that cannot be regarded as oppositions). Rather, the idea is that theory is a form of practice, independent and often parallel to other forms of practice to which it refers (Foucault

and Deleuze, 1977).

The second idea, partially derived from the first one, defines the "organizational sciences" as a particular kind of activity: discoursive [2]. In this sense the practice of theory is a discoursive activity, and as such it is determined by the rules of its practice, as any other practice would be determined by its own rules.

Particular to the rules of discoursive activities are the following: (a) discourses may appropriate as their subjects the objects of other practices; and (b) other practices may appropriate discourses as their own objects. Here I am purposefully using the term "appropriate" to make explicit that the relationship between the practice of "theory" and the practice of "other practices" (e.g. management) is one often determined by power relationships. The power relationship can become one sided when either (a) or (b), above, dominates. For example, (b) will dominate the relationship when a theory is appropriated to "support and represent" a useful practice, without facilitating more theory (e.g. easy access into organizations for academic research purposes) to be "built" on those practices.

From this perspective part of the organizational disciplines' current ambiguities can be further understood. On one hand, the "organizational sciences" have been involved in activities to bridge both sides of what may now be considered a non-existent opposition (i.e. organizational theory/organizational practice). On the other hand, the lack of understanding of organizational theory as a discoursive activity has prevented the discipline from understanding the possibilities embedded in a practice of theory independent of the practice of other

practices. That is, the lack of understanding of theory as practice has kept "the theoretician / researcher / disciplinarian" involved in a never ending quest toward the "progress of the discipline." The ultimate pre-tense of purpose is one of transcending "useful theory" into "useful practice." Because of such definition of the disciplinary situation, the relationship between the practice of organizational theory and the practices of other practices (e.g. the practice of management) has become one of dependency.

Unfortunately, whenever the practice of other practices stops appropriating the discourses of theory as "useful representations for practice" (as has been the case more and more in the practice of management), "the theoreticians" further retrench into the b(v)owels of academic research in their quest to regain their opposition (practice) and attain their "lost balance" (theory/practice).

The more recent "organizational sciences" separation from the world of "practice," discussed in Chapter II, can be interpreted as a "necessary" step in attempts at re-covering from "the lack of practice." It is interesting to notice that "the world of practice" has stayed quite comfortably going about its business without worrying over any "missing theory."

The activities I am performing in this dissertation aim at (re?)establishing the disciplinary "power balance" in a different mode. That is, by concentrating on what was defined as (a), above --- by working on defining how **the practice of theory** can appropriate as its subject the object of other practices--- the practice of theory will be able to go about its business without depending on the practice of other

practices. More specifically, by re-presenting the practice of theory as a discoursive activity, the dissertation is the practice of a discoursive activity which appropriates as its subject "the objects of organization" without depending on them.

The work to be done here, the activities of reading and writing over specific "organizational texts," are themselves practices of the theoretical variety. These commentaries about the constitution of a disciplinary subject are the practices to be evaluated ---they are not a "theory" for "some other practice".

In other words, this work is not about deconstructing the organizational subject to propose a different theory of organizations. On the contrary, the deconstruction of the organizational subject is in itself the practice of organizational theory. The task at hand puts emphasis on the practice of theory as an activity proper to the university. In the practice of theory the diverse university community may find itself bound and powerful, a requirement for participating in the world with (not towards) the practice of other practices.

The activities in which I work, deconstructing representations of "the organizational subject" through textual "mounting" and "grafting," are at the same time productions of "doing theory." They are exemplars of possible activities for the organizational theoreticians. They are also activities which connect the theoretical work in the "organizational sciences" to its proper institutional domain of the university and the "human sciences."

On Reading the Organizational Texts

The readings I will perform in this one and the following chapters demonstrate some possibilities for a postmodern practice of theory in the "organizational sciences." These readings correspond to three moments within a forty-year period of textual representations about organizations. The chosen texts represent exploited boundaries for the two main ideas expressed above: (1) that theorizing (about organizations or anything else) is a form of practice proper to the university; and (2) that the practice of theory is discoursive activity.

These texts have become well known connectors over the years between the world of management practice and scholarly managerial theories. But their constitutive textual strategies (e.g. the rhetorics of "authorial presence and experience", "realist descriptions", "practicality of ideas", and other textual representations) mark them as writings which are extremely self-conscious of their irresolvable position inside the world of theory (in spite of their constant claims to the contrary), and therefore particularly vulnerable to deconstructive readings focusing on their "externalities."

It is important to recognize that my readings are not a genealogical work on how "the organizational subject" came to be constructed in a progressive fashion, from the 1930s to the 1970s ---much to the contrary. First, the issue of the construction of the organizational subject is a current concern of this dissertation and, therefore, its relevance is itself a matter of the dissertation's representational strategies, and its own historicity. Thus, rather than

threading the development of the organizational subject through a forty-year time span, the readings collapse them in the single space of "contemporay theoretical concerns."

Second, this dissertation, as a form of post-modern work, is aware of the ex-post facto construction of "historical continuities" (e.g. White, 1973) and of history as another fictional work. The readings' "historization" is just a strategy to mark discontinuities between the different periods in which these texts were written. Such a strategy points at the fictions involved in creating developmental and progressive theories of disciplinary knowledge. In my readings each organizational theory is "conserved" as a localized discourse (in time/place) which had its meanings bound to those localities. That is, while recognizing the impossibility of reconstructing now how these texts meant when they were written, the readings use (inter/con)textualizing strategies to sustain the illusions of their separate time and place (e.g. Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Fabian, 1983; Clifford, 1986; Price, 1983) [3].

Thirdly, I do not claim any particular authenticity for the product of these readings. They are demonstrations of a conscious practice of theorizing as discoursive activity and not claims as to "the best" or "real" interpretation for these texts. Beyond this, my "interpretations" are themselves writings to be interpreted by other writings ---thus, one more time, the impossibility of claiming "the best and final" theory for any practice... including the practice of theory.

More specifically, developments in post-structuralist theory [e.g. Derrida's deconstruction (1976); Foucault's archeology of

knowledge (1976); even Barthes' writerly texts (1974)] and some philosophy of language (e.g Wittgenstein, 1958; Austin, 1975; Searle, 1979) let us recognize that:

(1) "words" do not necessarily have a fixed meaning, they can be separated from the "things" they are supposed to represent (they are more than any specific object we represent with them); and

(2) that even if there were fixed meanings, "words" are a different "thing" (they have separate identities) from "any-thing" they stand for.

This applies to any sign (which to simplify one might call "word") we use to represent anything, be it printed words, sounds, paintings, numbers, photographs, gestures... etc.

And once we get to this point we can reverse all I have said before and notice that, explicitly or implicitly, all practices ---be it of theory or other practices--- are writings. They are indeterminate signifiers, texts to be read.

In summary, what I am doing in/with these readings brings to the foreground the construction and legitimation of the "organizational sciences" through the discoursive constructions of the disciplinary subject and the progress of disciplinary knowledge. The readings aim to establish a "lineage" for the subject, while noting that "disciplinary knowledge" is nothing but localized discourses which address particular concerns of different times. It is a proposition for understanding the discipline as engaged in a constant activity of legitimation for its subject, which over time gets to invoke "tradition" ---e.g. the recent

Peters and Waterman's (1982) emphasis on Barnard's work--- as but one legitimizing strategy.

The readings accentuate discontinuities in the American culture between different points in time, and "serve" as testimony of an ongoing practice of theory which maintains the discipline "alive." In other words, it is proposed here that "progress" and "accumulation of knowledge" are textual illusions (based on conceptions of time) to legitimize the existence of the organizational disciplines. The readings, emphasizing how the practice of theory is a locally meaningful discoursive activity, overturn the possibility of "accumulation of knowledge" ---discourses ("words" as defined above) cannot accumulate anything. The localized discourses just become re-interpreted at different points through the textual representation "progress."

My readings, as critique of a disciplinary practice of theory when (re)creating the organizational subject and legitimizing the discipline, are themselves another kind of localized ---i.e. in postmodernity--- practice of theory within the discipline. This practice of theory would not have been possible before the current cultural period. Moreover, on being accepted now as **dissertation work in the organizational sciences** my readings become an instance of how the practice of other practices ---the institutional acceptance of a dissertation--- may appropriate discourses as their own objects of legitimation ---the possibility of this dissertation because of the existence of postmodern discourses now.

(Inter/Con)Textualizing Strategies

The specific strategies I will be using in these readings highlight the plurivocality of any interpretation, and the fictionalized character_of_truth. These strategies are purposeful in creating an argument to gain verisimilitude for the "textual interpretations."

In the readings I perform two main operations. The first establishes historical perpectives on the period when each book was published. These are current commentaries on certain issues now interpreted as "accurate descriptions of what was important" at previous times. They may be thought of as a chorus of voices which stand behind "the main production" (the text to be criticized) to "contextualize the scene." That is, they provide "historical context" through which the text gets established "on its own grounds."

The second operation provides a dialogue with the criticized text. This one is a cultural commentary contemporary to that text, which becomes intermixed with the text itself. The intercontextualizing strategy produces specific conditions for reading the criticized text by establishing a concurrent relation with its contemporary, the other text. I should indicate that intertextuality is an important poststructuralist issue. It emphasizes how anything we take as "original text" is really composed of traces from previous "texts" ---not just writings, but also ideas, institutions, discourses and various practices which become "inscribed" in any present culture. They are remains whose origins we ignore, and which are, anyhow, impossible to recover. Ricouer (e.g. 1981) provides a similar argument through his

"hermeneutics of suspicion."

What I attain by invoking the context/intertext is another site for re-interpreting the ideas I am reading. The aim is not to claim that I found "the real origin" but to subvert the "authorized version" as the only possible "real origin." Both strategies use the notion "time" to create the present space for the readings. Observe how in each case the background/foreground is current and locally created, now and in this dissertation. At the same time the strategies serve to "graft" other meanings over the criticized text, such that the latter becomes a current production.

I am not proposing these strategies as "a method" for reading organizational texts. My contentions against producing "a method" are anti-formalist, but mostly deconstructionist. They follow Feyerabend's (1975: chapter 6) concerns and, even more, Derrida's (1976: 157-164) contentions. Evidently, they can be used by others interested in approaching textual critique in a similar vein ---but the possible value of what I am doing here resides somewhere else. For now, the primary purposes of these readings are to subvert/deconstruct the illusions of "truth" and "progress" that have sustained the organizational disciplines, and to further the possibility of other disciplinary practices. From that point of view "my method" is meaningful in "this locality" and for those purposes. It is consciously subversive and deconstructive on working as an-other practice of organizational theory. As "a method" it can work better by metonymy, by eliciting ideas for

"other methods" which on deconstructing the discipline construct it explicitly anew, over and over again. In the last chapter I will discuss other purposes for what I am doing here.

Reading The Functions of the Executive

The text to be read in this chapter has become a classic in the organizational literature. Looking through recent organizational behavior textbooks one finds this work cited often to support definitions of managerial influence and authority (e.g. Kast and Rosenzweig, 1985; Baron, 1983; Ritchie and Thompson, 1984; Hellriegel, Slocum, and Woodman, 1986). Moreover, aside from the multiple citations in management journals this text is still being cited in non-management journals mostly in regard to its "theory of authority" (e.g. Rose, 1976; Conkling, 1979; Britan, 1979; Hougland, 1980; Reich, 1981; McMahon, 1981; Lackman, 1982).

This limited sample demonstrates, nonetheless, that The Functions of the Executive has been (re)interpreted to support an almost ahistorical rhetoric for the existence of "organization theory," as if organizational theory were a "natural fact" that was eventually discovered; and to emphasize the "growth of knowledge" in the field ---i.e. the text is often cited as a marker for the "original organization theory" which has now been "further developed."

On this account Barnard has been criticized sometimes for not discovering/developing enough of "the organizational theory truth". For example, in the introduction to the Function's 30th anniversary

edition, Andrews comments:

> "...Although he must be credited with readmitting man to organization theory, he seems much less interested in a living, growing person than in the abstract "Individual". He is not much concerned about personal involvement. His analysis of motivation suggests responsive behavior rather than full participation in the administrative process; it makes no room for the development of individuals, for the maturing of their needs, and for the dilution or strengthening of their commitment" (1968: xiii-xiv [my emphasis]). ---Oh... Maslow, Argyris, Hulin and Blood, where were you in 1938?

Similarly, Perrow critiques Barnard's work (including critiquing Barnard himself) by saying:

> "Another idea that does not fit with Barnard's cooperative view is that of the balance between `inducements and contributions.; Only in recent years has it become fashionable to conceive of organizations as systems with inputs and outputs. Barnard was way ahead of his time when he did so in 1938." (1986: 69-70).

Perrow seems to be unaware of the "social systems view" which was already around during those years. "The Hawthorne team", with whom Barnard was well acquainted held these views; and that was also the case with Mary Parker Follet, an author cited by Barnard. Perrow's greatest oversight is that, unlike other Barnard's commentators (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979) he explicitly ignores Pareto's influence over Barnard (clearly cited in the Functions) and which explains even better how Barnard's "systems and equilibrium" views were not really "ahead of his time." Moreover, Perrow explictly assumes that Barnard is unaware of Durkheim, Parsons, and Weber, but Barnard cites Parsons, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber with ease (e.g. 1938: 68-69).

Another recent review of The Functions (Keon, 1986) emphasizes how Barnard was almost in the threshold of "discovering" integration as

a means of conflict resolution (a la Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), and Equity Theory (as in Adams, 1963) but he did not quite make it. The reviewer is even more explicit in his disappointment about Barnard's treatment of inducements and contributions. He considers Barnard inadequate for not extending his analysis to the organization-environment relationship in the manner of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); and he is also disappointed because Barnard did not give enough attention to the contractual relationships between the executive and the board of directors. According to the reviewer, Barnard's oversight prevented Agency Theory (as in Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to be developed 38 years ago.

This last critique illustrates, perhaps better than the others, the violence ---a rhetoric that forces a view of "knowing the truth"--- in the quest for "disciplinary progress," "accumulation of knowledge" and sustenance of the "organizational subject." Beyond these points, it is difficult to read the last sentence in Keon's review without using it to pun-ctuate the initial paragraphs in this chapter. I emphasized there that to regard the relationship theory/practice of management as continuous, or even contiguous, activities is among the "organizational sciences'" major fictions. He says: "...The Functions of the Executive brings theory and practice alive in an integrative fashion" (1986: 459).

In general, The Functions' critiques and citations have separated it from its proper context and/or intertext in a quest to support interpretations quite beyond its time and place. But more important, the commentators have invariably assumed that Barnard's is a "theory of organizations" written to sustain the managerial point of

view. My readings may eventually subvert these common interpretations.

The first part in the discussion that follows "contextualizes" this book through an analysis of the historical moment when it was published, the decade of the 30s. The discussion will comment on general issues in American society during those years, and more specificly, on particular business issues at that time.

The second part of this discussion creates a "dialogue" between Barnard's work and Lynd's (1939) critique of the American culture at that time. The product of these readings is an interpretation of Barnard's text quite different from the traditional interpretations. I should re-iterate (a pun, emphasizing Derrida's notion of "iteration of meaning" which proliferates and disseminates other meanings from "the same words") that these interpretations are productions to mark the fictive character of any interpretation. They work by deferring the possibility of "truth" or "real meaning" in the interpretation of any text. Thus, my "interpret-a(c)tions" work on exposing the discipline's uses of discoursive activity in its agenda for legitimation, by re-marking how traditional interpretations need not be any more plausible than my own.

With all these said, let's turn our attention to an historical context.

Historical Con/Text: General Issues

If there is any one short description to characterize American society at the beginning of the 1930's it is probably "hunger and

inequality among technological marvels." For example, while the New York World's Fair was getting ready to unveil some "incredible" technological advances like television, and Birdseye's entered the business of mass producing frozen foods, people dug in the Chicago garbage dump looking for pieces of food, and the nation experienced a sucession of food riots. Right before the 1932 election unemployment reached 25%.

According to Goldman, the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency was for many a last hope against all hope for national recovery. And hope was perhaps what Roosevelt banked on with his inaugural words of "...let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself..." These words, however, were not those of a planner with well defined notions of "what is to be done." They were more those of an experimenter who was also saying: "The country needs... bold persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something" (1977: 254).

Behind the nation's general agreement with the New Deal's policies ---that the best solution to economic and social ills was action by the federal government under strong executive leadership--- one would find a general unawareness of the experimental nature of these measures. Thus, the public had confidence in those initial governmental measures like protection for bank depositors and for all investors in stock; in federal credit which eased farmers' and households' debts; in the way that phony bankrupcy proceedings were made more difficult and taxes were imposed over excess profits and dividends; and also, in the

Civilian Conservation Corps which provided a source of gainful activity for unemployed youth ... while prices were raised by taking the country off the gold standard.

Public expectations were intimately tied to the opportunities for the millions to have jobs at a point in time when the depression of 1929 presented "the free enterprise system" in its most inhuman form. This situation had created sympathy for the idea of national planning and national economic units. According to Goldman, by 1933 even "free enterprise" had abandoned their no-intervention stand and "...there was hardly any industrial, economic, financial, commercial reform, or agricultural leader who did not advance some idea of government intervention."(1977: 259).

The ensuing governmental activities eventually showed the experimental and ambivalent position of the nation's leader about his position on these issues. The two most important pieces of legislation in the early New Deal years, the National Recovery Act and the creation of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, were drawn in the context of the executive's ambiguities about national economic planning. Should it follow an Associational Activities pattern which emphasized noncompulsory relations between the government and economic life ---with trade associations which would give each industry a code of ethics, help modernize its practices, and provide industry wide understandings against cut-throat competition (and a way to by-pass anti-trust laws)?; or should national economic planning follow a pattern of powerful federal control? One way or another, the aim was to stimulate the economy.

By 1935 it was clear that in each case ---NRA and Triple A--- most codes had been written primarily by big business and were to their advantage. "Recovery programs controlled by the big corporations ---said a periodical of the times--- involved giving a subsidiary attention to the interests of the labor element, and hoping that the consumer will be satisfied with a few kind words and a seat out in the alley" (1977: 271-272).

After NRA and Triple A were repealed by the Supreme Court (in 1935 and 1936, respectively) George Peek, former Triple A administrator commented "I learned that the Americans think of their government as something above and beyond the people of the United States, as something which can control groups at its will. The truth is that no democratic government can be very different from the country it governs if some groups are dominant in any plan the government undertakes" (1977: 272).

During the early thirties Roosevelt was sympathetic with big business' predicaments. He thought of government controls more as a partnership between business and government to work on the nation's recovery than as way to crackdown undesirable and explotative business practices. However, indicates Goldman, "...during the NRA period the President discovered that corporate executives could prove highly unsatisfactory partners. Many openly flouted or skirted around all provisions of the NRA which were not entirely favorable to them, assailed most of the other New Deal measures, and spent millions of dollars trying to convince the country that Roosevelt was an egomaniacal Communist." (1977: 281). By the mid-thirties Roosevelt was certain that he could not bring big business as a partner in the enactment of any

future legislation. He was enraged enough with businessmen to comment "I get more and more convinced that most of them can't see farther than the next dividend."

Out of this situation the common notion that Marxist and Socialist activism was prevalent in the United States during those years can be better understood. There is no doubt that social and labor legislation of the likes of the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Farm Security Administration were not endorsed by most business organizations and business executives. These constituencies were used to being the primary beneficiaries of most former legislation, and seldom the "economic supporters" of it. On the other hand, it appears that more than ever before the general population was developing a populist, nationalist spirit.

In spite of the loud accusations by the business "class" that society was dominated by Marxist ideologies, at this time Marxism was more a topic for the literary intellectuals than an issue in social and cultural theory. According to Bottomore (1969) these were the years that post-Marxian European thinkers were being discovered in America. In particular, Pareto and Weber (the latter still in its German version) were studied by those interested in pure theories of society; and social criticism appeared to be a declining interest in most intellectual circles.

It is important now to further qualify the above. Russia, and its government, did gain more widespread acceptance in the United States during the thirties, but for reasons beyond the peculiarities of Marxist theory as such. There was indeed admiration for Russia's economic

achievements at a time when most of the world was suffering a depression, but the increasing regard for that country was borne in different grounds. Russia was interested in building military allies against the by now imminent menace embodied by Hitler ---who had proclaimed himself as the defender of the world against Bolshevism. To these ends the Communist International defined in 1935 the idea of Popular Front which made clear their interest in working with any "antifascist" organization and government, including now the United States. At the same time they indicated the ceasing of all revolutionary activities.

These changes in Russian policies generated a large group of fellow-travellers among the liberal minded in the United States, and also an increase in respectability and "understanding" of Moscow. Perhaps this "Americanization of Communism" can be best represented in an anecdote told by Goldman to describe how the Russian version of Marxism had become fashionable in America: "For a liberal to show sympathy for Communism hardly seemed extreme when the Baltimore Sun was reporting: `Hearing a black ensemble with orchids at the shoulder, Mrs. William A. Becker, national president of the Daughters of the American Revolution, attended the reception at the Soviet Embassy last night to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution'" (1977: 275).

Thus, in spite of the general economic difficulties of the times, and the lack of opportunies for Blacks and other minorities ---now becoming aware of the obstacles in their path to success--- the New Deal "engendered a new optimism, it reawakened for a time the

populist sentiment of the beginning of the century, and it offered at least the hope of a more efficiently managed economy" (Bottomore, 1969: 47). In general, the view of America as "The land of opportunity" was still alive. The opportunities were just postponed, and in the meantime Eleanor Roosevelt was assuring "Now it is accepted that the government has an obligation to guard the rights of an individual so carefully that he never reaches a point at which he needs charity."

The covert social unrest brought about by the New Deal was not, however, centered in the more disadvantaged groups. The government protection of the rights of "the little people" ---instead of patronizing them, as had been the tradition of previous progressive goverments--- created rabid anti-Roosevelt feelings in the upper classes. These groups would have supported the government's economic measures had they been allowed the belief that the new laws were the way to fulfill their responsibilities as "superior people." The New Deal government, especially during the second term, became instead a direct challenge to anybody's position as "superior people" (Goldman, 1977).

Historical Con/Text: Business Issues

By the onset of the depression in 1929 many large American corporations had restructured their operations in a more decentralized form, following the diversification of their products and services. Thus, by this time the two major forms of organizational structures used in the management of large enterprises had been developed. The traditional form, centralized and departamentalized by functional units,

was exemplified by General Motors and Du Pont before World War I. The other, developed by General Motors and by Du Pont in the 1920s, was multidivisional and decentralized. According to Chandler (1977), centralized forms have been used primarily by companies producing a single line of goods for one major product or regional market, while the decentralized form has been more common in companies with several lines and products, and diverse markets.

It is interesting to notice that American Telephone and Telegraph ---Barnard's company--- operated as a centralized, functionally departmentalized structure from the beginning of the centruy to the 1960's. In general, it maintained long lines of responsibility in long distance operations, while the regional subsidiaries (around twenty) were centrally managed. In the structural sense this company was an exception from what became the norm in large, diversified operations by the 1930s.

Another trend in business operations, which started with the century and became overtly clear in the thirties, was the professionalization of business brought about by the separation between management and ownership. Blackford and Kerr comment:

> "The shift raised questions about corporate goals. Corporations had traditionally been seen as devices to earn profits for their owners, who also ran them... the managers questioned whether simply trying to earn maximum profits for themselves and their stockholders could serve any longer as their sole or primary goal in business. Searching for new identities and for new sources of approval for their actions, many corporate managers began looking upon themselves as professional men" (1986: 295).

During the 30's the general public paid special attention to anything pertaining to business and society, as demonstrated by the type

of books which became widely read during that period (e.g. Berle and Means, 1932; Lynd and Lynd, 1935; Arnold, 1937). These works of social theory offered analyses of business and economic conditions, and usually expounded managerial and technological views. There was indeed interest in a theory of society that would improve the economic situation without resorting to radical ideologies (Bottomore, 1969).

For example, the "power without property" case indicated above became a public issue through Berle and Means' (1932) book. This work showed two important changes in the American economic system: the concentration of industrial production in a small number of big corporations; and the separation between ownership and control of industry. After reporting that about 6000 men controlled the entire American economy they argued that corporations were becoming similar to nations. Under this condition, they acknowledged, managers would have to function more like statesmen than merchants. The "managed capitalism" that they advocated included economic regulation by the state, and the development of a socially responsible business community, which would exert care when exercising their increased powers.

The professionalization of management was enacted in a mystique of "better management education and training." It was almost a direct transference, through the Comtian connection, from "the divine authority of the king" to "the educated authority of the manager" where the latter's superior knowledge would provide security to the "common people" by having society's business and economic matters well taken care of. They would be serving society like other professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers).

Behind the mystique of the superior management knowledge were other facts. Out of 9000 business executives in 1932, 32% were college graduates and 45% had some college education ---but only 7.5% received formal business college education; and there was little correlation between business success and college education of any kind. More important, more than half of the group came from well-to-do families with business or professional backgrounds; and it was also clear that the rags-to-riches cases were only a few exceptions (Blackford and Kerr, 1986). As already mentioned in chapter two, college education in America was more a consequence than a cause of economic development.

The professional management mystique was maintained, and even enhanced, during the thirties (the hope that individuals possessing a college education would get out of economic disadvantage). But there was also public awareness of the complex relationship between business and society, and the dominance by business organizations of all spheres of American life. There is no doubt that in the public eye big business lost all redeeming qualities during this period.

These feelings are perhaps best expressed by Lynd in the following commentaries:

> "... [T]he marked presence in the culture of extreme differences in power... appears in many ways: in the dominance of industrial areas over rural areas in such matters as import tariffs; in the ability of business pressure-blocs to prevent the passage of legislation manifestly in the public interest...; in the ability of great corporations to command able lawyers to squeeze out small competitors, to control patents, and otherwise to dominate their fields; in the helplessness of the individual worker in the face of the labor policies of a Republic Iron and Steel Company...

> ...In a culture which prizes "equality" as one of its foundation assumptions, this habitual and widespread tolerance of extremes of inequality in power requires the disguise of a formula. Two such convenient formulae are in wide use:
>
> (a) The disparities at any given moment are regarded either as but temporary differences in a general progress in which "tomorrow can be different,"...
>
> (b) The second formula invoked to justify a special but crucial disparity in size and power, i.e., that between the individual and the corporation, is the convenient legal fiction which views a corporation as a person...
>
> ... And if [they] go to court over their transaction, they are still conveniently assumed to be simply two equal individuals with equal access to the law as represented by their respective counsels." (1939: 74-77)

This chorus of historical commentaries, made (with the exception of Lynd's) from a "vantage point" of various years past the narrated situations, provide the background for the readings that follow.

These readings comprise the deconstructive critique of Barnard's text, worked through an intercontextualizing strategy. That is, The Function of the Executive is read by establishing its relationship with other texts which may have been within its experience. Experience, as defined here, does not imply necessarily other "cited" texts. Mostly it is speculations about how other discourses may have "in-formed" what we call Barnard's.

Three types of discourses are considered here:

1.- Barnard's other commentaries contemporary with The Functions' publication date.

2.- A critique of the American culture written by the time The Functions was published. This cultural commentary will be laced with Barnard's text as a dialogue in a clearly deconstructive move: the

"grafting" of one text on the other. At the same time, it is mimicry in a very extensive sense: The text "works itself" over my "silence." [See, for example, Price (1983) and Irigaray (1974/1985) for similar strategies].

3.- Philosophical influences in the text which may be detected from Barnard's discourses.

At the end of the chapter I will reiterate the significance of these readings in exposing, through deconstruction, the construction of the organizational subject.

Inter/Text 1: What Was Barnard Saying at This Time?

In the following paragraphs I am reproducing a partial text by Barnard, published in Fortune in March 1939 (three months after the Functions was published). Barnard's comments appeared in the first of a series of businessmen's "round tables" the magazine sponsored in the late '30s and early '40s. Here Barnard, who was a Round Table member, dissents, in no uncertain tems, from the other businessmen's opinions on issues of government spending. The "businessmen agreements" ---where Barnard is the only fully dissenting voice--- is reproduced in Figure 4-1. In reproducing Barnard's words, instead of paraphrasing them, I am pointing at Barnard's discoursive strategies, where a strong social orientation can be read [4].

With these readings as **palimpsest** [5] I propose now that Barnard's Functions is not a theory of organizations but a processual theory of society. I will comment more about this later, but first let's hear it from Barnard:

> "I dissent from the report of this Round table... Dissagreement with specific items could be sufficiently cared for by two or three footnotes. However, the Round Table does not confine itself to the question of deficit financing but goes into that of profits and the control of economic conditions in the future. I disagree especially as to what I believe are important implications in the statements concerning these matters.
>
> ... the opinion of the Round Table concerning profits seems to me utterly fallacious. It essentially is based upon the popular conception that we live alternately in a profit economy (when it works well) and a loss economy (when it doesn't). I think it is a profit-and-loss economy, and that this means not only that it must be expected that a very large proportion of all business will be conducted at a current operating loss or without profit, but that a substantial proportion of savings and investment will also

Figure 4.1 Fortune's Business Men Round Table

HIGHLIGHTS OF FIRST ROUND TABLE

This report is a synthesis of the opinions of eleven active men concerning the vital problem of government spending. The background of this group as a whole represents a wide horizon. Here are five practical business leaders, a judge, a farmer, a distinguished laborite, an engineer, a writer on economics, and a professional economist. These men might fail to agree on many specific points, but on the general principles set forth herewith they reached—with the exceptions noted in the footnotes and two appendixes—an impressive unanimity. The highlights of their argument are:

I. There are 10,000,000 men out of work; few new industries are being created; little new capital is being invested. What is the cause of the trouble?

II. One school says that government spending will revive the economy. Another thinks that spending is the great obstacle to recovery. Which is right?

III. The Round Table believes:

1. That both schools make some good points but that neither has the answer.
2. That government should *invest* its money so as to increase productive opportunity rather than merely *spend* to create purchasing power.
3. That the fiscal policy of the Administration has brought with it a failure in business confidence.
4. That the spirit of enterprise languishes largely because of the belief that the Administration does not really care about the system of private enterprise.
5. That these intangible concomitants of the spending program should be at once corrected.
6. That, in general, the social and labor reforms so far established should be retained.
7. That public spending should indeed be used to counterbalance the business cycle.
8. But that this should be done within the framework of a periodically balanced budget and a dependable debt-retirement plan.

Reproduced from Fortune, 19, March 1939; p. 60

be lost...A realistic approach to the problems of today seems to me to require not merely the admission of but the insistence upon this proposition as broadly to the general public advantage. Hence, I agree with the statement "Now no economic system can be expected to operate indefinitely at a loss," but I believe it equally true that no economic system can be expected to operate indefinitely at a profit... Profit is a competitive reward of relative success within the system; loss is a competitive penalty for relative failure.

...What is important is not aggregate profits or losses in themselves but a belief on the part of individual businessmen (or business) that if they exercise initiative, skill, and effort there is an opportunity for profit for them individually, if, and only if, they are successful.

...My objection to the report as a whole is that it seems to me to reflect a philosophy of efforts to correct foundations merely by readjustment of the superstructure, to cure a disease by alleviating its symptoms. The fact that I do not know how to correct the foundations or to cure the disease does not lead me to endorse these methods as sound or promising.

The question put to the Round Table and its opinions both assume that the difficulties of the last ten years are essentially economic, that they are the result of economic maladjustments, and that they are to be corrected by economic readjustments. My belief is that the economic difficulties past and present lie chiefly in the unequal distribution of the opportunities for productive employment, and that the correction of these difficulties requires direct attack at that fundamental point as a social rather than an economic process.

The social destructiveness involved in this unequal distribution of adversity is much greater than can be conveyed in economic disaster for all classes. Many of the losses of the depression are not due, in my opinion to the collapse of a boom, but to the incidence of a disproportionate share of the burdens of that collapse on a large section of the population...

Taking this view, the question of deficit financing, and whether it is good or bad from an economic standpoint, seems to me to put the cart before the horse, the effect before the cause.

...[I]t seems to me that the approach to the problem should not be primarily economic but social. The attempt to deal with the social problem by relief processes (whether for the unemployed, for industries, or for farmers) by unemployment compensation, by extravagant pension schemes, by the artificial creation of government projects, and by the artificial stimulation of certain types of industries with emphasis upon capital-goods production as essential to

a current prosperity, seems to me to have been, and likely to continue to be, either ineffective or abortive or at best merely palliative. These efforts attempt to cure by redistributing "purchasing power." They not only create nothing, but by coming **after** production they reduce initiative in production where it is most important and hence actually destroy purchasing power.

... Many of those who understand the position I take here seem to think the answer is some form either of communism or of state socialism or of state capitalism. Such answers seem to me and most Americans to be extremely undesirable... For this reason I believe many unconsciously refuse to face the sad and dangerous facts of the present situation fearing that they would be driven to present doctrines which to them are worse than present difficulties. I think the line of attack which is consistent with what we all desire is neither an artificial and compulsory equality nor a regulated distribution of property and income nor a general regimentation, but chiefly an insistence upon the equal distribution of opportunity for employment...

Any such distribution of the opportunity to work, at least by any scheme I have been able to imagine, would meet the opposition of the aristocracies of labor (including most government employees) and of most managers of industry and government officials because it involves reduced weekly earnings for everybody when there is economic adversity ---that is what sharing economic adversity means. However I should expect it to limit the adversity for all, to prevent this cankerous combination of both social and economic depression, and to increase sound prosperity... (1939: 124-126)

From my perspective, it is reasonable to read the above exposition as Barnard's concerns for the possibility of a better theory of society. That theory of society would take into account multiple "institutional issues", and subsume them into a more holistic and balanced order, for the common good. Thus, it will be appropriate now to notice how for Barnard the terms "cooperation", "organization" and "organizations" are not equivalent. In my readings, "cooperation through the process of organization" is his theory of society. "Organizations," on the other hand, are specific entities of various kinds ---including business--- which may or may not enter a process of

organization toward cooperation.

The issues indicated above are guiding points for reading the philosophical orientation which informs Barnard's work. This orientation is "the Hegelian connection." It is a philosophy which has influenced the modern discourses of "progress" (of both right and left) since the eighteenth century and up to our times. In Barnard's case, however, the Hegelian influence appears to be quite direct rather than just acquired from "the general text" of modern society.

But before we enter any further argument, let us look at Barnard's response to Copeland's (1940) critique of the Functions. In his discussion Barnard explicitly notes how the theory of cooperation would incorporate more and more units of society into a whole. And his examples, especially the whirlpool one, make even more clear the processual nature of cooperation and its adequacy as a theory of society.

Barnard cites Copeland saying the following about Barnard's work:

> "He seems to have been torn between a desire to present a conceptual scheme of a sociological pattern and an impulse to follow his realistic instincts. Sometimes his realism does not effectively come to his rescue. For example, he included in his concept of a "cooperative system" in the industrial fields not only employees and investors but also customers. Customers, therefore, are a part of the "material of organizations..." (1940: 297).

Thus, Barnard goes on to make a case for his views, retorting:

> "Professor Copeland then refers to this as `the sort of confusion that has just been cited.'

This quotation certainly makes clarification necessary...

When the acts of two or more individuals are cooperative, that is, systematically coordinated, the acts by my definition constitute an organization. Every such act is a component simultaneouly of two or more systems as determined by its functions. Thus every act of organization is also an act of some individual, and is his contribution to the organization. When two or more organizations cooperate, the cooperative acts are simultaneously (1) of individuals, and either (2) of the organization contributing the act and (3) of the second organization participating, or (4) of a new complex organization embracing the two original organizations cooperating; or of all four. This simultaneous functioning of the cooperative act of an individual in two or more organization systems provides the interconnection which results in complex organizations...

This will seem to many, no doubt, a strange, artificial, unrealistic kind of thing chiefly because they will not realize that this is precisely the kind of thing they are working with in their minds in a rough and ready way all the time. Take, for instance, a man who is always changing, or a corporation of which the principal nearly constant attributes are its name and by-laws; or, to get farther toward the earth, take a whirlpool... When you use the name nearly everyone knows what you mean, and there is no other name commonly covering the same thing. But if asked what it is, I think you might have to say something like this:

A whirlpool is a situation in a body of water in which there are comparatively stable uniformities of relations between streams of molecules of water, moving with increasing rapidity spirally towards a center called a vortex, the level of which is depressed with reference to the level of the surrounding water. The movement of the stream of molecules is downward at the vortex. New molecules move into the situation as fast as old ones move out. The position of the whirlpool also may move as is easily seen by the movement of the vortex. If the molecules stop moving in this way, there is no whirlpool, because all there is to a whirlpool is streams of molecules of water moving in certain ways. And don't ask what a "stream" is.

Others will be puzzled at the idea that a single act can be called part of several organizations at the same time, yet we have no difficulty with the same or similar idea when we are used to it...

To put the matter in reverse, you could not completely understand a specific act of a human being without knowing all the organizations in which the act functioned as a part. If this sounds "abstract" and "unrealistic," let me put it this way: you cannot deal

effectively with people unless you can get their "point of view," which means knowing what "influences" govern their behavior...

In a community all acts of individuals and of organizations are directly or indirectly interconnected and interdependent. Analogously all elements of the physical universe are said to be interconnected and interdependent. For convenience obviously necessary to some degree, we disregard the interconnections which we consider minor or trivial ...

Among the simplest of organization is the exchange of goods between two men,... Perhaps we often fail to think of an exchange as cooperative, because emphasis is so much placed upon conflict of interest or bargaining in a hostile sense, conditions that may precede exchange; but a moment's reflection is sufficient to see that an exchange is based upon **agreement** to effect a **transaction**, a coordination of acts of the two parties, the acts being mutually dependent and interconnected. We should not be misled by the ephemeral character of this particular case. It is perhaps more short-lived than a microbe, and may be dismissed as unimportant. But the aggregate of the relations between what is exchanged by such cooperation is the subject matter of economic science; and also the aggregate of such acts constitutes, at least in part, stable unit and complex organizations, and is the subject of study of cooperation.

In the sense of ultimate analysis an organization is a composition of cooperative **acts**. It is convenient to deal with certain aggregates of such acts as named organizations and to classify them in various ways.

Professor Copeland found confusion because he could not reconcile the definition of organization, the implications of which I have made more explicit above, with what I said about the executive functions...

Let me be definite about the matter. I meant then and I mean now that in the fundamental sociology of business behavior the services of an employee and of a customer when making a purchase are equivalent elements, similar contributions to the **same** organization, and that every statement quoted above applies unequivocally to either employees and their acts of purchase.

... When once the cooperative relationship has been established, the exchange that constitutes organization is to be elicited. The exchange in one case (that of the employee) is services for money, in the other (that of the customer) money for services (the act of transferring goods or services).

... Note that we are not dealing in analogies. I do not say that the treatment of customers is analogous to that of the employees. I say that the nature of the cooperative acts is the same in both cases under the definition of

> organization I am using...
>
> ... The greatest mental difficulty is that we are habituated, in economics and in business ideologies, to make the inducements the primary concern, whereas in the more fundamental study of cooperation it is the process of coordination of acts which is primary..." (1940: 297-303).

Thus, with Barnard words above as background for his own words in the Functions, I will enter him into a dialogue with Lynd's (1939) critique of the American culture at the time. The "constructed" dialogue, based on the assumption that the Functions is a theory of society, makes even more explicit Barnard's preoccupation with his time and place.

Inter/Text 2: A Conversation With Bob and Chet

The dialogue that follows has been enacted with excerpts from Barnard's _The_Functions_of_the_Executive_ (1938) and Lynd's _Knowledge_for What?_ (1939). Barnard's comments belong to various parts of his book while Lynd's are all from his chapter III on the pattern of American culture.

This section is set to accomplish two major operations within the dissertation. First, it demonstrate a practice of textual "grafting" which re-construct the meaning of a text by re-weaving it in a context other than that "dictated" by its "tradition." That is, the operation _mimes_ a citation of the text by placing the _chosen_ original words in a context which claims a certain specific meaning for those words. This is not any different from what one does in traditional citations, except by elimination of "the traditional." Once the traditional context is eliminated one may expect to find the "stark naked, true meaning of the text." The surprise is to discover that the text can only mean in context--- an-other context. For example, think of a mime _on_stage_ "walking a dog." The movements the mime makes when "walking" the absent dog are the same as if the dog were present. But what makes one understand that s/he is "walking a dog" are the dog-walking movements embedded in a different context: the cultural agreement of a re-presentation that _means_by_absence_.

The second operation displaces the necessity of "a traditional context" by providing an-other context which is also plausible. This operation signals to the arbitrariness and indeterminacy of meanings.

It also subverts the possibility of returning blindly to the previous "traditional" context without questioning further its privileged "claim to truth." To follow the example above, after observing the mimed/staged "walking of a dog" it is difficult to ignore that the actual walking of one's dog is just another form of cultural representation. Which is more truthful? Which is more real?...

The re-casting of Barnard's text in a context other than the traditional managerial interpretations ---in this case, in the context of cultural criticism--- provides one way to observe well known textual movements (Barnard's words; paragraphs) in another context. It is like staging "walking a dog" without the dog. The displacement of traditional interpretations, which occurs when the new context sustains the possibility of these movements (the same words, paragraphs continue to be meaningful in the new context) calls into question any privilege toward meaning claimed by the more conventional context of managerial interpretations.

Now, let's observe some other details in the forthcoming dialogue. First, it is important to notice here how these operations bring to the fore the mimetic aspects of any textual representation. In appearance only Barnard's and Lynd's voices are present in the text while my voice is absent. But, look again. My pretended silence sets the stage for a playfulness of presence (theirs) and absence (mine) that makes "their dialogue" possible. Again, this is not any different from the choices made by any "scientific" writer in citing others. He/she "moves out" of the text by "bringing in" the voices of "authority."

Second, as to the plausibility of the "new context" for Barnard,

the similarity of time/place makes Lynd and Barnard likely reflectors of their own culture ---and makes even more strikingly dismal Barnard's critics disappointed by his inability to "discover" all the managerial knowledge (?) that is currently possible, while inhabiting "his authority" for their own purposes. The "new context" dramatizes the textual violences that occur in the "scientific enactment of truth." Where/when does Barnard mean better?

On the other hand, I do not claim that Barnard and Lynd knew each other in "real life". They do not cite each other, but Barnard may have read Lynd and Lynd (1929 and 1937), given that they were widely read during the thirties. There are a few common citations (e.g. Mayo, T.N. Whitehead, Brigdman, Bentley, Marx, and acknowledgements to Gestalt psychology), but Barnard, not being an academician, often alludes to ideas without citing the sources; his language gives him away (for example his critique of "economic man," which is also a critique made by Lynd).

In spite of the differences it was possible to enact a dialogue between these two very unlikely texts. My "only" additions are the titles and summary statements for each section (as well as the design of the sections) and the transition comments written inside the brackets []. The latter do not change the original contents in any other way than that of providing continuity. The texts can converse with each other because they are discourses of their own times. They are widely concerned with the conditions of their society, at a time when the conditions of society were of primary concern in the Western world in general, and in the United States in particular.

Introduction

Summary Statement: What are we now? How have we created our culture?

L: [Let's converse about our present culture]. If we individuals in a given culture did not learn to accept substantially common meanings for a wide range of phenomena --from the physical universe to human gestures and institutionalized situations--- we could not make sense out of accepting a piece of paper in repayment for a week's labor, or obeying the authority of a policeman, or putting sheets of engraved paper away in safety-deposit boxes, or voting, or submitting to eight or more years of compulsory schooling (:54).

B: [I think that] Leadership ...is the indispensable social essence that gives common meaning to common purposes, that creates the incentive that makes other incentives effective, that infuses the subjective aspect of countless decisions with consistency in a changing environment, that inspires the personal conviction that produces the vital cohesiveness without which cooperation is impossible (:283).

L: [Yes]. Daily living, if it is to go on, cannot stop at each moment to scrutinize every word, concept, symbol, or other institutionalized device, but must take these largely wholesale, in patterns and proceed to use them as given. These roughly common meanings for details and whole chains of details, thrust upon us by those about us, need conform to no system or logic or reason, for human beings are notoriously adroit in "thinking up good reasons" to explain what they habitually do. These meanings provide recognizable and dependable shorthand identifications which reduce complexity and enable us to live together (:55).

B: [As a matter of fact], P.W. Bridgman (1938) notes that "the totality of situations with which we are confronted, including society in its economic, political, esthetic, and religious aspects, is enormously more complex that the situations presented by any well defined scientific activity such as physics or chemistry." It seems to me quite in order to cease encouraging expectation that human behavior in society can be anything less than the most complex study to which our minds may be applied (:xxxii).

L: [But that is not how we stand today]. The deeply fissured surface of our American culture is padded smooth

with this soft amalgam of assumptions and their various symbolic expressions; so much so that most of us tend to pass over the surface most of the time unaware of the relative solidities and insubstantialities of the several areas. In time, assumptions are built in on older assumptions, so that we have verbal cliches standing for clusters of underlying assumptions. Thus, "individual freedom" or "democracy" or "welfare" comes to stand for whole battalions of associated assumptions (:58).

B: [Yes],... Much of the conflict of dogmas and of stated interest to be observed in the political field ---the catchwords are "individualism," "collectivism," "laissez-faire," "socialism," "statism," "facism," "liberty," "freedom," "regimentation," "discipline" --- and some of the disorder in the industrial field, I think, result from inability either intuitively or by other processes to reconcile conceptions of the social and the personal positions of individuals in concrete situations (:9).

L: [Thus], As one begins to list the assumptions by which we Americans live, one runs at once into a large measure of contradictions and resulting ambivalence. This derives from the fact that these overlapping assumptions have developed in different eras and that they tend to be carried over uncritically into new situations or to be allowed to persist in long diminuendos into the changing future... It is precisely in this matter of trying to live by contrasting rules of the game that one of the most characteristic aspects of our American culture is to be seen (:59).

B: [And that explains the contradictions in the idea of "individualism"]. On first consideration, the physical thing endowed with life that has interacted with other similar organisms becomes more and more unique, separate, distinct, just as a point where many lines cross seems to the mind more definitely a point than one where only two line cross. But when we stop to think of the history of its physical components, of its long line of ancestors, and the extent to which it embodies the effects of actions of others, it becomes less and less distinct, less and less and individual, more and more a mere point where the crossing lines are more important than the place where they cross. The individual is then a symbol for one or more factors, depending on the breadth of our interest (:11-12).

Uneven Organization of the Several Areas of Living

Summary Statement: How is one an individual in such a society?

L: [Then], One may hazard the generalization that the functional strength of a culture may be gauged by the degree to which it satisfies the following requirement: Does it present to individuals a closely, explicitly, and dependably inter-supporting frame of behavior throughout the several institutionalized areas of living which provides the minimum of strain and the maximum of active assistance in the discovering and following of their own creative patterns of rhythm, growth, and motivation in living? (:71).

B: [What you are asking for is] The search for the universal of organization [which] has been obstructed, I suspect, by the long history of thought concerning the nature of the state and the church. The center of this thought relates to the origin and nature of authority. Its consequence appears to be a legalism that prevents the acceptance of essential facts of social organizations. No theory of organization that conflicts with the doctrines of the law can be acceptable unless it also explains these doctrines. The doctrine of states as sources and bases of formal organizations in society --- the doctrine relevant in legal theory to all corporate organizations, such as those of municipalities, universities, business institutions, armies --- is inconsistent with the theory that all states are based upon organizations. But the latter hypothesis cannot be accepted unless it is able to explain both the facts of states and their obvious dominance in some respects over the organizations from which they arise (:xxix).

[But also, we must not forget that]...all law arises from the formal and especially the informal understandings of the people as socially organized, and that so far these practices and understandings are formulated in substantive law and promulgated by lawmaking authorities the "law" is merely the formulation. Its source is not rulers, legislatures, or courts, however constituted, but the people as organized in families and communities of various kinds... (:xxx).

L: [I don't agree. For example], Anti-trust legislation, while useful as a vote-catching device, dodges the central problem involved. "Bigness," large-scale operation and concentration of power, is a useful servant of modern man ---when it is... But our system of wide differences in power, casually developed and casually tolerated, leaves unanswered the crucial questions: At what points in our institutional system is bigness useful? And how can such

differences in power as are useful be made to serve rather than to disrupt the democratic process? (:79).

B: This is not a difference of principle but merely one of the relationship of the size of the informal organization relative to the individual or formal group. A strong individual can resist the domination of opinion if it is confined to a small number; but rarely there is in question the opinion of an overwhelming number, actively and hostilely expressed. Now the size of any subsidiary organization is small compared to the informal organization that permeates the State; and this wide informal organization will usually support "law and order" regardless of merits if the question at issue is minor from its point of view. The pressure on the subjective attitude of individuals or on that of subsidiary or dependent organizations is strong ordinarily to induce acceptance of law in an "orderly" society.

But this informal support of objective authority of the State depends upon essentially the same principles as in the case of ordinary organizations. Inappropriatness of law and of government administration, lack of understanding of the ultimate basis of authority, indifference to the motives governing individual support, untimely or impossible legislation, as is well known destroy "respect for law and order," that is, destroy objective political authority. In democracies the normal reaction is to change law and administration through political action (:183).

The "Individual" and Cooperation

Summary Statement: What is then "an individual" in this state of affairs?

L: [I think I know what you mean.] Within the general framework of devotion to laissez-faire individualism, our American culture has tended to make the following sub-assumptions regarding the process by which its structural form grows:

(a) It is assumed that as individuals feel the strain of trying to do any over-complicated thing alone, they will recognize, as free, rational persons, the need to join with their fellows and do something about it.

(b) It is assumed that when the institutional structure supporting one area of behavior, such as getting a living, becomes over-developed and begins to unbalance and to distort the rest of living, individuals will be aware of this and will automatically redress the balance (:66).

The lack of balance and coherence in the culture structure is markedly apparent when one compares the elaborate structuring of property rights in our culture with

the almost total lack of structuring of the rights of the individual worker to access to and permanence in the job upon which all the rest of his daily living must depend (:67).

B: [I think it is necessary to define what we mean by individual. It is my view that] The individual possesses certain properties which are comprehended in the word "person." Usually it will be most convenient if we use the noun "individual" to mean "one person" and reserve the adjectival form "personal" to indicate the emphasis on the properties. These are (a) activities or behavior, arising from (b) psychological factors, to which are added (c) the limited power of choice, which results in (d) purpose.

...the idea of free will is inculcated in doctrines of personal responsibility, of moral responsibility, and of legal responsibility. This seems necessary to preserve a sense of personal integrity...(:13)... This power of choice, however, is limited. This is necessarily true if what has already been stated is true, namely, that the individual is a region of activities which are the combined effect of physical, biological, and social factors. Free will is limited also, it appears, because power of choice is paralyzed in human beings if the number of equal opportunities is large.(:14)

[Moreover], ...every participant in an organization may be regarded as having a dual personality ---an organizational personality and an individual personality. Strictly speaking, an organization purpose has directly no meaning for the individual. What has meaning for him is the organization's relation to him --- what burdens it imposes, what benefits it confers. In referring to the aspects of purpose as cooperatively viewed, we are alluding to the organization personality of individuals. In many cases the two personalities are so clearly developed that they are quite apparent (:88).

L: [But what I want to address here is the] ...pattern of increasingly large population massess, held together principally by the tie of the individual to his job, and with attenuated sentiments of community in feeling and purpose... (:80).

B: [I agree, but I see it as of lack of knowledge about the idea of organization]. Always, it seemed to me , the social scientist ---from whatever side they approached --- just reached the edge of organization as I experience it, and retreated. Rarely did they seem to me to sense the processes of coordination and decision that underlie a large part at least of the phenomena they described. More important, there was lacking much recognition of formal

organization as a most important characteristic of social life, and as being the principal structural aspect of society itself. Mores, folkways, political structures, institutions, attitudes, motives, propensities, instincts, were discussed **in extenso**; but the bridge between the generalizations of social study on the one hand and the actions of the masses to which they related on the other was not included I thought. (:xxvii-xxix)

[In my case] The tangible result of this experience and these beliefs is this book. The need for it lies in the confusion and uncertainty which now attends the subject, and the extent to which especially the purposeful and constructive activities of men in present society are governed by formal organizations. It also lies in the relations of such organizations to society in general, and in the degrees to which the activities of formal organizations, as contrasted with institutions and other abstract generalities of social life, provide the structure and processes of social systems (:xxxi).

[However] no construction of the theory of cooperative systems or of organizations, nor any significant interpretation of the behavior of organizations, executives, or others whose efforts are organized, can be made that is not based on some position as to the psychological forces of human behavior.

For this reason I should add at this time that the exaggeration in some connections of the power and of the meaning of personal choice are vicious roots not merely of misunderstanding but of false and abortive effort. Often, as I see it, action is based on an assumption that individuals have a power of choice which is not, I think, present...(:14).

The efficiency of cooperation therefore depends upon what it secures and produces on the one hand, and how it distributes its resources and how it changes motives on the other (:59).

L : [I still think that]... The individual's identifying tag derived from his job and the property it yields him tends to be heavily overworked as the fragile basis for social cohesion. The common focus is not on living together but on "the job"... This carelessness about common sentiment is part of the general orientation toward matter-of-factness in a culture stressing material development, personal mobility, and postponement of the subtleties of living. At point after point our culture plays down extensive, acute, and subtle feeling. To be "business-like" is to be impersonal; in our moments of deep, personalized emotion we tend to retreat from others into ourselves or to the trusted tolerance of our immediate family; a businessman who is "artistic" may be somewhat suspect; being "romantic" or

"idealistic" is regarded as an evidence of youth; and the person who "gets enthusiastic about things" is mildly disparaged as inmature and "unsound." Human beings do not easily live so emotionally sterilized... Mickey Mouse and Charlie McCarthy tend to displace Uncle Sam and local symbols as repositories of common sentiment (:84).

B: [My answer to that is]: Still more do I regret the failure to convey the **sense** of organization, the dramatic and aesthetic feeling that surpasses the possibilities of exposition, which derives chiefly from the intimate habitual interested experience. It is evident that many may lack an interest in the science of organization because they are oblivious to the arts of organizing, not perceiving the significant elements. They miss the structure of the symphony, the art of its composition, and the skill of its execution, because they cannot hear the tones (:xxxiv).

L: [Granted], Human beings crave big, aggregating symbols on a culture-wide scale, but they also crave localized and highly personalized meanings. Human loyalties are largerly built of an infinite number of shared purposes in commonplace daily acts... We are today living through the end of that phase of our cultural history which was dominated by the quest for the conditions of individual liberty. Heavily laden with institutions developed to that end, we are reluctantly moving to a new phase in which we must somehow manage to rewrite our institutions in terms of organized community of purpose. To this end we may no longer conceive of the state as simply a kind of umpire over what Sir Henry Maine called "the beneficent private war which makes one man strive to climb on the shoulders of another and remain there through the law of the survival of the fittest" (:87).

B: [But to attain that] ...we have clearly to distinguish between organization purpose and individual motive. It is frequently assumed in reasoning about organizations that common purpose and individual motive are or should be identical. With the exception noted below, this is never the case; and under modern conditions it rarely even appears to be the case. Individual motive is necessarily an internal, personal, subjective thing; common purpose is necessarily an external, impersonal, objective thing even though the individual interpretation of it is subjective. The one exception to this general rule, an important one, is that the accomplishment of an organization purpose becomes itself a source of personal satisfaction and a motive for many individuals in organizations... It is rare, however, if ever, and then I think only in connection with family, patriotic, and religious organizations under special

conditions, that organization purpose becomes or can become the only or even the major individual motive (:88-89).

L: [I still don't see a solution. Our cultural pattern] ... is a pattern that assumes that achievement of man's values will follow automatically from material advancement.

Under this theory of indirection, the rest of the culture tends to bent to serve the ends of business. Nothing escapes. Even the qualitative ends of living themselves are exploited in the service of money-making. Freedom is invoked to defeat a child-labor amendment. Liberty is used by a privately owned "free press" to defeat the effort to control misleading food and drug advertising in the public interest. Justice is invoked to protect the rights of property against the efforts of workers to organize. Education in the public schools is made to exclude consideration of economically unorthodox subject-matter and is used in other ways to indoctrinate ways of thinking useful to the status quo. Love of country and religion are exploited to the ends of better business. And "free" public opinion, a prized check on the misuse democratic processes, is continually bought and paid for by using public relations counsels whose services are for sale for the private ends of the highest bidder. Such things befuddle men's view of their values (:99-100).

B: [I agree] ... we should not deceive ourselves by thinking that either a science of cooperation and organization or the further development of the executive arts will alone promote a greater integration of social forces, or even maintain the present status. The ethical ideal upon which cooperation depends requires the general diffusion of a willingness to subordinate immediate personal interest for both ultimate personal interest and the general good, together with a capacity of individual responsibility. The senses of what will be for the ultimate personal interest and of what will be for the general good both must come from outside the individual. They are social, ethical, and religious values. For their general diffusion they depend upon both intelligence and inspiration. Intelligence is necessary to the appreciation of the interdependence of peoples in a crowded world on their combined technological competence --an intelligence that perhaps will be derived from experience in cooperation rather than from anything suggestive of formal education. Inspiration is necessary to inculcate the sense of unity, and to create common ideals. Emotional rather than intellectual acceptance is required. No one who reads, or who observes the events of our times, but will recognize, it seems to me, the supreme importance of beliefs in ideals as indispensable to cooperation (:293).

In Conclusion

Summary Statement: Our hope then rests on better knowledge for the whole of society.

L: [To summarize, then,] As one begins to list the assumptions by which we Americans live, one runs at once into a large measure of contradictions and resulting ambivalence. This derives from the fact that these overlapping assumptions have developed in different eras and that they tend to be carried over uncritically into new situations or to be allowed to persist in long diminuendos into the changing future... It is precisely in this matter of trying to live by contrasting rules of the game that one of the most characteristic aspects of our American culture is to be seen (:59).

The following suggest some of the outstanding assumptions in American life:

-- Individualism, "the survival of the fittest," is the law of nature and the secret of America's greatness; and restrictions on individual freedom are un-American and kill initiative.

But: No man should live for himself alone; for people ought to be loyal and stand together and work for common purposes.

-- The family is our basic institution and the sacred core of our national life.

But: Business is our most important institution, and, since national welfare depends upon it, other institutions must conform to its needs.

-- Honesty is the best policy.

But: Business is business, and a businessman would be a fool if he didn't cover his hand.

-- Education is a fine thing.

But: It is the practical men who get things done.

-- Poverty is deporable and should be abolished.

But: There has never been enough to go around, and the Bible tells us that "The poor you have always with you" (:60-62).

B: However, the present questioning and discouragement do not come, it seems clear to me, merely from economic disturbances and international conflict. Much more do they arise from a deep conflict of beliefs concerning cooperation itself. There are two beliefs that are far apart, both struggling not only against each other but also against unrecognized limitations. One of them centers upon the freedom of the individual and makes him the center of the social universe. At the present time, on the whole, it is critical and pessimistic. It lays its emphasis upon failure of cooperation, upon wars and conflicts, confusion, and

disorganization, waste, hunger, disease and death, and yet it preaches uncritically an extreme liberty, an ideal individualism, a self-determination, that in their unrestricted dogmatism would prevent all formal cooperation beyond that imposed by the most obvious immediate opportunities and necessities.

The second extreme faith is adulatory and optimistic. It places its emphasis upon the order, the predictability, the consistency, the effectiveness, of untold myriads of concrete acts that are cooperatively determined, in systems so extensively interrelated that the effects have been enormously to expand the world's population and to advance measurably the material and cultural state of many millions. Those who speak from this point of view are likely to advocate uncritically a vast regimentation, an endless subordination, a completeness of coordination, that in their unrestricted dogmatism would stifle all development of individuals beyond that found inescapable.

And so we find ourselves again with the very problem with which we began... centered upon the old question of free will and determinism, or on sentiments from which this question takes its origin (:294-295).

L: [Yes, and] Growing out of all the preceeding, a final characterization of our culture pattern runs somewhat as follows: It is a pattern of markedly uneven change, of unprecedented rapidity in some traits and of marshalled resistance to change in others, and tolerating at many points extreme disjunctions and contradictions.

Human beings are, as Freud has pointed out, inevitably ambivalent at at many points, but a culture which encourages unnecessary ambivalence is recklessly careless of the vital energies of its people...(:100-105).

B: [Expressed perhaps differently, but within the same line of thought is the following]: Scarcely a man, I think, who has felt the annihilation of his personality in some organized system, has not also felt that the same system belonged to him because of his own free will he chose to make it so. Many an executive, I believe, has seemed to himself at times to be merely the channel of imponderable universal forces, of all his associates the least free; and yet he has also believed that when men do not choose, do not will, do not regard themselves as responsible and are not so regarded by others, the very stuff of cooperation dissolves (:295).

[Thus, my book], without the intent of the writer or perhaps the expectation of the reader, had at its heart this deep paradox and conflict of feelings in the lives of men. Free and unfree, controlling and controlled, choosing and

being chosen, inducing and unable to resist inducement, the source of authority and unable to deny it, independent and dependent, nourishing their personalities, and yet depersonalized; forming purposes and being forced to change them, searching for limitations in order to make decisions, seeking the particular but concerned with the whole, finding leaders and denying leadership, hoping to dominate the earth and being dominated by the unseen ---this is the story of man in society told in [its] pages (:296).

L: [And that brings us to] ... the gross imbalance between what we are able to know and the limited extent to which we have institutionalized this knowledge in the service of living (:106).

...The knowledge which the sophisticated experts possess in our culture is growing at a rate far more rapid than the rate at which it is being institutionalized in the habits of thought and action of the mass of our population. This increasing disparity arises from our heavy reliance upon casual adjustment, assumed to occur automatically wherever it is rationally relevant; from our over-exclusive reliance upon commercial exploitation to diffuse any new knowledge throughout the population; and from the freedom granted to interested power-blocs to supress patents, obstruct change, and bend new knowledge to their private ends (:108).

B: [At this point I must, then, ask the following]: Would a thoroughly scientific approach to the problems of cooperative systems and organization provide a useful tool for the executive arts? It is my belief that it ultimately would, and that the development of such science is important in further progress in these arts and hence in cooperation generally. This belief is based upon reflection concerning the failure observed in many concrete instances to take into account all the elements of the situation as a whole...

Neither the consideration of present experience nor that of the pertinent aspects of history permits escape from the suspicion that much sheer lack of good sense in human relations is to be explained by the history of the sciences. There is no science of organization or of cooperative systems... (:290).

L: [Unfortunately, and related to the above] As a culture, we are cumulating our disabilities and the resulting strains incident to daily living at a rate faster than social legislation, education, and all the agencies for "reform" are managing to harness our new knowledge in the reduction of these disabilities (:109).

B: For this reason perhaps [my book's] chief value, if presently it has any, will merely lie in its expression of one view of experience... (:292).

I hope that the social scientist, on the other hand, may attempt a preliminary testing of it against the background of present knowledge. More concretely, I hope for a social anthropology, a sociology, a social psychology, an institutional economics, a treatise on management, etc., written with the concepts of a cooperative system and an organization which has been presented as a part of the working scheme, for what this kind of thinking requires at present is not so much the testing of details as the ascertainment of whether or not there is a correspondence between it and general experience and social knowledge as a whole (:293).

L: Every gain in knowledge and efficiency and every outworn symbol or causal explanation displaced by more realistic analysis is potentially a gain in ease and richness of living. But when this new knowledge is not put to work in the service of all the people, when it is only partially applied to those able to "pay for it" or bright enough to learn it unaided, or when it is used by those with power in order to exploit others, this knowledge may be either largely barren or, worse, it tends to become a disruptive factor (:113).

B: Such a story calls finally for a declaration of faith. I believe in the power of the cooperation of men of free will to make men free to cooperate; that only as they choose to work together they can achieve the fullness of personal development; that only as each accepts a responsibility for choice can they enter into that communion of men which arise the higher purposes of individual and of cooperative behavior alike. I believe that the expansion of cooperation and the development of the individual are mutually dependent realities, and that a due proportion or balance between them is a necessary condition of human welfare. Because it is subjective with respect both to a society as a whole and to the individual, what this proportion is I believe science cannot say. It is a question for philosophy and religion (:296).

The readings that I have presented by enacting the preceding dialogue give us a view of Barnard very different from that of contemporary management texts. I believe that my readings show Barnard as a social theorist far removed from the issues of immediate concern in the limited world of any particular organization.

He explains his concerns through "the executive organization" because that is what he knows best --- As a good Hegelian that is his positive moment, what he can take possession of, what he can show mastery over. It is a demonstration of transcending the Lockian model of personhood, only conferred to the "proprietor," with a philosophy that shows a reversal between master and slave. It is a Hegelian conception that concedes to the servant the dominant position in the making of a master: the master depends on the work of the servant for his mastery. It is also a conception in line with Barnard's theory of authority.

In the following pages I will show more explicitly the Hegelian in Barnard. The influence in his writing of this philosophical orientation (that also influences Lynd's writing) situates The Functions in a space that aims to transcend more conventional knowledge about business organizations: from benefitting any particular organization to the benefit of society as a whole. Both Lynd and Barnard identify the problematics of their respective positions by pointing at conceptions of "the individual," versus a more general view of society. Each in his own way recognizes that viewing the individual as a separate free entity, determiner of his society, is certainly a convenient fiction for

some dominant groups, but not for the conditions of the whole (e.g. Barnard, 1938: 170; Lynd, 1939: 77).

Lynd shows an awareness of Nietzsche's "original text" critique, and addresses these problems through a class/historical materialism critique, inherited from the Hegelian/Marxist discoursive connection. Barnard, on the other hand, dwells into more "pure" Hegelian issues. His resolutions point at the possibility of ultimate synthesis, absolute knowledge, at the end of time. Lynd's pessimism and Barnard's optimism are reflections of these two different lines of Hegelian discourse.

However, Barnard's choice of considering in detail the problematics of individualism ---for working out the contradictions of Social Darwinism in his notion of cooperation--- served to keep his text as a major production in the "organizational sciences." As we will soon see, Hegel was effaced while "the individual" was enshrined. As for Barnard, he remained as a discoursive opening to provide for his own fall into the void.

Inter/Text 3: Barnard The Hegelian

Recognize these words?:

....responsibility, then, is that capacity of leaders by which, reflecting attitudes, ideals hopes, derived largely from without themselves, they are compelled to bind the wills of men to the accomplishment of purposes beyond their immediate ends, beyond their times. Even when these purposes are lowly and the time is short, the transitory efforts of men become a part of the organization of living forces that transcends man unaided by man; but when these purposes are high and the wills of many men of many generations are bound together they live boundlessly...

The abstract change which occurs in history has long since been interpreted in such a way as to contain a progression to the better, the more perfect. The changes in nature show only a cyclical movement... Only in the changes which occur in the field of the spirit does the novel occur. This aspect of the life of the spirit long ago led to seeing man as destined for something different than the merely natural things.... a capacity for genuine change for the better, the more perfect, a drive toward perfection...

Cooperation and organization as they are observed and experienced are concrete synthesis of opposed facts, and as opposed thoughts and emotions of human beings. It is precisely the function of the executive to facilitate the systhesis in concrete action of contradictory forces, to reconcile conflicting forces, instincts, interests, conditions, positions, and ideals.

the ethical world of social life is the absolute unity of subjective and objective good. In this sphere is found the solution of the antinomy in strict accordance with the concept of freedom. Ethics is not merely the subjective form and the self-determination of the will, but it has real freedom for its content. Both right and morality need the ethical for their foundation, as without it neither has any actuality.

For the morality that underlies enduring cooperation is multidimensional. It comes from and may expand to all the world; it is rooted deeply in the past, it faces toward the endless future. As it expands, it must become more complex, its conflicts must be more numerous and deeper, its call for abilities must be higher, its failures of ideal attainment must be perhaps more tragic; but the quality of leadership, the persistence of its influence, the durability of its related organizations, the power of coordination it incites, all express the height of moral aspirations, the breadth of moral foundations. So among those who cooperate the things that are seen are moved by the things unseen. Out of the void comes the spirit that shapes the ends of men.

The left column is Barnard's words (1938: 283-284, 21, 284, respectively) the right is Hegel's (Friedrich, 1954: 21, 259, respectively). In each case the preoccupations with the progress of history toward the betterment of humankind is obvious, as well as the need to resolve the apparent contradictions in men's life (Barnard and Hegel against Kantian categorical imperatives) through dialectical processes and ethical developments.

In the following paragraphs I will trace some evidence of strong Hegelian thinking in Barnard's Functions. Doing so will serve as final evidence for the impossibility of "translating," "transferring," or "interpreting" Barnard's work into current management thinking. Any traditional "managerial interpretation" is/will be just another "miming" and "grafting" over a text that may have meant something very different in his time and place.

I should stress, again, that I am not proposing my interpretations as "the correct ones." One more time I should say that my purpose is to bring awareness of the fictive nature of all our interpretations when constructing theory. However, the tracing of a clear Hegelian influence in Barnard's text offers an interesting possibility for understanding the privileging of certain fictions in the development of the "organizational sciences."

In this regard, one may say that as an early theoretical work in management Barnard's brought into the discipline discourses which helped construct the "organizational sciences" over a notion of progress. But if such is the case the resulting "disciplinary development" seems quite ironic.

Here the notion of progress attains a double meaning if we notice how it is that progress (toward the ultimate freedom through the Spirit) informs Hegel's work, as much as Barnard's work. The irony is that progress, in the sense of progress of the organizational disciplines toward human control for particular organizational purposes, (e.g. in the manner that Barnard has been traditionally "used" as a management text) has worked to limit the idea of progress as ultimate freedom of man, in the Hegelian sense.

These paradoxes and contradictions in the notion progress illustrate points made by Barnard and by Lynd. Barnard would say that the problem results from the inability to reconcile conceptions of the social and the personal positions of individuals in concrete situations. Lynd would say that they result from overlapping assumptions that tend to be carried uncritically from one time/place to the next. In either case, they result from grafting one kind of philosophical discourse over the remains of another. Those remains, of which we are often unaware, have opened the door to still other discoursive/institutional disciplinary developments . They are the developments which determined what kind of subject could be "the organizational subject." They are the discourses which excluded Hegel and included "the individual."

The "Hegel" in Barnard

The following is a brief summary of Hegelian ideas which seems to be central in Barnard's text. First, basic in Hegel is the notion of freedom. His work tries to resolve the apparent contradiction

between free-will and determinism. His main contribution, where he resolves these difficulties, is one where all spheres of the life of the individual become unified through a dialectical process. The wholeness and synthesis attained through dialectics, however, does not happen for every individual in every society. Societies, and the individuals in them, move into historical stages. The end of history comes when man is finally realized beyond objective/subjective, free/determined in the Spirit.

Hegel's works are philosophical investigations in history, logic, aesthetics, ethics, and law, where he tries to show the unification that must exist on all the spheres of life if the process of "becoming" is to be attained. Barnard's works show his preoccupation with similar issues. And his notion of cooperation comprises that ultimate synthesis announced by Hegel's philosophy.

Moreover, in Hegel's philosophy the state of "nature" is one step in the road toward the Spirit, thus precluding any final resolution of society through pure evolutionist theories. And that is why Barnard, moving away from the social Darwinism that pervaded American social thought before the thirties, is so conscious of proposing a theory of human organization that avoid any answer based on "the survival of the fittest." This is a point that Perrow obviously unaware of Barnard's Hegelian "connection," notices but fails to discern (1986: 68).

Also, within Hegel's philosophy is a notion by which transcendence into ultimate freedom becomes possible only when individuals can translate their freedom into personality and property (e.g. Arthur, 1985). How to deal with this issue in the state of "power

without property"? The executive functions are the key answer. By inculcating common purpose, that each individual can make "their own," individuals then attain "property" and "personality" (i.e. Barnard, 1938: 87-88) by which they can transcend their present imperfect state into the perfection of cooperation. How this is to happen depends on every particular formal organization (formal, as in form and content, a Hegelian issue for concreteness, for the materials of society). Why this is to happen? So that the whole of cooperation, throughout society, could happen.

Barnard never gets to resolve these problematics. He just proposes an idea that may transcend into the ultimate end of men if American history reaches its final state of "absolute knowledge." This is the Hegelian view of science, which incorporates both rationalism and intuitionism and transcends them with a higher level of consciousness [6]. Barnard makes his proposal from the only position that he "owns," from his personality as an executive, still moving in history.

Why Hegel in Barnard's Work?

In the preceding sections of this chapter I have been arguing that Barnard was very preoccupied with the state of society during the thirties, and that he thought he could do something about it. His comments in Fortune show his social orientation, his disposition to be very vocal when disagreeing with current "business" thought, and his awareness that his views might be interpreted as Marxist when they were not so. Moreover, in his in response to Copeland he is also quite

emphatic about having the concept of cooperation understood in a larger context than that of the immediate particular organization. The concept of cooperation, a system of identity-in-differences, is dialectical in its parts but synthetic in its totality, like the whirlpool of his example. It evolves toward "the spirit that shapes the ends of man." These words lead us closer to the possibility of Hegel informing Barnard's work.

As I have already discussed, the issue of Marxism was alive and well during the thirties, but it had also attained an intellectual status beyond the merely political one. Barnard is explicit about his awareness of Marxism in the Functions (e.g.1938: 145n, 295). Following this lead, one must remember that the main influence in Marx's theories was Hegelian, except that Marx basically turns Hegel's propositions upside down in the development of a materialistic theory of society. Based on this, it is my assumption that at any point Marxist thinking becomes an intellectual issue there is a likelihood that Hegel's works will be also read and discussed.

I have noted before that Barnard did not want to be thought of as related to Marxist thinking. Wouldn't it be fitting, then, that he would involve himself in an entreprise whereby he could go beyond Marx? What about a theory of society which, based on Hegel, would overturn Marxism? The kind of work he does in The Functions can certainly be read as directed toward these ends.

Could Barnard have read Hegel? The possibilities are of course there. Whether Barnard read German or not I cannot claim but Hegel was already widely translated into English. The following editions should

have been available: Baillie (1901), Croce (1915), McTaggart (1922), Stace (1924), Hegel (1931), Hook (1936).

But I guess that a more important clue for the possibility of anybody re-addressing Hegel to draw a theory of American society during the thirties lies in Hegel's own words. He explicitly mentioned that he would not address America in his Philosophy of History because:

> "America is therefore the land of the future in which times to come...world history shall reveal itself...But what has so far happened there is only an echo of the old world and an expression of an alien aliveness, and as the country of the future it does not concern us here. For in history our concern must be with what has been and with what is... Concerning politics in North America the need of a firm cohesion is not yet present, for a real state and a real government only develop when there is a difference of classes, when riches and poverty become very large and a situation arises where a great number of people can no longer satisfy its need in the accustumed way. But America does not yet approach this tension...For a state to become a state it is necessary that the citizen cannot continually think of emigrating, but that the class of cultivators, no longer able to push to the outside, presses upon itself and is gathered into cities and urban professions. Only then can a civic system develop and that is the condition for an organized state" (Friedrich, 1954: liii-liv).

Thus the possibilities of "doing" Hegel in Barnard's times get further enhanced if Hegel's words are taken as a prophecy of America during the thirties. And the possibility that the Functions were based on Hegel becomes stronger if we remember Berle and Means' (1932) arguments. They said that American society was that of the giant corporations, where the managers of the future would have to function "more as princes and ministers than as promoters and merchants." The Functions, then, as a Hegelian theory of the American state finally coming into history ---a state where civil society had the corporate

form--- must focus on the functions of "the princes and ministers" (the executives) who, as servants of that society, had the responsibility to move history toward the ends of man: cooperation.

Who is speaking? Hegel? Barnard?

Foucault (1977) asks: "What is an Author" --- and answers: "To this day, the `author' remains an open question..."(:113) to conclude:

> "We can easily imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without any need for an author. Discourses, whatever their status, form, or value, and regardless of our manner of handling them, would unfold in a pervasive anonymity. No longer the tiresome repetitions: Who is the real author? Have we proof of his authenticity and originality?... New questions will be heard: What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where does it come from; how is it circulated; who control it? What placements are determined for possible subjects? Who can fulfill these diverse functions of the subject? Behind all these questions we would hear little more than the murmur of indifference: What matters who's speaking? " (:138).

And so we stand. What does it matter that Barnard was inspired by Hegel? ---even if ample proof can be drawn just by doing a close analysis of Barnard's uses of language: his concern with "levels of discourse" and "the concept" (1940); the notions of intended and unintended results to illustrate "efficiency and effectiveness"; all of which can be traced back to Hegel. As a matter of fact, I can also show that Barnard could have been inspired by the symbolic interactionist approach of George Herbert Mead (first published in 1934) noting in passing that Goffman cites Barnard often. And I could contend against the "pure functionalist orientation" that Perrow sees in Barnard. But

why would I do that?

What matters is that we cannot be "innocent" anymore of how we use Barnard. Barnard, and all of us, have established a mode of existence for "Barnard's" discourses. And as much as he did, every time that we "do Barnard" we are determining places for possible subjects. What kind of subjects?

The fictions I have created in my Barnard readings point at historical discontinuities to defer resolution of interpretation, to emphasize the indeterminacy of the signifier. But one step removed, right on the surface of my discourse, and his, and ours, is the modern episteme and the modern subject. It does not matter that in a detailed micro reading Barnard might be closer to Hegel than to March and Simon --- what matters is that Hegel, and Barnard, and March and Simon have all participated in creating the subject of history through the discourses of modernity.

On the one hand, Barnard moved away from conceptions of organization which focused on micro organizational issues. He chose to emphasize the dialectics of a societal view of organizations. On the other hand, he gave careful attention to ways by which "the individual" could be reconciled with his (Hegel's?) societal/holistic/processual views. Ironically, this latter issue provided a rich source of "the individual" for those citing Barnard in discourses of very different philosophical orientation. These are the citations (e.g. in the books, articles, and critiques indicated at the beginning of this chapter) that effaced Hegel and enshrined "the individual." Barnard provided a gap where the "discourses of the modern subject" were eventually erected in

his much anticipated "organizational sciences."

This modern subject is explained by Foucault (1982) as one still submitted to pastoral power. From his perspective this is a form of power established in the discourses of Christianity and secularized in the eighteenth century. That is, at the Age of the Enlightenment the preeminence of the Church was substituted by the reasonableness of Civil Society, but the discourses of "pastorality" simply became embedded in another institutional order, still concerned with the same subjects.

The "pastoral power" in Christianity (as that exercised by the clergy) is concerned with assuring individual salvation in the next world. It not only commands but is also prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of "the flock." It looks both after the community and each individual in particular. And it cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's mind, without exploring their souls and knowing their conscience and ability to direct it.

With the arrival of Civil Society the "pastoral power" remained, first exercised by the state, and eventually by more and more institutions in society, in the following manner:

--- salvation became a matter of insuring "well-being" in this world.

--- the "pastoral functions" extended from the church to all the institutions of society.

--- the knowledge of souls became the knowledge of man both in its globalized (population/social) and analytical (individual/psychological) forms.

And so, on being modern individuals we have become pastoral

subjects. Subjects in the meaning of subjection --- either through cooperation or corporation, through executives or management, efficiency or effectiveness, the end of history or bounded rationality --- throughout we have subjected ourselves to the ideologies of "well-being", of institutions, and of "self-knowledge", because we do not know how to be individuals without being subjects.

That is, as long as we are involved in discourses and disciplines whose concerns are those of man/individual/person while they develop a technology of the social (e.g. organizations) we are still involved in the discourses of pastorality.

Thus, beyond any naive interpretation of Barnard (as discoverer of "organizational truths;" or by deforming his theory to make it "fit" current management "knowledge") he can be seen as one entry point of discourses of pastoral power in the creation of the management disciplinary subject. To use his own words, Barnard is a mere point where the crossing lines are more important than the place where they cross.

And at the end, all that is left on the way "toward progress" is that the more things change the more they remain the same. Or, as Hegel would recognize in his ironic stance, absolute knowledge lies in a recollection carried by language, but language can never say what it means (Verene, 1985). Those are the modern discourses. Can we be anything else in Postmodernity?

Notes

[1]

The concept simulacrum is used here in various manners. One understanding would be to identify it with image or representation. That is, a particular representation is brought to the reader by claiming that the dissertation is postmodern. Or one can reverse this same idea; one may be exploiting the writing here of the word simulacrum as a postmodern representational strategy ---i.e. postmodern works often use this term, so writing it here will associate the dissertation with postmodern writings.

It also offers a militaristic image (simulacrum as war games) where one plays on the invasion of others. In this case the simulacrum Postmodernism plays on the invasion of modernism, and subverts its taken for granted categories.

Finally, simulacrum could be interpreted as trace, an insubstantial form or semblance of something ---thus, the effacing of the modern categories in the postmodern. The remains are the modern traces.

[2]

Discourse/discoursive practice, as used here, refers to the Foucauldian usage. It is also similar to Derrida's notion of ecriture/writing. Both were discussed in chapter one.

[3]

One caveat here: I am not proposing historical relativism but pointing at the differences in meaningfulness of discourses "interpreted" out of their time and place. It is to say, one more time, that there is no "original text."

[4]

I should stress the fact that all this was published in Fortune. If one just considers its selling price of $2.00 in 1939 (Business Week was $0.25 then) one can understand that the magazine addressed a very elite group in society.

[5]

One definition of palimpsest is a piece of writing on second hand vellum, parchment, or other surfaces carrying traces of previous writings, which were erased. The Greek usage referred to reinscribing a stone or slab whose previous inscription was either scraped or turned over. It can also be used to mimic "pali-sades," a containment for loose grounds. In any event, it is used here to indicate that the readings to be done reinscribe "meaning" on very loose grounds (the traditional claims of what the text mean).

[6]

In the appendix to The Functions of the Executive, "Mind Over Everyday Affairs," Barnard is even more explicit about this issue, using a very Hegelian mode of expression. For example, he says: "That the

increasing complexity of society and the elaboration of technique and organization now necessary will more and more require capacity for rigorous reasoning seem evident; but it is a super-structure necessitating a better use of the non-logical mind to support it... the corrective of the feeling mind that senses the end result... **the interest of the all and of the spirit that perceiving the concrete parts encompasses also the intangibles of the whole** (1938: 322 [my emphasis]).

CHAPTER V

FOR AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY: THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE

In chapter four I emphasized two issues which are central to this dissertation project: the discoursive nature of the organizational disciplines, discussed at the beginning; and the importance of defining a particular concept of **the individual** as organizational subject, discussed at the end.

My readings of Barnard's work paid major attention to the first issue. These readings, which presented Barnard's theory of cooperation as a theory of society, aimed at subverting the traditional "managerial" interpretations imposed upon it. It was my intention to represent, with my readings, a theoretical barrier for conventional interpretations, by problematizing the application of Barnard's theories to any particular organization. That is, in my Hegelian "interpretation," this theory would work if, and only if both the parts (individual acts of organization) and the whole (society) have entered into cooperation. Otherwise, any one organization in society practicing cooperation, while others do not, would create **competition** through the practice of cooperation. From a Hegelian point of view, this latter contradiction can only be resolved by transcending the state where competition is regarded as necessary.

My readings re-attached Barnard to a historical context in an attempt to mark how ahistorical interpretations (of this one or any other text) in the organizational disciplines can reach very different

conclusions from the same words. The importance given to the historical context is, however, a reading strategy to stress the difference in sameness, the independence of any "word" from anything it may represent, and not a claim to the "true meaning of the text" from historical interpretations. The primary aim of my deconstructive readings was to show that "the accumulation of knowledge" and "the transference of theory into practice," ---the traditional representation of what the organizational sciences are supposed to do--- are difficult claims to sustain as they are based on the instability of signification. At the same time, this type of reading presented an-other manner of "doing organizational theory," which produces and disseminates different understandings of the disciplinary "tradition."

The second issue ---the definition of individuals as organizational subjects--- stressed the "entrance," through Barnard's work, of the "pastoral subject" (Foucault, 1983) in the organizational discourses. The "cultivation" of this subject is the major theme in the current chapter, and will be analyzed by reading McGregor's (1960) work. This view of the individual has become the "approved version" of the organizational subject: management/the manager ---unified, whole, balanced, consistent, a true Cartesian cogito. As mentioned in chapter three, it is the representation that hides the fragmentation and ambiguities within the discipline by limiting the authorized interpretations. That is, the movement that has permitted the "organizational sciences" to be defined as a "true discipline" hinges on cultivating a particular discourse: one which accomodates or separates this subject from cultural or historical events.

Essentially, the "pastoral subject" view argues that a particular understanding of subjectivity emerged in the eighteenth century in Western civil society. It emerged out of the transformation of previous relationships between the individual and the church. As the modern state became more responsible for the "well being" of individuals it took upon itself traditional ecclesiastical responsibilities, which later spread about other institutions of society (e.g. schools, private organizations). Hegel's philosophy can be understood as a reaction to this situation: What kind of "self" can anyone be in a society which puts emphasis on individualization and totalization at the same time?

Barnard inaugurated this issue in organizational texts. His theory of cooperation, and the role of the executive, go to extraordinary lengths trying to balance this problematic. His effort is particularly significant since it was done at a point in time when American society could not refuse to exert pastoral power --- Who was to care for each and all the disadvantaged? Could a notion of "rugged individualism" and "survival of the fittest" still be sustained? Thus, from this perspective Barnard's theory of cooperation could be read as an statement in support of the pastoral power of the corporation, in lieu of the state --- but a power which could not be exercised unless each and all organization members in each and all possible organizations (including, and especially so, the executives) learned how to become pastoral subjects.

From a deconstructive perspective, the manner in which Barnard "authorizes" his concept of "individual," ---a "self" who would value the benefits of cooperation, instead of personal action--- is

particularly interesting. He increasingly plays with the notion of self-identity of the subject, present to himself in the knowledge from his own personal experience as an executive ---a phenomenological claim. At the same time, he advocates the benefits of self-in-other through cooperation; that is, a "lacking self" who requires the supplement "other" to be whole and self-present. Thus, "the authenticity" of Barnard's experiences are really constructed not on "self-identity" but on his difference from those "others" on whom he depends to make a truthful claim with his text (e.g. Derrida, 1976; 1978).

The above commentary serves two purposes: first, it marks the phenomenological influences in a 1930s organizational text. As the "scientific" orientation gained popularity in the discipline the phenomenological orientation was deauthorized as "true knowledge," and Barnard became interpreted as "an early and naive effort" on the road to "disciplinary progress." Second, the irony is that the "scientific orientation" has been unable to expunge "knowledge through self-experience" (i.e. phenomenological knowledge) from later organizational texts. As I will soon point out, the phenomenological claim just became "hidden" differently, while the discourse of supplementarity took center stage.

Similar to the previous chapter, my readings will use historical contextualization to indicate how the discontinuities in historical periods affect the main text read, and render impossible the alleged "progress" of the organizational disciplines (in this case the possible "progress" of "the role of the manager"). The "cooperative subject" made sense in Barnard's times with the rise of the American "welfare

state." What would happen to this subject with the return of national prosperity during the fifties?

Reading the Human Side of Enterprise

In the following pages I will establish the context for reading McGregor's work in a format similar to the Barnard's readings. However, here the presentation of the historical context plays a different role. In the previous chapter "returning" Barnard's work to its "time and place" was a way of emphasizing the production of alternative significations out of well known discourses. Also, it was a way of pointing at the fact that no interpretation can be regarded as innocent or value-free.

In the present readings I use the historical context to trace a movement in American society away from the "welfare state" of the thirties and toward the "social responsibility of business" in the fifties. It is at this time that organizational discourses start focusing on the manager as subject; a movement away from "sociologizing organizations" and into "psychologizing organizational participants."

By mid-twentieth century it was clear that management and ownership would never again go hand in hand. It was also clear that the shape of American society was defined through its large corporations. And for the first time ever, it was clear that government was working more and more through these private organizations ---that the nation was a system of "corporatism" (e.g. Hawley, 1978). Thus, the "ascendancy of the manager," as Chandler (1977) calls this situation when managerial

capitalism took center stage in society, required a better definition of the manager role.

The historical context will call attention to the dominant ideas between the end of World War II and the decade of the fifties. With this analysis I will show the importance of constituting "the manager as subject." It was the appropriate technology to sustain the status of `truth' at that point in time.

Historical Con/Text: General Issues

Goldman (1977) describes the years after World War II as those where American liberalism triumphed as a form of conservatism. What he meant was that the Truman years saw an increase in general support for government intervention to protect and advance the standard of living. In this sense, the liberal support for government interference in private affairs was fueled by the conservative attitude of maintaining a status quo of economic well being.

Along these lines, the American public became prime supporters of world-wide right wing governments and the main blockage to Communism. These were also the years where a large majority of the population fell into the middle income brackets, including farm families. And they were years of regained strength in the labor movements.

These societal changes along income groups created "status anxiety" (Hofstadter, 1963) in politics. The heterogeneity and search for secure identity of the American population gave way to a status politics expressed in vindictiveness rather than proposals for positive

action. For others it was a matter of "status panic." Within this period C. Wright Mills (1948; 1951; and 1956) wrote three important works focusing on the members of three different influential groups in post-war society. The first one analyzed the evolution of the American working class and the circumstances that made trade unions aspirants for a place in the national elite, rather than becoming social critics. The second book argued that the traditional middle class ideology of independence, individualism, and mobility was a mystification in the conditions of mid-twentieth century, where most Americans were "hired employees." In the last one he examined the American upper class. He concluded that in spite of its "classless ideology," the main power in the nation was concentrated in three important elites: political leaders, big business executives, and military chiefs. More importantly, he argued that the three groups coalesced in a power elite which made all the important decisions pertaining to the society.

In a somewhat related theme, Riesman (1950) focused on the massification of society, where he saw the majority anxious to conform very closely to the apparent values of the groups in which they found themselves. In part he attributed this conformism to the declining importance of work and the increasing importance of consumption and leisure. But he also noticed that the nature of work itself had changed, and that now the success in an occupation became more dependent on being a "well-adjusted" (i.e. conforming) person.

The changed nature of work and the relationship between work and leisure became important topics of discussion during this time. The first topic was broadly discussed by Whyte (1956) in the contrast

between the Protestant ethic, which stressed the values of individualism, hard work, thrift, and competition and the new "social ethic" which stressed the importance of the group and the value of belonginess. This new ethic is embodied by the business executive and his loyalty to the business corporation. All his life-style is defined by his loyalty to a situation which, Whyte suggests, resembles feudalism: the clearly delineated ranks of the corporation, and the closed-quarters contemplation of these small worlds. Fromm (1955), on the other hand, saw group conformity as an escape from the burdens of freedom where "man regresses to a receptive and marketing orientation and ceases to be productive;... he loses his sense of self, becomes dependent on approval, hence tends to conform and yet to feel insecure; he is dissatified, bored and anxious..." (op. cit.: 270).

The change of social orientation from work to leisure was a topic addressed by Riesman, who saw it as an issue requiring some creative thinking on how to occupy the free time liberated from working time, and also by two other influential thinkers of the decade: Arendt (1958) and Galbraith (1958). The first one presented the pessimistic outlook of a society of laborers without labor, unable to develop of other meaningful activities beyond work itself. However Galbraith, is fairly optimistic. He sees the affluence of the nation as the natural development of an economic growth which will continue. This affluence allows a decrease in the production of consumer goods, with which society is already oversatisfied. Consequently, there could be increased free time, or a reduction in the number of people who work, or attempts to make work easier and more pleasant, or development of the

occupations that are already found enjoyable because they call for intelligence and skills.

This was the general situation of the time, where affluence, conformity, additional leisure time, and a new large managerial/middle class dominated the discourses of society. It is worth paying attention to the rhetoric of "wellness" at the core of most these discourses. It is a rhetoric which dealt with the creation of "individuality" for the socialized largest group in society ---the "new" middle classs.

Historical Con/Text: Business Issues

To talk about "business issues" during the fifties as a separate historical category from other issues in society can be very misleading. As can be gathered from the above, general societal concerns were increasingly tied to business concerns (in all its double meaning) and economic issues. This sentiment is captured by Bottomore when he exclaims after analyzing Whyte's text:

> "Is there no difference between the kinds of loyalty which may be expected toward different organizations; between loyalty to a nation, a class, a church, an academic community, or a business concern? Is there no difference between organizations in the degree of conformity which they expect or exact? Is not one of the major problems revealed by The___Oranization___Man simply that a particular organization, the business firm, which should be merely an instrument, has set itself up in the United States as a way of life and a source of ultimate values?" (1966: 84).

To understand this situation it will be important to reiterate that after World War II it became clear that the "pastoral powers" assumed by the government during the thirties were being transferred to

private interests. Economic expansion (real GNP rose by 52% between 1945 and 1960) and price stability (consumer prices rose only 25% between 1950 and 1962) indicate that the strongest economy in the world belonged to the United States between the 1950's and 60's. For a society which, as we already commented in chapter two, had economic development as its primary value, any "institutional order" seen as responsible for economic "miracles" was likely to earn a "pledge of allegiance." There is no doubt that private enterprise played the main role in post-war economic growth. How this happened is indicated by the importance that the following five interrelated business/management activities acquired during the fifties: (1) the growth of manufacturing and production; (2) the increase of service industries; (3) the re-structuring of big businesses; (4) the emphasis on consumer marketing; and (5) the expansion of world markets (Blackford and Kerr, 1986).

The return to civilian production in the manufacturing industries put in consumer's hands a vast array of durable goods that had been scarce during the Depression and War years. Consumer purchasing power was strong due to the combination of full employment and vast scarcity during the previous years. Cars, television sets, and household appliances became accesible consumer goods. Emphasis in manufacturing and production was accompanied by aggressive marketing techniques which made the desirability of fashionable products (e.g. annual changes in automobile models) and comfort (i.e. air conditioning) a <u>normal</u> expectation on the part of consumers.

Manufacturing became the identifying tag of "big business" while

the growth in service industries became often associated with smaller entrepreneurs. However, the large organizations continued to grow larger through strategies of decentralization and diversification. This time they took three different routes: through internal technological developments into related fields; by purchasing other companies which complemented existing technologies; by purchasing other companies which had similar channels of distribution for similar markets. In each of these cases the diversified companies tended to maintain decentralized operations.

In spite of the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950, which had placed limitations on the vertical and horizontal integration typical of diversification, "big business" was alive and well. By the end of the decade the "bigness syndrome" became even stronger through the appearance of the first conglomerates.

Another new type of business which appeared in this decade, the franchise, offered opportunities for small entrepreneurs. These big "small businesses" combined fairly low-investment accesibility with the umbrella of "national big names" and standardized services and products.

Finally, as if national markets were not enough to sustain the "productive push" of the decade, the worldwide markets were there for the taking. Multinational operations increased during these years with new management structures. Rather than separating the international divisions from "home" operations, as has previously been traditional in companies serving international markets, the new "cosmopolitan management structure" came about. In this case the top operating management of domestic products divisions took over the responsibility

for their products' international business. Another new structure, the multifunctional, gave equal status to the international and domestic divisions. In either structure it was clear that top management had become more involved in worldwide operations.

Two trends appeared in these years' political economy: The Office of the President became more involved in preserving American capitalism; and business appeared to reduce the power of organized labor. The government took the responsibility of managing the overall level of prosperity chartering in 1946 the Council of Economic Advisers together with the Employment and Production Act. From here on the professional economist became an important figure in government circles but the national Chamber of Commerce played an equally influential role. In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act made clear that the government wanted to preserve management prerogatives from labor intervention. Nonetheless, if the growth of organized labor was not dramatic after the war, there is no doubt that groups already organized participated in the increased national prosperity.

The government/business partnership in progress appeared in many other forms. For example, the liberalization of foreign trade after the War helped the growth of multinational corporations as well as the disposal in foreign markets of farm surpluses; the creation of the military-industrial complex reshaped the relationships of technology developers, business corporations, and the military. The Defense department became an important source of funding for scientific and engineering research in firms and universities, while over half the prime military contracts went to the fifty largest corporations in the

country. And public funds stimulated employment in road constructions, but it had the main aim of satisfying the requirements of business firms seeking a more efficient trucking industry.

There is no doubt that national prosperity and government support were important influences in improving "big business' image" in America after 1945 to a population which was before wary and suspicious of its meaning for the well-being of society. Blackford and Kerr indicate another important influence in altering this image:

> "The production miracles of World War II did much to restore public faith in the business system, but the fact that the executives of the large corporations were a self-selected elite whose powers and privileges lay hidden from view accounted for the second main direction of public relations, to impress upon the public the notion that the large corporations were socially responsible... Big business required individuals to fit into the complex maze of organization charts, and big businessmen wielded power through committees and other group activities. The large-scale organization did not seem to reward the individualism American traditionally admired, but public relations efforts helped the American public to adjust to the institutional realities of big business..."(1986: 431-432).

How to understand within this context The Human Side of Enteprise? As in the previous chapter, we will see now how appropriate is this book as exemplar discourse of its time.

Let's remember, from chapter two, that these were the years of the "Foundation reports" (Gordon and Howell, 1959 [Ford Foundation]; Pierson, 1959 [Carnegie Foundation]). They were also the years when the first properly academic management journal was founded, and the years when the Academy of Management was defining its separation from "the practitioner." These were the years of making the discipline rigorous

and the practice professional. Implicit in these explorations were questions about the relationship between education and the well being of the economy. As indicated through Bell's (1976) discussion in chapter three, these were the years when to be funded one must have shown the relationship between scientific/technological endeavors and the strength of the economy and society.

In such a society the discourses of "truth and knowledge," and the sustenance of the systems in power are intimately related. Their articulation depends on the possibility of constituting a particular individual subject: one in whom that truth and power gets enacted. McGregor's work is analyzed as one exemplar of constituting the subject which sustain the "truth/power" of society through the organizational disciplines.

Hegemony, Truth, and The Pastoral Subject

In the following paragraphs I discuss some ideas developed by Foucault (1978, 1979, 1983) and discussed by Smart (1986). My interest here is to delineate the relationship between the concept of hegemony, the status of truth, and the notion of the subject as proposed before. This discussion will be helpful in understanding the constitution of the organizational subject as a technology to sustain power/knowledge in the organizational sciences.

My readings stress these relationships by interspersing comments from McGregor (1960) throughout the discussion. At certain points I will also insert commentaries from Galbraith (1958), a text contemporary with McGregor's but which makes almost the opposite arguments. It is interesting to notice that McGregor's arguments followed the acceptable ideas of society at the time. He articulated the discourses for which there already were conditions of possibilities. Galbraith, on the other hand, was bringing a set of "fresh ideas" which were not followed. McGregor was a__voice, repeating the signs already there. Galbraith attempted to inscribe a new writing and failed. But perhaps he knew from the start whose were the hegemonic discourses. He said:

> "Scholarly discourse, like bullfighting and classical ballet, has its own rules and they must be respected. In this arena nothing counts so heavily against a man as to be found attacking the values of the public at large and seeking to substitute his own. Technically his crime is arrogance. Actually it is ignorance of the rules. In any case he is automatically removed from the game. In the past this has been a common error of those who have speculated on the sanctity of present economic goals..." (:350).

Hegemony

Traditionally hegemony has been interpreted as the domination of one individual, group, class, or nation over another. In more modern terms, Gramsci associates the notion of hegemony (in the sense of direction or leadership) as one of force/consent between the state and other organizations in society and the members of that society. (Mouffe and Laclau, 1985) With Focault this notion attains still another definition.

According to Smart, for Foucault hegemony resides in the various complex social techniques and methods fundamental to the achievement of a particular type of relationship in society. In this sense:

> "Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not through force or coercion, not necessarily through consent, but most effectively by way of practices, techniques, and methods which infiltrate minds and bodies, cultural practices which cultivate behaviours and beliefs, tastes, desires, and needs as seemingly naturally occurring qualities and properties embodied in the psychic and physical reality (or `truth') of the human subject" (1986: 160)

Thus, the hegemonic orientation prevails not by overt domination or resigned acceptance but by naturalization. By a general recognition that "this is the way things are, and they cannot be any other way." It is the constitution of the relationship "truth/power."

And what does McGregor have to say?:

> "Industry... is the economic organ of society, of all of us. Its ultimate purpose is to serve the common good" (:24).
>
> "It is natural to expect management to be committed to the economic objectives of the industrial organization. However, the history of social legislation has indicated that society will grant management freedom in its pursuit of

> these objectives only to the extent that human values are preserved and protected. Professions like medicine, education, and law in general maintain high ethical standards with respect to the influences they exert on human beings. In directing the human resources of the industrial organization, management is in a similar position. Here, as elsewhere in our society, the price of freedom is responsibility" (:13-14).

Observe here the "naturalization" of industry as the organ of common good. More striking, observe how the relationship between management and the other technologies of the subject (medicine,... etc.) are established through a rhetoric of responsibility over mind and bodies.

Galbraith has a counterpoint here, which the hegemonic orientation is likely to ignore as "merely an intellectual position:"

> "The trend toward increased leisure is not reprehensible, but we resist vigorously the notion that a man should work less hard while on the job. Here older attitudes are involved. We are gravely suspicious of any tendency to expend less than maximum effort, for this has long been a prime economic virtue" (:336).

Truth

From the above, then, we can say that hegemony cannot be constituted unless "truth" is established, since the truth is what is natural. Foucault analyses what he calls "the regime of truth." He studies "true discourses" which rationalize and legitimate particular courses of action upon the actions of self and others. Central in this analyses has been his recognition that in modern Western society there has been a scientific hierarchization of knowledge. That is another way of saying that what is true or false has become more dependent on whether what is said is recognized as scientific discourse or not. A consequence from that is the disqualification as "true discourses" of

low-ranking knowledge; that is, local and popular knowledge.

This point is of particular importance in this project. As I indicated before, and demonstrated with the readings of Barnard's work, discourses are extremely flexible things. If "truth" is embodied in "true discourses" something beyond the words must contribute to its stability as "truth." It is Foucault's position that there is a political economy of truth. In other words, that what counts as truth depends on economic/political demand and supply. Under the aegis of "science," "truth" is associated with specific institutions and discoursive forms: produced and transmitted by the universities, the military, scientific journals, and media in general; diffused and consumed through education and information. But all this depends on people believing it.

Let's observe the construction of "true discourses" in McGregor's words. Notice how these discourses play on the hegemonic notions already discussed ---they sustain one another--- and how they stress the hierarchization of "true knowledge:"

> "Discussions of the idea of controlling human behavior raise justifiable apprehensions about possible manipulation and exploitation. These concerns are not new, but they will be intensified as the manager becomes more professional in his use of the social science knowledge to achieve the objectives of economic enterprise..." (:12).

> "Every professional is concerned with the use of knowledge in the achievement of objectives... The professional draws upon the knowledge of science and of his colleagues, and upon knowledge gained through personal experience. The degree to which he relies upon the first two of these rather than the third is one of the ways in which the professional may be distinguished from the layman.... It is beginning to be possible for the industrial manager to be a professional in this respect. He can draw upon a reasonable and growing body of knowledge in the

> social sciences as an aid to achieving his managerial objectives. He need not rely exclusively on personal experience and observation... Progress in any profession is associated with the ability to predict and control, and this is true also of industrial management. One of the major tasks of management is to organize human effort in the service of economic objectives of the enterprise" (:3).

But Galbraith also has something to say about the "true discourses":

> "... one of the oldest and most effective obfuscations in the field of social science... is the effort to assert that all work ---physical, mental, artistic, or managerial--- is essentially the same" (:340)

The Pastoral Subject

Thus, who will sustain a society based on "natural hegemony" and "scientific truth"? The answer for Foucault emerged in macro-societal changes: when states refrained from "taking life" and started to "foster life." That is, a change from absolute monarchical powers to the emergence of industrial capitalism. In the latter case new forms of power exercised over life ---anatomo-politics of the human body and bio-politics of the population--- became distinctive features of modern society.

> "These two forms of power are directed respectively to the cultivation of more `useful' and `docile' individuals and to the administration or management of populations, ultimately through measures described as social which since the end of the nineteenth century have centred on the issues of industrial accidents, unemployment, sickness and old age, on questions of assistance and prevention, on questions of workers' demands, of promotion and leisure." (1986: 161).

"True knowledge" becomes then that which will enhance the psychic and physical reality of the individual; and the powerful institutions become those which will foster human well being. In modern society that is the power/knowledge relationships which allow human

beings to recognize themselves as subjects.

Thus, the modern "state" is not a monolitical force which confronts the individual from above but a "matrix of individualization." The apparently diverse institutions of modern society sustain similar discourses which determines what counts as "individuality." Through measures directed to the health, well-being, security, protection, and development of the individual, this pastoral power over the social has become progressively less the function of government and more of other dominant institutions in society.

McGregor's work shows the progressive "pastoralization" of the management subject. Notice how the discourse of management "wellness" ends up being a discourse of "self-control," which is an extreme "individualizing" strategy. The available "discourses of psychology" made it possible for management:

> "Under today's conditions management has provided relatively well for the satisfaction of physiological and safety needs. The standard of living in our country is high; people do not suffer major deprivation of their physiological needs except during periods of severe unemployment. Even then, the social legislation developed since the thirties cushions the shock" (:41).
>
> "We have learned that as a society we can have more of everything we want by specializing individually. However, the price of specialization is dependence on others... Growing up and learning to live in this complex of interdependent relationships is not without its emotional conflicts. Our contrary emotional needs and anxieties are profoundly influential" (:27).
>
> "The concept of integration and self-control carries the implication that the organization will be more effective in achieving its economic objectives if adjustments are made, in significant ways, to the needs and goals of its members" (:50).
>
> "Theory Y points to the possibility of lessening the

> emphasis on external forms of control to the degree that commitment to organizational objectives can be achieved" (:56).

Of course, the above is sustained by a hegemonic fiction:

> "The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest" (:47).

But not everybody believes it. In Galbraith's words:

> "Over the span of man's history, although a phenomenal amount of education, persuasion, indoctrination, and incantation have been devoted to the effort, ordinary people have never been quite persuaded that toil is as agreeable as its alternatives" (:335).

To summarize, according to this analysis the dominant ideas in society are supported by that which counts as truth. In modern society truth has been increasingly associated with "scientific discourses." The value of these discourses is enacted in a political economy throughout a "network" of institutions in society. However, the "institutional power" and "discursive truths" must be centered on individual and social "wellness" before it is "natural" for "individuals" to become subjects of these structures. As a corollary, it is not until a discipline has defined its subject in those terms that it can sustain its power/knowledge.

Foucault's objective was to create a history of the different modes by which human beings in Western culture are made subjects. My readings of McGregor's work are the story of one of those modes: the objectification/subjectification of the management subject.

In these readings I show the appearance of the management subject as we still know it today. McGregor's work enacts the approved version of the "disciplinary subject." My readings highlight that which

still sustains acceptable work in organizational behavior. We have become more "scientific and sophisticated," but this work marked the road we could travel. The principle of integration behind Theory Y was "how to integrate the discipline." It created a compendium which soon thereafter became defined as "organizational sciences."

First, it established the site of scientific knowledge in the discipline and the relationship between "scientific work" at the university and "professional work" in the workplace. More interesting, however, is to notice certain subtleties in the text which further define the relationship between the inside/outside, theory/practice as one of interdependence. In many ways this text deconstructs itself around this issue. That is, even though the text creates the impression that it is counseling managers on what to do with their industrial workers, the fact is that most examples used and recommendations for "testing the theory" focus on white collar, managerial personnel, which was clearly a growing class. Thus, from this perspective what the text is stressing is the control through "self-control" that McGregor has over the managers, the most likely consumers of this work. His text secures the continuation of this relationship.

He says, for example:

> "A number of applications of Theory Y in managing managers and professional people are possible today. Within the managerial hierarchy, the assumptions can be tested and refined, the techniques can be invented and skill acquired in their use. as knowledge accumulates, some of the problems of application at the worker level in large organizations may appear less baffling than they do at present" (:55).
>
> "It is not important that management accept the assumptions of Theory Y. These are one man's

> interpretations of current social science knowledge, and they will be modified... It is important that management abandon limiting assumptions like those of Theory X..." (:245).
>
> "...few of us achieve that degree of emotional maturity which makes us able to accept dependence with complete objectivity. Dependent relationships are sensitive ones" (:27 [my emphasis]).

Second, how to understand the devaluation of experience as a source of knowledge (remember Barnard?) while scientific and professional knowledge is stressed? If we remember the "Foundation reports" it was clear that the "age of vocationalism" in management education had ended. These were important years for structuring the difference of being "an academician in administration." For example:

> "Management is constantly becoming disillusioned with widely touted and expertly merchandized "new approaches" to the human side of enterprise. The real difficulty is that these new approaches are no more than different tactics ---programs, procedures, gadgets--- within an unchanged strategy..." (:42).

We must not forget that science and technology had primacy of funding in the universities. McGregor's text provides a scientific technology of the most common subject in society at the time: the manager; and guarantees for himself a source of funding. He says:

> "Some years ago during a meeting of the Advisory Committee of MIT's School of Industrial Management, Alfred Sloan raised some questions related to the issue of whether successful managers are born or made. I was aware ---as he was--- that his questions were not easily answered. The discussion, however, served to sharpen certain interests I had had for some time in a systematic examination of the many common but inconsistent assumptions of what make a manager... In 1954 the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation made a grant to Alex Bavelas and me to explore some of these ideas more fully" (:v).

However, what is the difference between Barnard's and McGregor's

claims to knowledge? Basically the discoursive "truth" (personal experience vs. science). McGregor's text still depends on "the author's presence and experience," in this case his experience as a scientist versus "the layman." Notice his strategic scorn of "charlatans," and his frequent comparison of "the social sciences" with engineering, medicine, and physics. McGregor provokes a sense of deja-vu. Towne's (1886) and Hotchkiss'(1918) expectations were not quite fulfilled by the late 1950s:

> "...the position of the manager vis-a-vis the social sciences will one day be no different than that of the engineer vis-a-vis the physical sciences or the doctor vis-a-vis chemistry or biology. The professional need not be a scientist, but he must be sophisticated enough to make competent use of scientific knowledge" (:5).

> "The frequent success of the outright charlatan in peddling managerial patent medicine also reflects the consciousness of inadequacy" (:4).

Third, this work is very explicit about a distressing consequence of abundance: the lost of authority over "the individual," as well as the lost of individualism. The understandings that came about to regain control over the subject was a technology of "individualizing" the mass. For example, it was comfortable to be able to recognize "stages of development," "hierarchy of needs," the possibility of management by objectives, role complexity, and testing individual "abilities." Thus, this text provides the hope of regaining prediction and control over the individual based on increasing differentiation of the managed:

> "Every managerial decision has behavioral consequences. Successful management depends ---not alone, but significantly--- upon the ability to predict and control human behavior" (:4).

> "The results so far achieved in the management of business and industry reflects considerable ability to predict and control human behavior. The fact that a company is economically successful means, among other things, that management has been able to attract people into the organization and to organize and direct their efforts toward the production and sale of goods or services at a profit" (:4).

Fourth, related to the above, different from previous "management" texts which put more emphasis on functions and structure of management, or the macro aspect of organization, this work centers on the importance of each individual for maintaining economic well being ---and even for preventing political revolutions. This "psychologizing" of society in discourses that stress the naturalness of economic objectives, and the sickness of those who do not contribute to such objectives (Barnard also called sick those unable to cooperate) define the administrative discourses of "wellness:"

> "Political revolutions often grow out of thwarted social and ego, as well as physiological needs" (:38).

> "The man whose needs for safety, association, independence, or status are thwarted is sick, just as surely as is he who has rickets. And his sickness will have behavioral consequences. We will be mistaken if we attribute his resultant passivity, or his hostility, or his refusal to accept responsibility to his inherent "human nature." These forms of behavior are symptoms of illness --- of deprivation of his social and egoistic needs" (:39)

> "...we will have to abandon the idea that individual and group values are necessarily opposed, that the latter can only be realized at the expense of the former. If we would look to the family, we might recognize the possibilities inherent in the opposite point of view" (:240).

This latter quote is very relevant because it stresses the group and the family as "individualizing" opportunities. The definition of

the family as responsible for "creating and sustaining individuals," rather than as a societal unit per se, is a major critique of the discourses of modernity (e.g. Venn, 1984).

Finally, the text also illustrate the optimism of the times in believing that the road to progress had not only been found forever, but that any societal change in the future would only be of a qualitative nature (upward of course). It is almost as if the announced Hegelian end of history had been found. While the work recognizes that the proposed "technologies" are required due to historical changes in the nature of society, it ignores the possibility of other discontinuities, which could render a technology of the individual obsolete. This latter issue has almost guaranteed the "permanence of the subject" in the management disciplines:

> "If we don't destroy life on this planet before we discover how to make possible for man to utilize his abilities to create a world in which he can live in peace, it is possible that the next half century will bring the most dramatic social changes in human history" (:244-245).
>
> "I believe that the industrial enterprise is a microcosm within which some of the most basic of these social changes will be invented, tested and refined... The fundamental difficulty is that we have not yet learned enough about organizing and managing the human resources of enterprise" (:245).

Barnard entered "pastoral power" into management discourses, but it was McGregor who developed a clear technology of the subject. As the previous discussion illustrates, this is the story of a mode of making human beings into subjects, the most common human beings in Western society: the organizational management subject. And who can resist a

little Barnardian discourse here?:

> "And, if we can learn how to realize the potential for collaboration inherent in the human resources of industry, we will provide a model for governments and nations which mankind sorely needs" (Last three lines of The Human Side of Enterprise: 246).

The next chapter shows the further institutionalization of the "organizational subject" in the face of radical changes in society. The hegemony of this modern subject, of such late creation, was not going to expire in the threshold of postmodernity. The road "toward progress" is paved with the rhetoric of his "staying power."

CHAPTER VI

WITHOUT APOLOGY: THE NATURE OF MANAGERIAL WORK

What we "traditionally" call theoretical work in the organizational disciplines ---which at this point I should reiterate seems like a very recent "tradition"--- tends to enunciate an accepted idea and either extend or refute it with "new developments." The work I have done so far in this dissertation has strayed from that "traditional path." I have not claimed a theoretical position from which I work to overturn or extend previous theory because the first thing I am questioning is precisely the issue of "doing theory." I am starting from a position that asks: What are we now? and problematizes all that is "natural" for us to do.

In chapter two I presented an account of the institutionalization of the organizational disciplines. My purpose was to indicate how the birth and development of the modern practice of education and "knowledge creation" is co-articulated with other practices of their time, which contribute conditions of possibility for the discourses of this one, or any other, educational discipline. In chapter three I discussed how scholars in fields other than management are critiquing the current institutional "production of knowledge." These critiques illustrate how questioning what has appeared as natural activities in the universities belongs to current discoursive formations that are announced as postmodernity. That is, what I am doing here is not just a postmodern critique of our institutional production of

knowledge. I am stating, further, that critiquing the institutional production of knowledge is a postmodern issue. It is from this position that my work can make some sense: when the normal modern practices get to be questioned in their "normalization."

For that questioning to occur, however, one must stand somewhere else, outside those normal modern practices. The ideas of postmodernity discussed in chapter three provide a place to re-cast the natural in not so natural terms. Thus, I can understand the difficulties that may arise for any reader who expects to find the normal development of a dissertation work in management in this dissertation, since I am trying to stay away from it. For example, if I had said at the beginning "These are Foucault's theories and methods ---(and explain them)--- and they support the theories and methods I advance here," I would have been doing exactly the natural. I would have claimed "Foucault's truth" as my truth to develop "a logical argument" for the "knowledge" I am "advancing" here. In so doing I would have fallen exactly in the place from where I am trying to escape: I would have done "the normal." And then it would have been possible for others to do "Foucault" in a "normal management way;" I would have "painted" a "realist Foucault" that would have little to do with Foucault, and a lot with "normal management." Because "normal management" belongs to an order of discourse, to a moment of modernity, that does not and cannot include "Foucault." And I am re-iterating this point since some of Foucault's statements could be used in support of some "normal critiques" inside management discourses. To "do" Foucault for management one must come out of management.

That is, an important part of doing this dissertation has been precisely the doing. It is an attempt at practicing theory in a postmodern sense. Thus, its content is what it is ---questioning how we have created our disciplinary practices, how we have represented them, because that kind of content is a postmodern concern. But questioning that concern also needed to be done differently, represented in a different way, which included re-casting representations of the organizational discourses, of our modes of doing organizational theory, as we have understood them to this point.

My attempt at doing Barnard in chapter four is an illustration of some different modes of representation. In that chapter I was questioning how we came to the agreement that Barnard's work provides theoretical developments applicable to any particular organization ---which is one way to understand how we have created one particular instance of the discipline. But I was questioning it by doing Barnard in a "different mode." I was illustrating the flexibility of discoursive activities which have permitted us to maintain "Barnard" in/for "the tradition of the discipline." It was a demonstration of the Derridian notion of "iteration of the signifier" which, at the same time, introduced the problematics of this issue into our "normal" work. Notice that on working through these ideas I set my own work in a position which cannot claim stable meanings for what I say. I cannot propose my interpretations as a different theory about Barnard's work. But I can propose the possibility of practicing thory in a different mode (e.g. alternative readings over "our classics" which "make present" current possibilities in the discipline).

If chapter four focused on the problematics of signifiyng with discourses, of "making meaning" with signs ---a kind of thing that can be created for and attached to any other thing--- chapter five focused more intently on the conditions of possibility of discourses. That is, on noticing how discourses are involved with, are materials in, other conditions of their time and place. I wanted to mark how "meaning" is achieved by analyzing the functioning of discourse in the production of the social and material "life" of "the modern individual/subject." This was illustrated by working with McGregor's text. In this case McGregor's was an exemplar of "humanistic" discourses inside organizational texts. These were discourses of the social context at those times, and it was "natural" to have them as part of "a newer, revitalized scientific discipline," which may not have been articulated without them (i.e. the important psychologizing discourses of the fifties legitimized and provided further definition for the role of organizational management, inside and outside the university).

On noticing this co-articulation of McGregor's discourses with other practices of society at his time I was also calling attention to the struggles of "this field of knowledge" to demarcate its legitimacy. From this perspective we can further propose that our practice of theory for the past twenty-five years or so has been part of a local struggle. The struggle to maintain a powerful site for our disciplinary discourses.

At this point I also want to make explicit that the struggle expressed here stays away from totalizing discourses either from the right or the left. I am not implying "struggle" as if it were a

concerted activity of one group or class against another. As I will further argue in the concluding chapter, these struggles ---a "discoursive politics"--- is neither politics of discourse nor political discourse.

This chapter is an illustration of that discoursive politics. I will discuss how the conditions of the sixties and early seventies could di-articulate the organizational discourses, which were then attaining their "scientific" stability. Mintzberg's work can be read as one instance of the struggle in the discipline to strengthen that position. What is interesting is its complete focus on and devotion to defining the unified subject of the discipline: a "free standing" subject that depends only on his actions for his existence. The perfect intentional actor, predicated as rational even in his irrationality. A manager who, different from McGregor's manager, does not depend on his relationship to others to be who he is. For example, the interdependent relationship management/managed which articulated McGregor's discourses is transformed into one of <u>the purposes</u> for Mintzberg's manager. The latter's manager does not need <u>the managed</u> to be who he is. He is <u>the definer</u> of who the managed can be. As I will discuss next, to theorize a condition of interdependence between manager/managed could have been a dangerous stance to take in the late 60s.

Reading The Nature of Managerial Work

Reading Mintzberg in the context of the sixties and early seventies is a fascinating enterprise. Any "straight" management text read against the grain of the counterculture movement is likely to show a stark absence of sensitivity to such an "environment." However, probably no other text could illustrate better than The Nature of Managerial Work the organizational disciplines' trends toward separation from the rest of society at that point in time ---nor could any other text illustrate better the internal disciplinary struggles that were then unfolding.

We must remember first that Mintzberg was a student during the sixties, and that his book was developed from his doctoral dissertation, completed in 1968. From this, wouldn't it be possible to ask what kind of mark the sixties left in this text? Weren't those the years of student revolts? Could one have been a student in a major American campus at that time and not be touched by the counterculture? Could silence about the social issues of the sixties in a late sixties text be anything but an overt mechanism of exclusion, especially when the text deals primarily with a social image ---capitalist management--- which was widely implicated in the issues of those times?

The `68 dissertation [what a year for a Quebecois to have completed this dissertation! Remember May `68 in France?] "inspired" the first printing of the book in 1973. The edition I am working from is the 1979 reprint. I want to digress for a minute here and come back to the significance of this second reprint.

The first part of this chapter's title (Without Apology) was taken from Sayres et al. (notice, 1984) The 60s Without Apology. In the introduction the editors state:

> "The 60s is merely the name we give to a disruption of late-capitalism ideological and political hegemony, to a disruption of the bourgeois dream of unproblematic production, of everyday life as the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, of the end of history... In the 60s, the anti-work ethic was thus introduced... "Free time" replaced the pride of the craft upon which the trade union and laborist tradition had been built.
>
> ...The 60s also saw the emergence of new historical subjects, or at least groups that constituted themselves as subjects on the basis, for instance of sex and race. Having formed social movements, these subjects contested institutional spaces but also declared a sort of counterhegemony to the dominant social and ideological power... The women's movement played with the language of domination and imposed on American society a bi-gender pronoun convention (his/her) to replace the ordinary masculine usage...
>
> Blacks, as opposed to Negroes, were of course another new subject, constituted on the foundation of an older black nationalism... A new vocabulary followed. Afro-American became the sign of militant identity...
>
> The 60s was also a time when new global perceptions permeated public discourse. It was the first time in this century that anti-imperialist protest came to dominate the overall political agenda of the nation; the global domination of capital was challenged from within on a more serious scale than ever before... the first time that discrimination based on circumstances of birth (such as race) became the object of political contestation at global level..
>
> ... reflecting the radical displacement in those years of homogeneity itself, we make no claim that ours is a complete account. We put this work before the reader in the form of an intervention, and we do so without apology" (1984: 2-9).

Did Mintzberg have anything to say in 1979 about his 1973 (1968's inspired) book? His book only uses masculine pronouns to refer to "the manager," or any other subject of its interest for that matter. Women, Blacks, the EEO are never separatedly or specifically

acknowledged as relevant issues in the workplace. The only more explicit reference to any of these, by then recent, major social changes is made in pages 184-185 (out of a total 198 pages in the book) by saying:

> "Any organizational unit exists because certain people ("influencers") created it and others are prepared to support it. To the managers falls the difficult task of keeping this coalition of influencers together... people are increasingly seeking greater freedom in, and control of, their workplaces... Hence, the manager will have to face a new set of influences, this time from below. The coalition will be broadened with some power given to the employees who work for him... The coalition is being attacked from the outside as well. Where once businessmen could seek to satisfy only shareholders, and university presidents could answer primarily to trustees, today they must react to a diverse array of influencers. Indeed, the top managers of large corporations are becoming more and more like political leaders, engaged in balancing acts among pressure groups of every conceivable kind. It will not help the manager to question the legitimacy of these demands... Social issues come to the forefront --pollution, treatment of minority groups, attitudes toward consumers. Where power is concentrated, as it is in the large corporation, there is a natural tendency for people to analyze its use and to expect it to be applied explicitly for the public good.
>
> The influence of this trend on the top manager's job will be profound. He will be forced to give more attention to the external roles, liaison, spokeman, and figurehead, in order to maintain rapport with various pressure groups, and to the negotiator role in order to deal with their conflicting demands..."

Did Mintzberg have in 1979 any apologies for his 1973 blandness, avoidance of profound social issues, or insensitivity to what by the end of the 70s were clearly permanent social changes? Here is a partial reproduction of his Preface to the 1979 reprint:

> "The current volume is identical to the original book published... in 1973, with one exception. The original appendices... have been deleted... Meanwhile, the shortening of that edition by almost 100 pages should make the book

more accesible to students and managers.

As for other, more significant changes, I believe it is still too early to consider making them... I should also add that as I look through the book in 1979, I remain for the most part happy with what I wrote in the early 70s.

What has changed is my perspective of what I wrote back then. In 1973, I felt I was simply trying to replace a worn-out description of managerial work. But having had six years to see the book through the eyes of others, I now find in it broader meaning: essentially the putting into question of some conventional views about rationality and bureaucracy...

In the space of one week after an article on this book appeared in The New York Times (October 29, 1976), I was called... to be interviewed on morning shows. In both cases, the callers... expressed pleasure that someone had finally `let managers have it.' Of course this book does no such thing. In fact, I am amused by the fact that the only people who seem to appreciate its message more than program assistants are managers themselves. Time and time again, I have been told: `You make me feel so good. All this time I thought I was doing something wrong..." (1979: xv-xvi).

And that is exactly the case. Mintzberg does not have anything to apologize for. Every attempt at "misreadings" of the 1973 edition are "straightened" in the 1979 edition. On the one hand, he recognizes the need "to see the book through the eyes of others," thus accepting the inevitability of dissemination of meaning. But he is also quick on curtailing the proliferation of those meanings ---that is, in the "authorized version," authorized by the author himself, he would never `let the managers have it.' He writes for the managers, to have them feel good. The book is an apology for those unsung heroes of society: the managers. Let's hear Mintzberg's voice again in his Preface to the original edition:

> "I... decided that I would endeavor to create a book with wide appeal, one that would have an impact on practicing managers and staff people as well as on academics and their students. I felt that there were too many misconceptions in the field, that managers had had enough of

> the fact-free wisdom of the armchair, and that they were ready for a new look at their job, substantiated by systematic research" (1973: xviii).

And so he wrote the ultimate eulogy for the managers. And made sure that, in the process, the managers would notice that he was not "sitting around" anymore. The managers' "truth" was not going to be fact-free; it was going to be close to reality, thanks to Mintzberg's systematic research.

In the following section I present some major aspects of this book. Departing from the contextualizing and intertextualizing strategies that I have been following in the previous two chapters, here I show Mintzberg's text against a partial listing of important national and world events between 1961 and 1971. This deconstructive strategy dramatizes the manner by which the criticized text functions as a mechanism of exclusion/inclusion. As mentioned before, the text explicitly ignores most social issues of its time, many of which could have direct relevance to the managers' job. But, at the same time, that ignorance punctuates the author's awareness about the issues. First, he cannot address them directly in a negative manner, since that was to fall in contempt of legal mandates. Second, he cannot ignore them and maintain the hierarchical relationship manager/managed ---which is clearly punctuated in previous "humanistic" management discourses. To do so was to sustain the manager's dependence on the managed, and the manager's "social responsibility." Given the conditions of society, the managers would be in a difficult position if the second route was taken.

The text is a solution to this paradox. It is constructed around a notion of a free-standing manager, not dependent on anybody

else for his being --- the manager as Being (in a Heideggerian sense). But Heidegger's Being, as I discussed in chapter one, could only be articulated in silence --- and this text is certainly not silent about the manager. Thus, what is the opposition, the "other," against which this "free standing" manager stands? How is he articulated?

The manager is articulated as the boundary marker. His is the body that imposes limits to transgressions (who can be a manager? not Blacks, not women, not "others") but his mind is not his'. He is just given the "mantra" which we are about to read. The "mantra," ---the repetition of these points which form almost the whole body of this text--- produces the ultimate hegemonic dream: it is the Rule of the Father, self-present, free-standing, needed but un-needing, the creator of objects of desire and his controller. My commentaries in the middle column unites the "insider's mantra" to its "outside." They point at the fictions which are present in the textual absences.

The Managers' "Mantra": Ten Working Roles

"The manager is that person in charge of a formal organization or one of its subunits. He is vested with formal authority over his organizational unit, and this leads to his two basic purposes. First, the manager must ensure that his organization produces its specific goods or services efficiently. He must design and maintain the stability of its basic operations, and he must adapt it in a controlled way to its changing environment. Second, the manager must ensure that his organization serves the ends of those persons who control it (the "influencers"). He must interpret their particular preferences and combine these to produce statements of organizational preference that can guide its decision-making. Because of his formal authority the manager must serve two other basic purposes as well. He must act as the key communication link between his organization and its environment, and he must assume responsibility for the operation of his organization's status system" (1979: 166).

1961

John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as President of the United States

I wonder if JFK had a simple role as figurehead?

As figurehead, the simplest of managerial roles, the manager is a symbol, required because of his status to carry out a number of social, inspirational, legal, and ceremonial duties

Lumumba, the radical Congolese leader is murdered

The leader role defines the manager's interpersonal relationships with his subordinates.

He may not have been a good subordinate

Invasion of Cuba at Bay of Pigs

the liaison role focuses on the manager dealings with people outside his own organizational unit

This role did not quite work here.

Gagarin becomes first man in space

Interstate Commerce Comisssion desegregates bus/train stations

Through the leader and liaison roles, the manager gains access to priviledged information and he emerges as the "nerve center" of his organization.

Not in space, nor in desegregation. The "nerve center" not always transports the information.

The Berlin Wall

Seems ironic to talk about monitoring here.

As monitor the manager continually seeks and receives external information from a variety of sources to develop a thorough knowledge of his millieu.

1962

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS): The Port Huron Statement

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Disseminator or inseminator? Still, public relations were working quite well during the 50s. Not quite at this point.

As disseminator the manager transmits some of his internal and external information to individuals outside his organizational unit. He acts in a public relations capacity.

John Glenn, first American to orbit Earth in space.

And Glenn was certainly in control here. Or was it Mission Control?

As entrepreneur the manager is responsible for the initiation and design of much of the controlled change in his organization.

1963

King's Letter From A Birmingham Jail

Massive civil rights March on D.C.: "I have a dream"

Who was in control? How were resources allocated?

As resource allocator the manager oversees the allocation of all his organization's resources and thereby maintains control of its strategy-making process.

Assassination of JFK

I see. I wonder who was in charge?

Finally, as negotiator the manager takes charge when his organization must have important negotiations with another organization (1979: 55-99).

1964

Free Speech Movement begins at Berkeley

Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man

Congress passes the Civil Rights Act

King receives the Nobel Peace Prize

Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique

What is with the manager that makes him different? I do not have a program. But I am more than one dimension. Free? Rights? Peace? Mystique?

Science in the Job. Managers use a whole repertoire of general-purpose programs in their work. Faced with a particular task, the manager chooses, combines, and sequences a set of programs to deal with it... In addition, the manager has some special purpose programs. He uses one --the scheduling program-- to control his activities and determine the sequence of tasks to be executed... The current reality is that all these programs are locked in the manager's brain, not yet described by the management researchers.

1965

First regular US combat troops in Vietnam

The first teach-in at the University of Michigan

Large-scale bombings of North Vietnam

Anti-war march on D.C.

The Voting Rights Act is signed

Malcolm X is assassinated

Ah, Yes! research! knowledge! some have it and some don't, who can teach in this simulacrum?

Napalm! who researched it? who did?

They were probably over-burdened

There can be no science of managing until these programs are demarcated, their contents specified, the set of them linked into a simulation of managerial work, and particular ones subjected to systematic analysis and improvement.

To sum up, we find that the manager, particularly at senior levels, is overburdened with work. With the increasing complexity of modern organizations and their problems, he is destined to become more so... It is these very characteristics of the work that impede attempts to improve it.

1966

King comes out against the war in Vietnam

The National Organization for Women (NOW)

Louis Althusser's, For Marx

1967

Black uprisings in the United States, e.g. Detroit

Six-Day War (Israel)

Che Guevara is killed in Bolivia

Siege of Pentagon

NOW adopts the Bill of Rights for Women

1968

Student uprisings in Warsaw and Mexico City

Student uprising at Columbia University, N.Y.

May '68 in France

King is assassinated
Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

There are those who work and there are those who think.
You should not do both but how to provide guidance if you don't tell me!

Perhaps this way it will be possible to do without the unruly subjects

It appears that they weren't teaching too well in Warsaw, Mexico, NY or France

The researcher has had immense difficulty trying to describe work of this nature... The evidence from the professions is that the analyst must take a major responsibility for bringing science to bear on the performance of work. The practitioner is busy; his job is to do the work, not to analyze it. The management scientist has so far effected little change in the job of managing. Unable to understand the manager's work and describe his programs and unable to gain access to his information. Hence, the manager continues to manage as he always has, receiving little help from the management scientist... Society loses, because it looks to its senior managers for solutions to its major problems.

To take advantage of the help possible from management scientists, the manager must somehow share his information with them. The result could be the establishment of entirely new and more effective ways of managing.

The management school will significantly influence management practice only when it becomes capable of teaching a specific set of "skills" associated with the job of managing. Just as the medical student must learn diagnosis and the engineering student must learn design, so also must the student of management learn leadership, negotiation, disturbance handling, and other managerial skills.

How could anybody be talking about management "skills" then? I was doing my MBA and truly thought I was going to make the world better.

1969

Woodstock and Altamont music festivals

League of Black Revolutionary Workers founded in Detroit

What kind of a revolution?

As has been emphasized, management schools have so far given little attention to the development of basic managerial skills; hence they have really done little to train managers... Skill training will probably be --and should be-- the next revolution in management education.

Certain words do "creep in"

US puts man on the moon

Trial of the Chicago Eight

Richard Nixon

Why this obsession with understanding?

1970

Kate Millet, Sexual Politics

Cambodian invasion; Kent State murders

Black September in Jordan

Senate holds ERA-hearings, the first since 1956

1971

Attica Prison rebellion

New York Radical Feminist stage Speakout Against Rape

Fourth World Manifesto by Detroit Feminists and Indochinese Women

For whom?

In what name is anybody claiming the ability to reprogram me, the unruly? Who can talk about success?

Success for Whom?
And for What?

Managers use programs that are not now well understood. The management scientist must help reprogram the manager's work; he must specify the manager's programs in detail and redesign them with a view to better performance... much of the manager's work lends itself to partial reprogramming, whereby the manager can work with the management scientist (or with the computer) in a type of man-machine system. The manager defines the issues and provides some of the input information, the scientist provides the time and the analytical capability.

The success of the teacher of managers and of the management scientist will depend on the success of the researcher [to] provide them with better descriptions of the job...

[M]ost significant, we must describe managerial work as a system of programs. Our ability to prescribe improvement hinges on our ability to describe reality precisely. We shall develop a science of managing only when efforts of this type are successful.
(1979: 167-198).

Who Authorizes This Manager?

In commentaries about Foucault's work, Gordon (1985) notices the changing meaning of "truth" to be spoken about a person: from the feudal bond where "truth" was the authentication of the individual by reference to others and his ties with others, to the medieval development of the religious practice of the confessional, where "truth" became the discourse that an individual is capable of conducting about himself (see also Luhmann, 1986).

What is the relevance of these comments here? First, we may notice that they point at moments in Western history where specific notions about the person became possible out of particular institutional approvals. And second, these notions about the person came to represent ideologies that informed those institutions. Out of these discourses of the past we have inherited conditions of possibility for various notions about the person, now co-mingling in the complexities of modern society. On the other hand we have mostly chosen to ignore the ideologies that informed these discourses. But they are there, everytime we speak "the truth."

The discourses of "managerial individuation" expressed in Barnard's work were very explicit in recognizing individual ties to others, and were also explicit in assessing the problems posed by these ties when personifying the executive as locus of individual action. Barnard's discourses, tied to his time, also show his broad liberal education and his ability to understand the philosophical issues

involved in the position he was taking. It is worth noticing here Andrews' naivete when he criticizes Barnard for being "...less interested in a living, growing person than in the abstract `Individual'..." (1968: xiii).

McGregor's work deals with the problematics of "self-and-other" introduced by Freudian and other psychologizing discourses which gained popular currency during his time. As a "social scientist" he is well versed in these discourses and capable of theorizing an elegant middle of the road "interdependent position." Mintzberg's manager, however, had to be capable of conducting a discourse about himself. Thus, he first declares the manager free of interdependence:

> "Every manager faces an imposing array of pressures in his job. As a result, he appears to react far more than he acts of his own free-will. But closer examination discloses two important degrees of freedom ---the latitude to develop certain long-term commitments..., and the right to turn obligations to his own advantage. In other words, all managerial jobs are constraining; only the strong willed managers control their jobs, whether they be chief executives or foremen... But it is my personal belief that managerial jobs are not inherently constrained or inherently open-ended simply because they are at a particular organizational level; managers at any level can exhibit a wide range of job control, depending on job design and their individual abilities to cope with the pressures... But we cannot conclude that his job allows for less personal control. At all levels the pressures are great; in most jobs, no matter what the level, it is the incumbent himself who determines whether he will control the job or the job will control him" (1979: 112-113).

And then he makes the manager a "human universal":

> "With regard to culture, for example we have the finding of Stieglitz (1969) that non-US chief executives ranked external relations as more important and planning as less important than American chief executives did. He suggest that this may be attributable to the American preoccupation with management science and professionalism,

> to an emphasis on growth, or, perhaps, to the inability to plan in societies with unstable political climates... Irkson et al. (1970) ...contrasting the work of senior managers in... England and... USA found that the latter appear to have greater belief in the principles of scientific management. Curiously, however, the empirical studies of the actual work activities of managers appear to show no variations by country... Evidence from... Carlton (1951) in Sweden, Stewart (1967) in Great Britain, and Dubin and Spray (1964) in America suggest that the basic charasteristics of managerial work know no national boundaries" (1979: footnote pp 103-104).

And, presto! Mintzberg had created a manager capable speaking the "truth" about himself, and to confess. How can we understand the "confessional position" of Mintzberg's manager? First, by understanding the changed position of the manager in the society of the sixties, and his need for separation from that society which he cannot "manage." Second, by understanding the position of "the manager" in a discipline where a "new class" was emerging since the "Foundation reports" --- the "management scientists", the new "wonder kids" of complex mathematical operations and computer prowess. And Mintzberg does not have to understand any historical and philosophical nuances to comprehend where he stands. It comes out loud and clear in spite of himself.

Gordon cites Nietzsche saying that Western history has bred "an animal with the right to make promises. Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security (sic) for his own future, which is what one who promises does!"(1985: 88). Thus, Mintzberg concocts a modern animal (the manager) with the right to make promises, and provides him with a technology, "the mantra," for creating an image of himself which provides that security. But security for whom? For

the managers? Or for Mintzberg?

Notice in Mintzberg's words, reproduced in the previous section, his strategy for making the "management scientist" depend on the manager, on serving him ---reducing the threat that the senior managers may have been facing by their inability to deal with the "whiz kids." Mintzberg is not too subtle when pointing at "the scientists'" ignorance and presumptuousness. For example, in the preface to the 1973 edition he comments that what made him decide to study `what managers do' for his dissertation was attending a conference on the impact of the computer on the manager and witnessing "...the frustration of leading thinkers in the field who were blocked by an ignorance of the top manager's job" (1979: xvii). And some other "telling" comments: "The management scientist must learn to work in a dynamic system, he must develop methods which, although less elegant than those he now uses, will be better suited to the problems of policy-making. His methods must be adaptive and they must operate in `real-time' ---while issues are current" (1979: 185-186). And another: "Management science must become once again the application of basic analysis ---clear, systematic thinking with a reliance on explicit data--- to the problems of management" (1979: 196).

On an similar footing, teaching also depends on the manager, whereby management schools, as he commented above, should provide managerial skills training. But notice now the interesting twist in this hierarchization of knowledge. Both the teacher and management scientist exist to serve the manager, and they both depend on... who else but the researcher!!! See the end of the previous section, and

more explicitly, observe these words in the second to last paragraph of the book: "We cannot longer afford to ignore managerial work as an area of research. It is the researcher, feeding knowledge to the manager and management scientist, who will ultimately determine the ability of our large bureaucracies to cope with their immense problems" (1979: 198).

... And so, we were all sanctified in the name of the Father (the manager), thanks to Mintzberg's work in extracting confessions from his "subject of knowledge." Or as Foucault said quoting Servant:

> "... When you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you may then pride yourself in being the guide and master. An imbecile despot can bind his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them more tightly with the chain of their own ideas, its end attached to the solid base of reason --- a bond which is all the stronger because we are ignorant of its sustance and believe it to be of our own making; time and despair can wear down bonds of iron or steel, but can do nothing against the habitual union of ideas except tie them more firmly still; and it is on the soft fibres of the brain that the unshakeable base of the strongest empires is to be founded" (1979: 102-103).

While Mintzberg, as quoted above, said: "The current reality is that all these programs are locked in the managers' brain not yet described by the management researchers." Thus, Mintzberg (1980) won the struggle on his own terms, safely speaking to Bill and Barbara from his Quebecois refuge. Most of us (Peters and Waterman are but one exception ---and then, it took them some time) could not understand the message... Its conditions of possibility were not provided in our institutional order. Our institutions continued to pursue the "elegant separation" of the management scientist --- who was never able, nor cared to learn, how to extract any "true confessions."

CHAPTER VII

PAST THE IDEOLOGY OF BEING PERFECTLY CLEAR

It seems only appropriate that in this very space I set out to deconstruct the title I have just written for this chapter. I cannot "think" of a better activity with which to start a "summarizing statement" of what "I" did in the "previous" chapters -----Notice all the fictions in this statement:

Think is "think" because whatever those thoughts may be it is only the writing of think which conveys meaning to that which you are interpreting as my thoughts when reading these words.

Summarizing statement is "summarizing statement" because the summary is another writing, a different text, which by pretending to restate the said it is pointing at what the "said" is lacking. The innocence of "a summarizing statement" is already implicated in a strategy of supplementing what is first presented as "whole."

I is "I" because there is none in this text. I exist here in the possibility of being repeatable on the printed page; and in the conventions by which others accept the understanding of an I which "I" can write here.

Previous is "previous" because it is used to mark this chapter, to make it present. Thus I must refer to an absence ("the previous"). But on doing this I am making the___previous present by implying its precedence to "this chapter."

Now let's try this:

PAST must be "past" because this idea is given by a philosophy of transcendence, of progress, which I have been trying to underline as problematic in the previous chapters.

IDEOLOGY must be "ideology" (especially when given as THE ideology) because traditionally it has meant something which prevents knowing, or which mystifies, the truth. But I have stated already the problematic status of "truth" in the position I have taken throughout the project. Thus, making problematic the notion of truth makes even more problematic a notion of ideology resting on it.

BEING must be "being" because it is a concept which requires accepting a transcendental subject, capable of being present to itself and/or capable of knowing itself in its sensed experience (starting with the Cartesian `cogito'). My questioning of both the positivist and the phenomenological positions about "the self" addresses the difficult status of this self-present being as origin of knowledge.

PERFECTLY must be "perfectly" because perfection can only exist in its difference from the imperfect, which is the "common term." In the perfect/imperfect pair we privilege the first term but, how do we tell what is perfect? Have you ever seen a PERFECT PERFECT?

CLEAR must be "clear" because it opposes opaque. To be opaque implies lying... not saying the truth. But if anything is proposed as truth we must be capable of lying about it (otherwise we cannot call it truth since we would not notice its difference from lying). But we have

already stated difficulties with proposing truth --- and that also makes difficult proposing lying. If truth can be lying, could clear be opaque? The editorial policy of the Academy of Management Journal says: "Articles should...be written as concisely as possible without sacrificing meaningfulness or clarity of presentation" (1986, 1: 2).

Now, let's do the title again:

"past" "the ideology" OF "being" "perfectly" "clear"

Oops!! I forgot the OF --- But I can discount it as a "language problem", my own mode of expression... I have difficulties with "the possessives"... Not very innocent those "possessives".... To possess, to own... What do I own?... not a nationality, I am just "naturalized" (normalized?) ---hispanic, an entryway, a ticket, a condition of possibility--- I better drop it

So... and now.... THE TITLE!!!!

"past the-being-perfectly-clear ideology"

At this point I feel like I may as well drop it all together. As Culler remarks, one may see deconstruction as an activity by which one:

> "...is sawing the branch on which one is sitting," ---but then he goes on to state--- "though it is unusual and somewhat risky, it is manifestly something one can attempt. One can and may continue to sit on a branch while sawing it. There is no physical or moral obstacle if one is willing to risk the consequences. The question then becomes whether one will succeed in sawing it clear through, and where and how one might land... If [it] seems foolhardy to men of common sense, it is not so for Nietzche, Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida; for they suspect that if they fall there is no "ground" to hit and that the most clear-sighted act may be a certain reckless sawing, a calculated dismemberment or deconstruction of the great cathedral-like trees in which Man has taken shelter for millenia" (1982: 149).

Thus, one may ask, what is all this "deconstructionist" business about? What is the "big deal" about it? ... and again the temptation of "being perfectly clear" surfaces... I may say it is only a discussion about philosophy, traditionally understood as a "foundational discipline" ---cradle of knowledge--- and how it can been seen as a form of writing. Philosophy-as-writing makes philosophy's foundational claims quite difficult to sustain, as we may now understand. Therefore, one may think that Derrida ---that deconstructionist par excellence--- has his own gambit against philosophy and that he will do everything possible to see it "out of circulation." Right?.... Wrong. It may be surprising to some that Derrida has been widely involved with GREPH. This group has been working <u>against</u> educational reforms that would reduce the role of philosophy in French schools, and reorient education towards what is touted as "technological requirements of the future job market" (sounds familiar?).

Derrida's work in this regard indicates the importance of philosophy not as a "foundational discipline" but as a critical discourse which is explicitly concerned with the politics of knowledge. In other words, there is no Western "knowledge" that does not stand on some "philosophical position." Our "world views" are predicated upon specific concepts like "origin" and "truth" which are not devoid of "a position" and which live on in particular discoursive formations. The ignorance of the possible philosophical positions, and of the role of philosophy in the history and politics of Western education, would permit the uncontested dominance of particular institutional philosophies --more dangerous when they stand on a denial of taking a "philosophical position."

This is perhaps one aspect of Derrida's work sometimes overlooked. But, in fact, one might question whether the deconstructionist project will make sense without an implication in the institutional domain. That is, Derrida's project is about the assumptions and conditions of discourse, and about frameworks of inquiry. It cannot separate itself from the structures that govern "practices, competencies, and performances." Two of his texts in English (1982; 1983) are good illustrations of these issues, but see also Ulmer (1985) and Culler (1982).

And what about Foucault? What is his connection to all this? It is precisely through the relationship between discoursive formations and institutional structures that one can understand the closeness of these two figures in what otherwise may seem like two very distinct projects.

What Derrida calls "the general text," of which history and institutional traditions are a part, is proposed as that which unbinds and bounds the context for interpretations. It is what makes unlikely a theory of "the anything goes," of total anarchy, which so many people fear. The "anything" that "goes" is already marked by its limits ---i.e. that which "didn't go" because it was not within the conditions of possibility. Foucault's projects, which deal with unraveling "the history of the present" and the relationships power/knowledge/subject, focus precisely on the conditions of possibility for the mutual sustenances of discoursive formations and institutional arrangements. At every moment what was said, and the structures through which it could be said, form the chain of traces from an irrecoverable "origin" of meaning to the place we stand today.

With these comments I am defining a frame around the project which, at least for now, I hope to finalize in this chapter. It is a way to re-mark the institutional connections delineated in chapter two with the rest of the project. It is to say, in no uncertain terms, that we are all implicated in the definition of our institutional order by the boundaries we have established around our disciplines, and by the way we have been able to say what we have said. My explorations of these issues, very tentative and not quite forceful, have only been an attempt to open other conditions of possibilities for the discipline; to investigate, like Derrida has done with philosophy, the opportunities for the organizational disciplines to become a critical discourse, a primary supplement.

But, as it could already be felt by the reader, this is more easily said than done. The amount of work required to elicit any transformation of the "discipline," and the complexities and ambiguities inherent in the "why and how" of it, may make such a project undesirable at best, and impossible at worst. As theory goes, I believe that having done this work attests already to its possibilities. Thus, I will concentrate now on creating an argument for its desirability. It is my position that how desirable such a project may be would largely hinge on how accessible it could be. What will be written in the following pages would hopefully point in that direction.

First, I will re-iterate the relationship of poststructuralism and deconstruction to the periodizing notions of modernism/ postmodernism. Second, I will emphasize the importance of deconstructing specific disciplinary contexts in the transition from the modern to the postmodern, ---and how deconstructing organizational discourses is of particular importance. Third, I will outline a program for the transition, and indicate what becoming a postmodern critical discourse would entail for the "organizational sciences."

Poststructuralism and a Postmodern Discipline

As I said in chapter one, I believe that understanding postructuralism is a necessary condition for anybody interested in working from a postmodern stance for the organizational disciplines. The idea of not having a "stable ground for knowledge" is the first step

for reconsidering what we mean by "knowledge." The issues we are dealing with here are as fundamental as claiming the impossibility of empirical knowledge on the basis of "science." It is observing how what can be claimed as knowledge is implicated in a network of conditions ---discoursive, institutional, social--- that include/exclude what can and cannot be "said." They are the context of science/fiction.

Deconstructing discourses of "knowledge" becomes a step in unraveling the fictive character of "truth." But this step should also be taken with recognition that deconstruction is not just criticizing any discourse ---i.e. to claim that a discourse was lying and that our critique discovered the truth--- since that would amount to doing more of the same. Deconstruction is first, noticing that our discourses are full of philosophical terms that have had their "roots" in the Western history of philosophy. Thus, Derrida's deconstruction of issues of presence/absence, soul/body, meaning/form, intuition/expression, etc. show how certain philosophical and linguistic positions have made their way into our current thinking and saying as if they were the only possible "truth." Second, deconstruction implies that we may undermine "the official versions" but that we cannot then claim to "know the Truth." Third, it also implies taking another step and asking: How does one live when the Truth is not possible anymore? What other questions can one ask? What other voices could be heard? This realization is particularly frightening when one's life has been constructed around the fiction that what one does is to "discover truth" and to "advance knowledge."

Similarly, Foucault's "archeologies and genealogies" make us pay attention to institutional relationships, and the "objects and subjects" which get constructed out of these relationships. The specific institutionalized practices that he points at ---like prisons, and sexual practices--- are not just "any" historical practices. They are particular constitutions of "subjects" which have permitted certain institutions to live on; and certain individuals to be excluded ---to constitute "the included."

However, "summarizing Derrida and Foucault so that we can use it in management" is a work I will not, nor can I, do. That would be equivalent to what we have done so often: transporting and appropriating other disciplines' "truth" for "management purposes." Rather, it is necessary for us to understand how implicated our institutions and our discourses are in the philosophies and epistemes Foucault and Derrida have discussed throughout their work. What I am saying is that <u>doing theory</u> in "a different mode," be it in the organizational disciplines or any other "modern discipline" requires at least some awareness of Western history and philosophy, ---and of the history of philosophy--- and then to understand how that history and philosophy constituted our understanding of "our modern selves." That is how Foucault and Derrida can be of help for us.

Once we accept that our discipline and disciplinary practices and discourses are just one point in the "matrix of the modern" we will realize our need to move into other disciplines which can help illuminate "where we come from." This movement out of our particular

disciplinary boundaries and discourses, to find our "disjointed" selves, is also a step toward participating in the postmodern breakage of "disciplinary boundaries" and in their multiple discourses. We would see our "selves" in those others, and would also see the many other ways that "our Truth" can be reinterpreted in light of them. This is a form of postmodern resistance to the temptations of hegemonic discourses and Grand Unified Theories. And those are already a few steps into our constitution as a postmodern discipline.

Organizational Science: An Exemplar Modern Discourse

One can say that the steps mentioned above may apply to any modern discipline in the university. Nonetheless, there is something special about the "organizational sciences" which impact our current culture differently than other disciplines do. Derrida did not deconstruct just any text ---but philosophical texts because they had a particular claim about "foundational knowledge." Foucault worked on historical documents because they provided keys about discoursive and institutional formations which, by supporting each other, defined what was "normal and possible" and what was not. I may ask now: What about us? Have we not created a very special discoursive-institutional relationship since the mid-1800s in America, and almost everywhere else since the 1940s? Are we not producers/repeaters, the articulators, of a particular institutional order and cultural formation? What do we do at the university? Outside of it? Aren't we the discourses of "the modern

condition?"

I said in previous chapters that in spite of all our efforts to look for "the ultimate theory of organizations" it is obvious now that "organizational practices" have kept on doing what they do quite comfortably, without our theories. They work, with us and without us. Thus, if the organizational practices do not need us, what have we been doing in the universities for so many years? I may say that we have been creating a mode of existence for the organizational subjects. We have re-created and extended a discourse which sustains the hegemonic order of society.

The analyses of Barnard's, McGregor's, and Mintzberg's texts could help us understand three different moments of the discipline when those discourses were articulated. In the first one the discipline was new and looking for some support in society for/from "the benefits of the corporation." Out of that situation, the "official Barnard interpretation" emerged. It made Barnard "an early contributor" in "the progress of knowledge," especially since he was gracious enough to address "the individual." Thus, his text still "lives on" in the making of the management subject. And the Barnard that does not "fit" is either discounted or ignored. In the second one, the military-industrial complex was then pouring funds into "new science and technology." It was necessary to propose a scientific technology of the management subject, and so it happened --- with the extra help of the Foundation reports which legitimized that the "organizational sciences" could borrow the already existing "technologies of the subject" ---e.g.

from psychology. In the third one, "science" was clearly taking over to the dismay of the managers. They could not under/stand the "whiz kids" any longer. Managers were not supposed to be "scientists."

Thus Mintzberg returned everything to its proper perspective. The scientist/researchers belong to the university. From there they can speak the "truth" if they want. But in the "managers' lair" all "scientists" better speak the managers' language. Should it surprise us that In Search of Excellence was a best seller?... But in the meantime we were "doing science." How many research projects in "organizational sciences" get "external funding" in how many universities these days?... We may even say that the little that gets funded at the present serves the main purpose, not of science, but of keeping us at the universities... extending the hegemonic discourses in our courses.

The possibilities for the "organizational sciences" to become critical discourses hinge on our particular knowledge about our own discourses, practices, and institutions. And in our capability for understanding ourselves as widely implicated in maintaining and fueling ---constantly reconstructing--- those discourses and institutions, which determine most of the values of our present society. Ours are the "normalizing" discourses of the modern.

A Program for Postmodernity

How to criticize ourselves becomes then a preliminary step in that direction. How to uncover what we do, and which is so normal? The work done in this dissertation is one example. A form of doing theory as discoursive politics, through analysis of our own discoursive-institutional productions. Because what is important to underline here is that, different from traditional critical theory (e.g. of the Frankfurt tradition) we are not dealing with organized groups or classes which confabulate to oppress another, or with stable ideologies that can be uncovered and denounced. What we are dealing with is the very "normality" of the discourses of everyday life ---i.e. in this dissertation, with the very normal "organizational sciences" discourses. We are dealing with struggles that are very local and normal, and which are articulated in many different ways, at different times, by different people. For example, big spending for the holidays and big debts in February, because it is "the spirit of the season;" or firing an employee because "s/he was not increasing productivity;" or balancing ecological controls with the "economic well-being of the nation;" or being "careful" in defining what counts as "sexual harassment."

Joining other disciplines in the university will help us analyze our practices with a wider understanding of its "different faces," and with more information about "where we come from." What are our values? What do we stand for? Joining other disciplines, however, would also alter the institutional order of the university. In my comments in

chapter three on Bove's (1986), Aronowitz'(1981), and Said's (1984) works I noticed their concerns with making the university participate more fully in the discourses of society. The separation between the university and the rest of society is a very specific American condition ---which, as they noted, has reproduced in its aim for specialization the same de-empowerment created in other forms of work in society. To join the others in an intervention of "everyday life" is a manner of reconstructing the "organizational sciences" in postmodernity. But what do I mean by intervention? It is not to go out and offer the services of "our knowledge" because that is no different from what we are doing today ---i.e. consulting. On what basis are we claiming to own or possess "the truth?" To intervene means to go out and learn from the voices in the margins --- those that do not count as knowledge --- and bring those discourses back into our courses. How does "organization" mean for them? Or can it mean at all?

Can we teach the same? Research the same? ---My position is that what I have outlined above is a very tentative idea based on the possibility that we can outdo our "realist representations." I would say "the same in its difference"... with a postscript/supplement because we know it is not the same. The point is not to do away with the organizational disciplines but to see to their transformation into critical discourses in postmodernity. And the critical question to answer first is: **What would count as knowledge?**

As I have argued in the previous chapters, the conditions of possibility of our current discipline, the closing of interpretations

about what a manager can be, depended on defining a controlled/controlling subject which could sustain the truth/power of its times. This issue has been explored in other non-organizational works beyond Foucault's (e.g. Henriquez et al., 1984; Heller, Sosna, and Wellbery, 1986; Huyssen, 1984). The main point in each case has been the construction of an image of the individual which is balanced, self-centered, normal. Everything that counts as knowledge in "the organizational sciences" has at its core a technology to sustain this subject. To do away with it is to agree that we cannot tell the difference. That anybody can be a manager, and that coming or not to a school of management will not matter one way or another. But we can construct this situation in a different way. We can agree that we have not made such a good society with the millions we have "educated," and we can bring the lack into the discipline--- that primary supplement which is the critical discourse.

How to bring "the other" into the discipline? It has been there all along, constituting its limits. It is, for example, the discourses of women and minorities, other cultures, and the relationship between human/artificial intelligence, all of which are acknowledged as "marginal" if acknowledged at all. And it is to question the relationship between management and the world in every act of "organization" ---to think globally and act locally, as some may say. It is to explore the experience of limits and otherness. It is to have a disjointed self and still be an OK "individual."

What Are We Going to Be in Postmodernity?

Huyssen gives an example of a postmodern "sculpture" in Germany, formed by 7,000 basalt rocks in a triangular formation. The "social sculpture" by Beuys, near a museum, is formed by "planting stones." At any point people can remove a stone and plant a tree in its place, to give life back to an area devastated by the war. In the meantime people are welcomed to touch, sit, and walk through the sculpture; it is everybody's art. This example of transformation, with discontinous substances (rock/tree), the solid (rock) substituted by the fragile (new tree) which may or may not live ---but which in any event makes the public participant in all the substances and all the transformations; and that makes everybody an artist in her/his own terms--- is a very good model of what we can be.

Is not ours the most public of discurses? ---about that entity that everybody knows: organizations--- Would we continue to be keepers of the rocks while shooing the public away?

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